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GRAMMAR AND LOGIC

IN THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AS SEEN IN

A Syntactical Analysis of the English
Language

BY

J. W. F. ROGERS

Inspector of Schools, Sydney

LONDON


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MELBOURNE, SYDNEY, AND ADELAIDE

GEORGE ROBERTSON

1883

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DEDICATION.

TO THE MEMBERS OF ALL ENGLISH-SPEAKING
UNIVERSITIES.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I believe I may claim the honour of being the first to inscribe a scholastic work, or indeed a work of any kind, to you collectively. The circumstance has an important significance. Fifty years ago the idea of addressing groups of universities in every clime speaking the English tongue would hardly have entered the mind of the most far-seeing spectator. Fifty years ago, it would be almost safe to assert, there existed not even the conception of an Anglo-Australian University, while now there are four such institutions active and flourishing. The number of similar establishments in America and India, I know not. In the United States, doubtless, their number and character keep pace with the gigantic strides civilization is making in that wondrously progressive country; and, while so many and such vigorous offshoots are springing into maturity, the universities of the motherland still continue centres of intellectual life to the whole English-speaking race. The great bond of union between all is a common language; and as the future of this language is of necessity interwoven with our destinies as a people, it behoves us to perfect it, and to see that it receives scientific treatment. That it

has not received the treatment it merits in some respects is one purpose of this book to show, and on this account I present it for your acceptance. The science of Philology would advance far more rapidly were it not retarded by the accumulated grammatical errors of centuries, some of which I hope to sweep away. The kindred science of reasoning is similarly hampered. Resting on language as a foundation, Logic, as we have it, is confronted by facts of Grammar and Philology which have long escaped notice; and this to some extent explains the circumstance, which all of you, Ladies and Gentlemen, must have had experience of, that while the practical part of Logic is very valuable, the theoretical part is most unsatisfactory. In view of this I claim your interest in an attempt to grapple with a difficult question from a new standpoint. That my self-imposed task has not been performed with undue haste may be gathered from the following circumstances.

Six years ago this book in manuscript was sent to London, and two of the first publishing houses there expressed a willingness to print it. A favourable estimate of its character was also formed by the proprietor of the *University Magazine*, then the *Dublin University Magazine*, whose letter expressing his opinion is in my possession. Since then the work has been recast, and has now been in hand the full period prescribed by Horace. During the last six years I have paid attention to many new publications on various branches of mental and linguistic science. This has helped to confirm me in my views, especially as in several recent works there are approximations to the improvements introduced in this book. I find, for instance, several allusions to the principle for word-classing, but nowhere is that principle distinctly stated, clearly explained or applied as in this volume. I notice too the exclusion of the copula from more than one recent work on Grammar; but the grounds for that exclusion,

when given, are unsatisfactory, while it is still retained in almost every system of Logic extant.

For much friendly conversational assistance I am indebted to the Very Rev. J. E. Bromby, D.D., of Cambridge and Melbourne; while to Professor M. H. Irving, of Oxford and Melbourne, I owe thanks for at least two very valuable hints, one of which served to inspire caution, and the other, alluded to in the body of the work, confirmed me in my views regarding the nature of logical propositions. I may mention, also, that the simple method of analyzing explained by me was followed by my own pupils as far back as thirteen years ago to their satisfaction, and one very similar was in use at the Geelong Grammar School about the same period; while, in regard to several important grammatical points, the opinion of the head master of that well known institution, Mr. J. B. Wilson, of Cambridge and Melbourne, almost coincided with mine. Indeed, so far as my experience of men and books extends, I have often found clearer views among the former than in the latter, our grammars in particular being replete with absurdities which many high-class schoolmasters repudiate.

I cannot here refrain from a grateful recognition of the sympathetic interest expressed in the present undertaking by the late regretted Chancellor of the Melbourne University, Sir Redmond Barry. Notwithstanding his judicial and other arduous duties, he found leisure to enter with zest into the study of language, and with his own hand sketched for me the plan of a work he himself had commenced on Grammar. One idea in the proposed work must commend itself to every true critic. It was to introduce, as far as possible, a uniform terminology in the grammars of different tongues, so that beginners should not be perplexed with one set of technical terms in Greek, another for the same things in Latin, another in French, and another in English. Such uniformity being secured,

allied languages were to be treated simultaneously, so far as their principles agree, and separately, so far as they differ. Whatever may be thought of the feasibility of this design, the members of the Melbourne University, who cherish the memory of their late Chancellor, will appreciate its philosophical comprehensiveness.

In concluding I wish to express my satisfaction at the improved state of things which gives me the privilege of opening this brief address with the word **LADIES**. Had any lady, fifty years ago, desired to enter a university, she could only have gratified her laudable ambition in the manner in which De Quincey's Spanish Military Nun satisfied her martial instinct, by assuming a garb which should belie her sex. After the successful inauguration of the important reform which admits ladies to our universities, I anticipate less strenuous opposition to that which I aspire to initiate in another direction.

I have the honour to be,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Your obedient servant,

J. W. ROGERS.

MELBOURNE, *1st January*, 1883.

INTRODUCTION.

It has come to be widely acknowledged that Grammar, the science of words, and Logic, the science of reasoning expressed in words, have for a long time been in an unsatisfactory state. Of the former Professor Max Müller says :—

“Grammar, which ought to be the most logical of all sciences, is frequently the most illogical.”

Another professor, formerly holding the chair of Classical and Comparative Philology and Logic in a university, once observed to me that in his opinion “it is impossible to compose a grammar without falling into contradictions.” No further proof, I think, is needed to show that there must be something wrong with Grammar.

With respect to Logic, certain critics, as for instance Professor Blakeley, look upon that science as involved in difficulties insurmountable, or nearly so, to human reason. On the other hand, not a few writers appear under the impression that the works, which they, or the masters they follow, have given to the world, are, if not perfect, substantially correct ; while the works of an opposite school of thought are by them explicitly or implicitly condemned as fundamentally erroneous. Indeed it is not too much to assert that even yet from the definition of Logic to its latest development on almost every question of importance there is dispute among writers of mark.

The object then of this book is not so much to show that confusion exists in the kindred sciences of Grammar and Logic, as to indicate what is wanted to get both into a

more satisfactory condition. From this it is seen I do not despair of the two studies named; though I think I can understand how some have been led to do so. I have limited my efforts to a fixed range of topics, passing by many questions to the right and left of my path that every now and then thrust themselves under notice, not, however, dismissing them without consideration. The points I have touched all connect themselves with the three important questions of—

1. Word-Classing;
2. The Nature of Sentences; and
3. The Nature of Propositions.

These are chief among the topics which I consider the logicians of no age or country have fully investigated; while grammarians have not given enough attention to that part of the matter which specially concerns them. Logical propositions form a species of Sentence. Without, therefore, a just apprehension of the nature of sentences, what the various species have in common and in what they differ, it is impossible to have a thoroughly clear view of the nature of propositions.

With regard to Word-classing, which logicians and grammarians claim as common ground, a settlement of that is essential to a satisfactory treatment of sentences. On this question then I have bestowed some pains; and, it is hoped, with good results. Several of the leading ideas put forward run counter to those generally entertained on the same subjects; but I greatly mistake the temper of the critical world at the present era if this prove a bar to the consideration of the views newly set forth; for neither individual nor collective authority is now admitted as a sufficient warrant for retaining theories which will not bear investigation.

Mr. Mason, one of the most original and painstaking grammarians, in the preface to the fourteenth edition of his English Grammar claims that "no serious attempt has been

made to controvert a single principle" advocated by him in the previous editions of that work. Mr. Mason will find several of the most important of his grammatical teachings impugned in the following pages, and notably his principle for word-classing, which is almost identical with that of Dr. Morell, both, I believe, following the German grammarian Becker; also his treatment of the verb and the copula, and his taking one species of sentence as a type of all the species.

Mr. J. S. Mill holds that a system of Logic, to be sound, must be based on a sound system of Grammar. In the following pages it is shown that several of the most vital parts of the grammatical system on which Mr. Mill has erected his logical superstructure are unsound. If, therefore, as a critic in the *Westminster Review* says, "the most enduring of Mr. Mill's works, and that on which his reputation with posterity will rest," be his *System of Logic* that reputation is in jeopardy.

In further illustration of the mode in which mistakes in grammatical matters may unhinge a whole philosophical system, I would refer to the effect on the logical teaching of Sir W. Hamilton, produced by the theory advanced in the third part of this work regarding the bipartite character of propositions. The Hamiltonian doctrine of predicative quantification, which once created so great a stir, is ruined by it. What renders this more noteworthy is that Mr. Mill, in laying siege to the great Scottish philosopher's position, never looked at its weakest points. Entangled in many of the same errors as his opponent, it is no wonder that Mr. Mill failed to crush Sir W. Hamilton's theory. These two leaders still share between them the allegiance of English-speaking logicians.

One of the most surprising circumstances relating to modern grammarians and logicians is that they commonly appear to ignore the revelations which philologists have made, as for instance regarding verbal terminations. They

cannot dispense with the aid of Philology. Not only, however, are many neglectful of comparative linguistics, but they completely overlook obvious facts which a consideration of their own language might be expected to present to their view. The bearing of Philology on Mental Science is a topic yet untreated, so far as I am aware ; but it will ere long attract notice ; and if the present work contributes to that end it will not have been written in vain.

The principal features in the following work are :—

1. An exposition of the only scientific plan for Word-classing.
2. A consistent definition of the Verb.
3. A rectified theory of Moods.
4. A clear distinction between Assertive and Non-assertive sentences.
5. A simplified system of Syntactical Analysis for the English language.
6. A reformed scheme of Parsing.
7. The establishment, or re-establishment, as some may call it, of the Bipartite Character of Propositions.
8. An intimation of the importance to Logic of results obtained from Philology.

As a consequence of all this is shown the impossibility of retaining much of the prevalent grammatical and logical teaching, if the sciences of Grammar and Logic are to keep pace with modern requirements. At the present day the boundaries of science are extending so rapidly that the quickest and easiest way of teaching and learning everything becomes imperative. So far as Grammar and Logic are concerned, I am of opinion that a satisfactory knowledge of these two necessary subjects can be imparted to students in half the time usually spent on them, and the economy so effected would of course be considerable. Should a careful perusal of this book leave a similar impression upon the minds of experienced judges, its object will have been achieved.

LIST OF WORKS REFERRED TO.

N.B.—*To prevent misconception, it may be stated here that the works in the subjoined list are not cited as "authorities," but for critical purposes.*

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
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24. Brownson's Review, 1853-4, Dolman.
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26. An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, by J. H. Newman, D.D. Third Edition. Burns, Oates and Co., 1870.
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32. Prolegomena Logica, by Dean Mansel. Hammans, Oxon, 1860.
33. The Chinese Mission Grammar, by Philo-sinensis. Batavia Mission Press, 1840.
34. A New Grammar of the English Tongue, by E. J. Howard, M.A. Used in the Government schools Bombay, the Punjab, and Central India. Longmans, 1864.

N.B.—In quoted passages explanatory interpolations by the author of this book are placed within square brackets [].

ERRATA.

- Page xvi., line 7, for "Waltham" read "Walton."
- „ xvi., „ 34, for "Howard" read "Howard Smith."
- „ 2, „ 30, for "would" read "might."
- „ 3, „ 29, for "arose" read "followed."
- „ 9, „ 32, for "arose" read "followed."
- „ 19, „ 24, for "Nineveh" read "Babylon."
- „ 25, „ 14, for "i" read "I"
- „ 46, „ 23, after "similarity" read "in some respects."
- „ 63, „ 24, after "adverb" read "an infinitive or a participle."
- „ 63, „ 31, for "beside" read "before."
- „ 64, „ 21, for "beside" read "before."
- „ 64, „ 35, for "by" read "before."
- „ 65, „ 30, for "beside" read "before."
- „ 65, „ 30, after "preposition" read "to."
- „ 66, „ 22, for "with" read "before."
- „ 66, „ 28, after "adjective" read "an infinitive, a participle."
- „ 71, „ 21, for "several" read "two or more."
- „ 77, „ 30, after "analysis" read "often."
- „ 81, „ 9, after "species" read "and then but partially so."
- „ 86, „ 4, after "itself" read "and the verb in each is used
in a different manner."
- „ 89, „ 7, after "the" read "simple."
- „ 89, „ 18, after "word" read "or phrase."
- „ 91, „ 14, for "had" read "has."
- „ 97, „ 28, after "awhile" read "thee."
- „ 115, „ 24, eliminate "cause, condition, concession."
- „ 159, „ 10, for "mine" read "nine."
- „ 177, „ 13, for "making" read "marking."
- „ 210, „ 19, for "supposed" read "thought."

N.B.—Some Greek accents have been accidentally omitted.



PART I.—WORD-CLASSING.

CHAPTER I.

THE PRINCIPLE FOR WORD-CLASSING.

SECTION 1.—ITS ENOUNCEMENT.

“THE classification of words being,” as Dr. Sullivan well remarks, “the very foundation of grammar,” it is of the highest importance to secure a sound principle for the division of words into classes. In fact a large proportion of the difficulties and disputes, not only of grammarians, but also of logicians, may be traced to the want of this. It might naturally be supposed that the first care of writers on grammar would be directed towards the establishment of a satisfactory principle for word-classing; yet at the present day “none is firmly established or universally received.” Have then the authorities of the last two thousand years altogether overlooked this indispensable requisite? To affirm this would be incorrect. Different principles have by various authorities been put forward, but nowhere has the writer of these pages met with a distinct and emphatic enunciation of the only one upon which the classification of words can be satisfactorily made. Not that there is anything new or startling in the principle alluded to; for, though in their theories many grammarians have passed it by, in practice all have in a measure adopted it, while some,

who partially adopt it even in theory, admit side by side with it other conflicting principles which render its application ineffectual, since they are suffered at times to throw it completely into the shade. Others, again, of the highest repute as philosophic grammarians, distinctly reject it. Hence the interminable disputes among both grammatical and logical writers concerning "parts of speech."

Now if there be, as undoubtedly there is, a satisfactory principle for the classification of words, where are we to look for it? Surely in usage—

Quem penes arbitrium est et jus et norma loquendi.—and from the fact that the primary aim of grammar is to teach how words in various languages are used, may be deduced the principle—

Words must be classed according to their uses.

This, however, though simple after explanation, may not at first appear so. For it may be asked—Are words to be classed by the signification they are used to convey? If so, there would be thousands of classes, and the principle so interpreted would not lead to the "parts of speech." Its product would be, not a grammar, but a dictionary or a thesaurus in which words with the same or similar meanings would be grouped together under various categories.

A second, and equally potent, reason may be given to show that words in grammar are not to be classed as parts of speech according to their signification. A scholar, ill-acquainted with nautical phraseology, and hearing for the first time such an order as—

Clew up the main royal,

though ignorant of the meaning of the word *clew*, would know, from the way this word is used in the sentence, that it is a verb. And though he has no idea of what is meant on board ship by the word *royal*, he would perceive that

this word is here a noun. Since then it is not necessary to know the meaning of the word in order that it may be classed, it follows that its classification is not decided by its import or signification. Yet Dr. Crombie, discussing whether infinitives are to be classed with verbs, speaks of "admitting the established principle *voces valent significationes*" to decide that question, apparently taking the Latin sentence to imply that words may be *classed* as parts of speech by their signification.

Again, in a note on participles (p. 113) the same writer alludes to "our classification of words agreeably to their *import* or the *offices* they perform,"—thereby confusing the true with a false principle. Words cannot be classed by their import, but they can by the offices they perform. Thus in "*A run*," "*I run*," "*A return*," "*I return*," "*A swim*," "*I swim*," the corresponding nouns and verbs convey the same fundamental ideas, and, if here we should attempt to classify by signification or import, we might be brought to acknowledge that verbs are nouns and nouns are verbs, thereby obliterating, instead of establishing, natural distinctions, as several famous writers, such as Horne Tooke and Sir W. Hamilton, attempt to do.

It is important to observe that the same spoken or written signs, in passing from one class of words to another, undergo a partial change of meaning, while retaining the primary idea; but the change of meaning suffered in this transition affords no tangible means of classifying the words which so change. Thus the word "*calm*" is a noun in "*A great calm arose*," a verb in "*Calm your temper*," and an adjective in "*A calm day*." In all of these instances the same fundamental idea is found; but the meaning of the word has changed, as becomes evident when we explain or paraphrase the expressions.

Sometimes, again, a knowledge of the meaning of a word will the better enable us to distinguish how it is used, and

thence how it should be classed. Nay, there are many cases in which, without a knowledge of the meaning of a word, we cannot distinguish how it is used ; but this makes no difference in the universal rule that words are to be classed according to their uses.

It is strange that Dr. Sullivan, who styles the classification of words the foundation of grammar, should not himself institute a strict inquiry for the principle on which this foundation should be laid. He indeed comes very near to a distinct enunciation of the true principle for word-classing, but afterwards goes far from it. Thus, after explaining how he thinks children are to be taught to distinguish various classes of words, he adds, *as an after-thought*—"Before proceeding further great care is taken to show the pupils that the same word may, *just as it is used*, be a noun, an adjective, or a verb, or in fact any part of speech "

But why, if this be so, are they not told it at first ; and why is not Dr. Sullivan thence led to infer that guiding principle, which most grammarians do not so much as mention, but which is calculated, when properly applied, to throw a flood of light upon grammar, and to annihilate half the difficulties which able writers have, during the course of ages, piled up to impede the progress of students, whether beginners or advanced ? The reason is that Dr. Sullivan confuses the *use* or *function* of a word with its *signification*. Thus, immediately after the last quotation, we read :—

"If a word be used to denote a thing, it is a noun ; if to express a quality, it is an adjective ; and if it implies action, or to do something, it is a verb."

Here the simplifier of grammar introduces the principle already condemned. Every word "denotes something ;" and so, according to Dr. Sullivan, every word is a noun ! Many nouns "express quality," and so by the same authority many nouns are adjectives ! Some nouns not merely

imply, but actually *express*, action; therefore also some nouns are verbs! If anyone understands what nouns, adjectives and verbs are, after reading Dr. Sullivan's explanation, it is not in consequence but in spite of that explanation. The true reason too why "grammar is one of the last things understood" is that those who teach it—or rather *those who write for the benefit of teachers*—have frequently themselves no clear understanding of some of the most important points in the science. There is no other cause. It does not take much time or pains to make children distinguish *by examples* several kinds of words; but English grammar has been cultivated for more than a century, and not only are not grammarians agreed as to what the parts of speech are, and how the classes should be formed, but it would appear that each new grammar adds its quota to the ingredients of confusion. There is but one way of remedying this state of things; and that is by carefully laying a solid foundation on a broad and secure basis before beginning to build. The basis is usage; the foundation to be laid on that basis is a consistent division of words into classes, without which there can be no thoroughly scientific procedure; and the principle by which that foundation is to be laid has been already stated.

Before leaving Dr. Sullivan it should be remarked that his words, quoted with partial approval, are liable to a misconception he has not provided against. *No* words in English belong to *all* of the recognized classes at different times, while few, if any, belong to more than three or four classes. In like manner it is somewhat ambiguous of Dr. Latham to say (*English Language*, Prelim. Dissert. I.) that:—

"A word with no characteristic signs at all in a language [like English] where such signs are either wanting or scarce may be *anything* or *everything* as a part of speech, inasmuch as its form is indifferent."

No word in English can be any or every part of speech ; nor is the form of words, even as regards their classification, altogether a matter of indifference. Sometimes in English, as frequently in Latin, the form of a word may help to show what part of speech that word belongs to. Thus a schoolboy who has learned the Latin conjugations, might tell by the inflection that *veniat* is a verb, without either knowing its meaning or seeing it in use. At the same time this word is not a verb on account of its inflection. Rather it has its inflection because it is a verb. Unfortunately there are not wanting writers, as we shall see, who, misled by a partial consideration of the *form* of Latin words, go so far as to make that a criterion for their classification, forgetting that the same terminations are frequently common to different parts of speech, and that consequently *form*, as a test for word-classing, is unreliable even in Latin.

To sum up. Grammarians and, as we shall see, logicians, have mixed up, so as to produce almost inextricable confusion, three different criteria for word-classing—(1) use or function, (2) signification, (3) form. Of these the first alone is the true one. Do we wish to classify words? The classification must be made according to certain of their specific uses. Do we wish to refer a particular word to its class? We must look to the way in which it is used. Both form and meaning may help us to distinguish the use or function, but by the last alone is the class determined. Other false criteria besides the two already mentioned will thrust themselves upon our notice occasionally ; while every now and then the true principle will show itself to clear away difficulties which some of the best critics look upon as insurmountable.

SECTION 2.—HORNE TOOKE'S COMPLICATIONS

If further proof be required of the necessity of bringing from the obscurity in which it has been involved the principle that words are to be classed according to their uses, abundant evidence may be obtained by carefully perusing the celebrated *Diversions of Purley*. That work contains, amongst other things, a partial sketch of the history of philosophic grammar down to Mr. Tooke's own time, showing the state of confusion into which the speculations of different writers had plunged the theory of grammar, and (quite unintentionally) that the grand desideratum towards its rectification is a sound principle for the division of words into classes. Several untenable principles are noticed, such as those which were based upon a prior division of things and of ideas of which words are the signs. But unfortunately it did not occur to the writer of the entertaining work named to search for a satisfactory principle. Nay, he distinctly declines the task of finding one. "Let them," he says (I., 82), "give the rule who thus confound together the manner of signification of words, and the abbreviations in their construction; than which no two things in language are more distinct or ought to be more carefully distinguished." And so he leaves the whole question in a state of obscurity equal to that in which he found it; and, when he has the true principle placed under consideration, he actually rejects it, and that too with warmth, since it happens to interfere with his own theory of derivation. This theory, never definitely enounced, but frequently implied and acted upon, is that words may be classified as parts of speech according to their *derivation*. There is something so preposterous in this principle when stated plainly that those who have been accustomed to look upon the author of the *Diversions* as one of the great master-minds in philosophic grammar will naturally revolt

against the charges here brought forward. Proof, however, is at hand, and first in regard to his rejection of the true principle for word-classing. Immediately after the words last quoted, Horne Tooke writes :—

“I do not allow that any words change their nature in this manner, so as to belong sometimes to one part of speech and sometimes to another, from the different ways of using them. I could never perceive any such fluctuation in any words whatever; though I know it is a general charge brought erroneously against words of almost every denomination. But it appears to me all error arising from the false measure which has been taken of almost every sort of words, while the words themselves appear to me to continue faithfully and steadily attached each to the standard under which it was originally enlisted.”

What is here styled a “false measure” is the principle laid down in my previous section for the classification of words, and nothing can be more decided than its rejection in the quoted passage. But it is hard to believe that Horne Tooke could not perceive, if he ever tried, the fluctuation of words from one part of speech to another—how, for instance, the word *run* is a noun in *A run* and a verb in *I run*. It should be remarked that while no grammarian, so far as I am aware, consistently follows the principle of classing words by their uses, many are driven to admit this principle in certain cases where their own theories are at fault for the classing of particular words or sets of words. Horne Tooke himself shows this in Vol. II., p. 440, in a passage comment on which will be found of consequence. Treating of adjectives and alluding to the fact that many nouns and adjectives convey the same fundamental idea and have the same root-meaning, he there remarks :—

“This difficulty has at all times puzzled all the grammarians who have attempted to account for the parts of speech by the single difference of the things or ideas of

which the different sorts of words were supposed to be the signs. And though everyone who made the attempt has found it miscarry in his hands, still each has pursued the beaten track and employed his time and pains to establish a criterion which, in the conclusion, each has uniformly abandoned."

Then, referring to the difficulties in which the authors of the *Encyclopédie* find themselves, he adds :—

"They are therefore forced to give up at last every philosophic difference between the parts of speech which they had first laid down as the cause of the distinction ; and are obliged to allow that the same words, without any alteration in their meaning, are sometimes of one part of speech and sometimes of another. 'Ces mots sont pris tantôt adjectivement, tantôt substantivement. Cela depend de leur service. Qualifient-ils ? Ils sont adjectives. Designent-ils des individus ? Ils sont donc substantives.'—Cela depend de leur service ! Does it so ? In the name of common sense then and common patience, why have you troubled us with a heap of stuff upon which it does not depend ? But, however, neither is this altogether true. Cela ne depend pas de leur service. The same word is not sometimes an adjective and sometimes a substantive."

So far Horne Tooke. Now it is undoubtedly true of many words that they are sometimes nouns and sometimes adjectives—not, however, without some alteration in their meaning—and that that depends upon their use, *service*. The Encyclopædists might have gone further and have shown, had they taken the English language into consideration, that many words are nouns, verbs, or adjectives according to their employment, as in *A calm day*, *A great calm arose*, *Calm your temper* ; while further consideration would have disclosed the rule by which words in all tongues should be classed.

But Horne Tooke in the same chapter (p. 435) writes :—

"I maintain that the adjective is equally and altogether as much the name of a thing as the noun substantive. And so I say of all words whatever. For that is not a word which is not the name of a thing. Every word being a sound significant must be a sign, and if a sign the name of a thing."

The assertion here made that adjectives and all other words are nouns and the reason given for it are equally erroneous. Horne Tooke will have it (p. 427) that in the phrase *A golden ring* the word *golden* is a noun. But the word *noun*, being only the grammatical term for what is commonly called a name, *golden* cannot be rightly called a noun. No one speaks of *a golden*.

Let us look, however, at Mr. Tooke's reason. He says that adjectives, and in fact all words, are nouns, "for that is not a word which is not the name of a thing." How does he make this out? "Every word," he says, "being a sound significant, must be a sign"—right—"and if a sign, the name of a thing"—wrong. Signs are not always names. The author of the *Diversions* treats these terms as convertible, but without warrant. The words *yes*, *no*, *but*, *of*, *when*, *fractured*, *spilt*, *golden* are all of them *signs*, but none of them are *names*. To say that such words are names is simply an abuse of language, and has nothing to justify it, not even convenience. For if it could be proved that all words are names or nouns, nothing would be effected so far as classification is concerned; for we should then have to begin anew and classify nouns or names. In addition then to noun-substantives and noun-adjectives, which Horne Tooke and many other writers speak of, we should be favoured with noun-verbs, noun-adverbs, noun-prepositions, and other objectionable terms.

It has, I believe, been asserted that Mr. Tooke follows Aristotle in maintaining that all words are names of things. But even if he does, what then? Aristotle has no com-

plete or satisfactory grammatical system, and therefore an appeal to him would be unavailing, since it could not be final.

It is to be regretted that in recent times Sir W. Hamilton has lent his support to Horne Tooke's erroneous theory of names. In an article on the *Deaf and Dumb* printed in the *Philosophic Discussions* (p. 136), the great Scottish professor writes :—

“Of such the treatise of Dalgarno is not barren ; but that which principally struck us is his remarkable anticipation, on speculative grounds, *a priori*, of what has been now articulately proved *a posteriori* by the Dutch philologists and by Horne Tooke, to say nothing of the ancients, that the parts of speech are all reducible to the noun and verb, or to the noun alone.”

Apart from the little value now attached to Mr. Tooke's etymological discoveries, any attempt to prove that all words are nouns, or that the *different* parts of speech are the *same* part of speech, must fail. Nor is a better method of teaching the deaf and dumb likely to spring from the adoption of self-destructive theories. Like others, the deaf and dumb should be taught, and are taught, to distinguish the parts of speech, not to confuse them together.

Sir W. Hamilton does not appear to suspect that, in endorsing the error that all words are names, he commits himself to a doctrine absolutely fatal to his own cherished theory of concepts. For if every word were a name, every word (unless a proper name) would be the expression of a concept, and there would then be in every proposition precisely as many concepts as there are words (proper names excepted). So that in the statement *All men are some mortals* there would be no fewer than five distinct concepts answering to the five words of the proposition and the copula itself would be a name or expression of a concept. The whole Hamiltonian logic rests on the assumption that

in each judgment there are two and only two concepts, and those who have read that logic attentively will perceive that many pages therein are pure waste on the assumption that every word is a name.

With regard to Horne Tooke, he is doubtless one of our ablest writers on grammar, yet his authority can be of no more weight than his reasons. His influence upon linguistic philosophy is positively amazing, when it is considered that his celebrated work is built upon several of the most glaring inconsistencies ever submitted for public acceptance. He commences (I. 44) by dividing all words into necessary words and abbreviated words or substitutes, the former including nouns and verbs, the latter all other parts of speech. But in the succeeding chapters he sets to work to prove, by *derivational* evidence, that certain of these substitutes are verbs and others nouns,—that they are all in fact nouns and verbs, only in disguise. . That is to say these unnecessary parts of speech are necessary parts; these substitutes are the things of which they are substitutes!

Secondly, he says (I. 45) that “in all languages there are *two* kinds of words which are necessary for communication of thought, and they are nouns and verbs.” But in II. 435 he assures us, as already noticed, in the most emphatic manner that all words whatever—and therefore of course *verbs*—are nouns! So that, after all, there are not *two* kinds of words necessary for communication, but only *one*, namely, nouns.

Thirdly, he refers (I. 49) to the noun as *id de quo loquimur*, a definition which clearly applies to no words but nouns and pronouns, except when we quote, as in parsing.

Fourthly, he comes close on several occasions to the true principle for word-classing, yet fails at the time to grasp it. He alludes more than once to “the *manner* of signification of words” stating (I. 44) that he intends to divide words

thereby. But, far from carrying out this resolution, he acts on an entirely opposite plan. For though the very examples he adduces show that certain words both signify and are used in a manner different from those words from which he derives them, he does not thereupon put them down as belonging to a separate class, but boldly asserts that they belong to the same class as their etymons! He says, for instance (I. 103), that *if* is a verb, because it is derived from the Anglo-Saxon *gifan* to give! Thus run his own words:—

“The truth of the matter is that *if* is merely a verb. It is merely the imperative of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb *gifan*. And in those languages, as well as in the English formerly, this supposed conjunction was pronounced and written as the common imperative *giſ*.”

However the word *if* may be derived, or however its etymon may have been used formerly, the word itself has long since come to be used and to signify in a manner different from that which Mr. Tooke considers inseparable from it. The transition from *gif* (*give*) to *if* (*supposing*) is easily effected, as was the crossing of the Rubicon, but it is nevertheless a decisive step both as regards mode of employment and signification, and the two words should therefore be placed under different headings.

It will be remembered that Horne Tooke implies in the second quotation made from his work that many grammarians actually took usage as the “measure of words,” but he only shows that they are driven to this when other criteria fail. Had he and they adopted it, carefully distinguishing past from present usage, both would have escaped many difficulties. In fact the great error of Mr. Tooke in the theory of grammar is that above noticed of setting etymology at variance with itself, of making past and present usage clash, of implying and acting upon,

though not distinctly expressing, the erroneous principle before laid to his charge, that words may be classed as parts of speech according to their *derivation*. One part of etymology teaches how words are classed, another how they are derived ; but no part tells us that they are to be classed as parts of speech according to their derivation. It would be as sensible to call the present inhabitants of the British Isles Asiatics on the ground that their ancestors came from Asia as to attempt the distinction of "parts of speech" by derivation.

But the author of the *Diversions* still further complicates matters by elsewhere introducing another criterion for word-classing, which has already been rejected as inadmissible, namely, their *form*. Thus (II. chap. 8) he denies the title of adjective to the word *gold* in the phrase *a gold ring*, on the ground that it has "no distinctive termination directing it to be joined to a noun." On the other hand he regards *golden* as an adjective on account of its termination. Such words as *general*, *principal*, *operative* would be always adjectives on the same plea. Yet they are often nouns (and pluralized as such), notwithstanding their termination, by the inexorable law of usage.

The secret of all Horne Tooke's complications is that he perpetually struggles against the true principle for word-classing in order to place in a more striking light his derivational discoveries and theory. You say, he argues, that such and such words are prepositions, articles, conjunctions, adjectives, &c. You may call them what you like ; but I will prove, by tracing back to Anglo-Saxon and other languages, that these words are nouns and verbs. And I will further prove, that all words whatever are nouns. Horne Tooke stakes much on the accuracy of his etymological investigation, but alas ! Mr. Wedgewood, in the introduction to his *Dictionary*, says :—

"Tooke's alluring speculations will not bear the light of

advancing knowledge, and it is hardly too much to say that there is not a sound etymology in the work."

However this may be, the author of the *Diversions* has merited enduring fame, of which no one would wish to deprive him who looks with an impartial eye from the mistakes he has made to what he has effected for linguistic science. Before the publication of the *Ἑπεα Πτεροεντα*, the science of language was a stagnant pool; but since, and partly in consequence, it has been an onward-rushing stream, foaming, breaking over apparently impassable rocks, impeded but not stayed, and destined after many windings to flow in triumph an abounding river, gladdening and fertilizing the land. The suggestions with which that work bristles have been followed up by succeeding writers both in England and on the Continent of Europe to a greater extent than is admitted; and the question arises—If Horne Tooke acquired so much influence in spite of adopting mistaken principles, how much might he have effected under the guidance of the true one?

There is yet another of his false steps to notice. He says (I. 46):—"Although in the strict sense of the term no doubt both necessary words and abbreviations are all of them parts of speech," he is "inclined to confine this title" to the former class. That is, he is inclined to use the phrase 'part of speech' in an unwarrantable manner. Considering that the whole of his work is about 'parts of speech,' this is a strange course for one who claims the title of philosophic grammarian; and, together with the other mistakes noted above, it will serve to explain the fact that, since the *Diversions of Purley* appeared, the very questions which it undertakes to settle have been more subject to dispute and misunderstanding than they were before its publication.

SECTION 3.—CONFUSION WORSE CONFOUNDED.

Of recent English grammarians Dr. Morell may fairly bear away the palm for involving this matter of the classification of words in Cimmerian gloom. Dr. Morell is said to be "by far the ablest exponent" of the German grammarian Becker, with whom Mr. Mason says "a new era opened for grammatical science," but who has written much which the last named writer is constrained to designate as "little better than rubbish." Becker, giving rein to an untamed imagination, which so often mars the splendid scholarship of Germany, bears Dr. Morell aloft among clouds of ideas or notions of things which exist and of things which don't exist, of relations between notions and of relations between affirmations. Into these lofty regions let us see if reason can penetrate.

Dr. Morell in his *Grammar* (pp. 26-7) gives what he calls the "principles" he professes to have adopted for the classification of words. I say *professes*, for as a matter of fact he follows no definite principle. He writes in the part named :—

"The various notions of which the human mind is capable may be divided into two great classes :—

"I. Notions of all the things, mental or material, real or imaginary, of which we can form any conception.

"II. Notions of all the qualities, states and actions which we can in any way attribute to them."

It will be observed that there is no distinction, or, as logicians say, no true division here ; for the second class of notions is included in the first. Qualities, states and actions are themselves things of which we can form conceptions, and to which we can attach attributes. Thus we speak of *Great goodness, A long sleep, A kind act*. Next we read :—

"Hence there are two principal classes of words corresponding to these two classes of notions :—

"I. Names of things, i.e. substantives.

"II. Names of actions, states, or qualities, i.e. attributives."

By substantives Dr. Morell means nouns and pronouns ; and under attributives he includes verbs, adjectives and adverbs. But at p. 9 he has already set down "names of qualities, states and actions" as nouns ! According to Dr. Morell therefore verbs, adjectives and adverbs are nouns ! Why not go a step further and say with Tooke and Hamilton that *all* words are nouns, and that all the different classes are one class ?

In order to account for prepositions and conjunctions, he then talks in a misty manner of "relations existing between notions," and of "relations between affirmations." Prepositions and conjunctions, accordingly, he brackets as "relational words," in contradistinction to nouns, pronouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, which he terms "notional words." But, it may be asked, do not prepositions and conjunctions convey notions ? And if so, should they not come under the head of "notional words," which Dr. Morell restricts to the other parts of speech ? The preposition *about* and the conjunction *but* to my mind convey notions, just as much as the noun *man*, the pronoun *he*, the verb *die*, the adjective *good*, and the adverb *well* do. If Dr. Morell replies that *about* and *but* do not express notions, then he would have no right to call them words at all, for in the first line of the chapter following the "principles" he defines "words" as "signs of ideas ;" and what are ideas but notions ? The whole of Dr. Morell's exposition of the "principles" for the classification of words is a tangled skein of incongruities, and coming from a writer who treats grammar "as a purely intellectual exercise" and who aims at "developing some power of philosophical thinking in the minds of the young," it is rather to be regretted than expected.

Mr. Mason adopts the same "principles" for the classifi-

cation of words as Dr. Morell, to whom indeed he refers as a "high authority." It is noteworthy that both these writers settle the parts of speech first and then look about for "principles" on which to class them! If, instead of ascending into the cloud-land of "notions" and "relations," these grammarians had set about classing words by their uses simply, they might have imparted to their works a permanent value. Nowhere does either of them tell his pupils that words should be classified according to their uses. Instead of giving this simple rule they introduce them to what may be called "untenable metaphysica."

SECTION 4.—USAGE THE BASIS OF GRAMMAR.

It were an endless task to expose all the errors connected with this important question of word-classing. More can be said, if needed; but it is not intended to make this a bulky volume. What is really desired is to draw earnest attention to a few important principles and truths which will be found to underlie, or be interwoven with, the whole theory of grammar, and to which sufficient heed has never yet been given. With regard to the principle under consideration, that, whatever classes words are divided into, these, to be satisfactorily formed, must be based upon usage, this, plainly stated, is not likely to be controverted. Nay, some will be inclined to say—"Of course, everybody knows this." People, however, do not always realize, or utilize, their knowledge. When the grammar of a language is to be written, what is the natural method of procedure? First, to examine the language under consideration, to classify words therein according to certain differences in their uses, to distinguish good from bad, past from present, ordinary from exceptional usage, and to legislate accordingly. This inductive method, however, is not explicitly and consistently followed, even in the most approved grammars, at times.

It gives place, in great measure, to the traditional method on the one hand and to the speculative on the other, the result being confusion where simplicity should reign. To construct a grammar really worthy of the English tongue is a task of difficulty ; nor need it necessarily be the work of one person. But the greater part of the difficulties have been created ; they do not exist in the nature of the language itself. As a rule, modern grammarians adopt with much variation the ideas and terminology of the Latin grammarians, without sufficiently independent study of the language they are going to treat. To usage, in spite of traditional and speculative tendencies, they cannot help paying much regard. But what grammarian makes usage his starting point, deduces his principles from it, and abides by them ?

Usage is the basis of grammar. This proposition is pregnant with important consequences. But what proof is there to advance in support of the statement ? To those who say everyone has long since been aware of the fact proof would be superfluous. To those who hesitate to adopt the theory is offered the following brief, but sufficient, proof. Let the reader, if not versed in the once mysterious hieroglyphics of Egypt, or in the antique language of Etruria, or in the cuneiform inscriptions of Nineveh, or in the ideographic symbols of China, place himself in imagination before a monument with writing in any of these, to him, unknown tongues. What is the problem presented to him for solution ? Is it not this ? He wishes to know in what sense each of the signs before him was used, and how the various symbols were combined by those who used them to express what they desired to record. This being conceded, it follows that the interpreter of the given characters must take for the basis of whatever he says about them the usage or custom of the nation. to whose language the inscription happens to belong, and

the same will hold true of every language. Usage, then, being the basis of all grammar, whatever grammatical rules are to be established must be grounded thereon. From usage has already been drawn the principle for word-classing; it remains now to apply it.

Fortunately grammarians have not toiled altogether in vain, despite the obscure position this principle held in their minds; and so, upon our entrance on this new undertaking, we find the ground already broken. Plato and Aristotle, the veteran pioneers of antiquity, turned the first sod by pointing out, in a confused manner, "the most animated parts of speech," *τα ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τοῦ λόγου*; but it was reserved for the Alexandrian and Roman critics to classify the rest and to frame a technical phraseology, which, with certain notable emendations and *mutatis mutandis*, may be satisfactorily applied to the English language. The misfortune is that later writers have not changed what ought to be changed, or made the necessary corrections. Dissatisfied with the work of their predecessors they certainly have been, as witness the repeated efforts to introduce a better order of things. Their failure to permanently satisfy has resulted from not consistently recognizing the basis upon which the foundation of their structure should be laid. With all efforts at improvement there has been a lingering admiration of, or affection for, the forms and phraseology of the ancient grammars which the boldest innovators have not shaken off entirely. Let us, however, regardless of precedent, or rather not misled by it, endeavour to apply the principle for word-classing to the English language.

The stock of words composing this language is not, and, from the nature of the case, cannot be fixed. New words are constantly coming into use, while old ones are becoming obsolete. Dictionaries vary as regards the number of words, and it is nothing unusual to see fresh editions

come out professing to give several thousand "new words." Every trade, profession, art and science has its own peculiar technical words, and as the number of these increases, and each becomes perfected, they contribute to the stock of vocables admitted to the pages of standard dictionaries. Without then attempting to be precise where precision is impossible, we may roughly set down the words of the English tongue at upwards of one hundred thousand. Of this total the first thing to remark is that the vast majority belong to the four great classes—nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs; while only a few remain to be divided among the minor classes. Another noteworthy fact is that the new words, which are constantly being added, all go to the great classes, while the others after certain mutations, some of which the patience of philologists has partially succeeded in tracing, have become fixed, and give no promise of further variation either as regards number or mode of employment. Now the object of the grammarian in dividing words into classes is that he may treat of peculiarities in their employment, and, if he effects this without introducing confusion, his classification will suffice. With respect to defining the various kinds of words, it is of course desirable to obtain perfect definitions; but if he finds that he is unable to give such, he must, to avoid confusion in the theory of grammar, be careful not to put forward as perfect definitions any which are not really so. Of the greater classes especially it is desirable to have succinct definitions, because to each of these belong thousands of words, and there can be no completely satisfactory treatment of them without precise definitions. These are to be obtained by observing the distinguishing characteristics of words. Of the minor groups of words definitions are not so necessary, because it is easy to make lists in a page or two of all the words belonging to any of them. But even of these valid definitions may be had by adopting what I

term the principle of Exclusion ; and with its aid I proceed to apply the principle for the classification of words in the English language according to their uses.

SECTION 5.—MR. J. S. MILL'S MISTAKE.

First, then, with regard to the term *noun*, about which Horne Tooke has raised so many difficulties, the only way in which this word can be used without giving rise to endless and profitless discussion, such as grammatical and logical works are replete with, is by confining it to those words which are employed as names. The word *noun* in fact is nothing but a technical word for what are ordinarily called names, in any gender, number, or case, *e.g. man, men, man's, woman*.

Many logicians have adopted the unphilosophic habit of calling certain expressions names or nouns which are not really such. Thus Mr. J. S. Mill in his *System of Logic* (p. 28) although calling adjectives "not names but parts of names," nevertheless (p. 30) declares he will "without scruple speak of adjectives as names" or nouns. And on what grounds are we to suppose he does this? Let him speak for himself. In the same place he says :—"Since there is no difference of meaning between *round* and *a round object*, it is only custom which prescribes that on any given occasion one shall be used and not the other. We shall therefore without scruple speak of adjectives as names."

So because usage gives the law in language and directs us in the choice of expressions, we are at liberty, according to Mr. Mill, to call one part of speech another ! It is not correct to say that the adjective *round* and the noun phrase *a round object* have no difference in meaning ; nor does their meaning, as I have shown, decide their classification as words or phrases. It is entirely wrong also for any

logician, however great his repute may be, to say that a certain thing is not another and yet he will call it that other. Until logicians determine to call things by their proper appellations they can never hope to satisfy inquirers. When Mr. Mill speaks of adjectives as "not names but parts of names," he means parts of *terms*, taking *name* and *term* as convertible, by which practice, common to many logicians, more confusion arises. A name is one thing, a term another; and there is no utility in confusing them. The latter is of wider application than the former, which it includes.

To the class of nouns then belong all names consisting of a single word; while under the term *adjective* are included all words, *except nouns or pronouns*, which are used to distinguish (whatever may be represented by) a noun.

But in giving this definition of the adjective, it may be asked, does not the principle of classing words by their uses fail? The word *Napoleon's*, for instance, in the phrase *Napoleon's sword* is used in the same manner as *golden* in *A golden ring*. Just as *golden* qualifies *ring* so does *Napoleon's* affect *sword*, and on this account Dr. Wallis would make them both of one class.

Answer.—The word *Napoleon's* is indeed used partly in the same way, but not altogether so. Inasmuch as the two words agree in the mode of their employment a distinction has been established between them, which no one need mistake unless he chooses, and this distinction is founded on a tangible difference in their uses. *Golden* is merely a distinguishing word, not a name, whereas *Napoleon's*, besides distinguishing something, is at the same time itself a name. Nouns in apposition likewise distinguish, but they are not on that account called adjectives. Although therefore *Napoleon's* distinguishes *sword*, it is not an adjective, since in the definition given nouns in any case are excluded from this appellation.

Without exclusions like this it would be impossible to draw a distinct line of demarcation between several of the parts of speech. No one objects to Euclid making similar exclusions in several of his geometrical definitions; and no valid objection can be made to the same practice in grammar. On the other hand it has this to recommend it, that it brings to a satisfactory termination several disputes in which philosophers have been involved for ages.

But Mr. Mill (*Logic*, p. 29) refuses the title of name to the oblique cases of nouns, stating in a note that they are "something more than names." *Answer*.—The fact of a noun being in any case, or having the significant termination of that case, does not prevent its being a name or coming under the definition given. If it did, then both the nominative and vocative in Latin, since they have distinctive case-endings, would be excluded from the title of nouns also! Mr. Mill has altogether overlooked this fact. Aristotle, it is true, like Mr. Mill, in the *Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας* (c. 2) restricts the term *ὄνομα*, *name*, to nouns in the nominative; but to refer to Aristotle as a guide in grammatical nomenclature would be absurd; for in another part of the same chapter he applies the same word *ὄνομα* to the *verb*, although he has previously denied it to the oblique cases of the noun itself! Compare the following extracts from Mr. Owen's translation of the *Organon* :—

"Φίλωνος indeed or Φίλωνι and such like words are not nouns but cases of a noun."

"Verbs therefore so called by themselves are nouns."

Other similar discrepancies will be pointed out in regard to grammatical topics, showing conclusively that Aristotle has no fully digested grammatical system. The Alexandrian and Roman grammarians fixed definitely, at least in practice, that names, in whatever case, should be referred to one class. In this there is nothing objectionable, since no confusion is caused thereby and a useful purpose is served.

But why modern logicians, who admit at least eight parts of speech, should wish to go back to the defective terminology of Aristotle, who regards only four and neglects the rest, is inexplicable. It is simply a retrograde movement.

As to Mr. Mill's opinion on the matter in hand, of what weight is it, seeing that, while in the note referred to he says that words in "inflected cases are names and something more," he tells us in the text that these same words are "something less" than names, adding in the note that:—

"The purposes of our inquiry do not demand that we should enter with scrupulous accuracy into similar minutiae." a principle, which, without being so openly acknowledged, has practically been adopted by a number of writers on grammar and logic? The note in which this admission of Mr. Mill occurs, in his *Logic* for 1865 he has seen fit to obliterate. It will be found in the earlier edition for 1846. But unless such questions be examined thoroughly, it is of little use to examine them at all. Through neglect of this very thing, to wit, scrupulous accuracy in grammatical matters, all that part of Mr. Mill's logic which treats of them—at least a hundred pages—loses its value, a fact which will become more evident in the third part of this work.

It may be observed here that to constitute a word a noun it is not sufficient that it be capable of standing as subject or object in a sentence. A pronoun can do this, and any word, whatever part of speech it may be, when quoted, can stand as subject or object, as in parsing. Mr. Mill says that when we are "speaking of the mere words themselves, as when we say *Truly* is an English word, *Heavy* is an adjective," in that case "they are complete names, viz. : names of those particular sounds or of those particular collections of written characters." This is inaccurate. *Truly* and *Heavy* are not names of the sounds or collected characters, but are the sounds or collected characters them-

selves. No thing is its own name. In Mr. Mill's examples *truly* is an adverb standing as subject and *heavy* is an adjective discharging the same function. If these words were names we should contradict ourselves by parsing them as adverb and adjective. Mr. Mill appears to forget that the habit of quoting a word is one of its "common uses."

Some grammarians in parsing talk of certain words being "adjectives *used* as nouns," &c. This practice is illogical. In the sentence "The wise are happy" *wise* is either an adjective or a noun according as we admit an ellipsis or not. As language is the expression of thought and of other mental operations, much of its meaning depends on the speaker's intention, and it is only in certain cases that ellipsis *must* be admitted. If after *wise* we understand *men* or *people* this noun understood is clearly the subject, and *wise* a mere attribute. If on the other hand we don't choose to supply such word, then *wise* is for the time being a noun. Hence it is inconsistent of Dr. Morell (*Gram.*, p. 71) to tell us an adjective may stand as subject, and then (p. 104) to lay down the rule that "*every* adjective qualifies some noun expressed or understood, or otherwise distinguishes it." What Dr. Morell should have told us, had he perceived it, is that many words are sometimes nouns and sometimes adjectives according to their uses. This clue to the whole difficulty unfortunately he missed, and much unnecessary toil in consequence has fallen to the lot of his countless disciples.

CHAPTER II.

THE NATURE OF THE VERB.

SECTION 1.—THE PREVAILING THEORY.

IN the whole science of grammar few points are of more vital consequence than the nature of the verb, and there is none by which grammarians have been more bewildered. In their search for a valid definition of this part of speech they do not appear to have been more successful than the alchymists were in theirs after the philosopher's stone. Is the pursuit as chimerical?

In the last chapter of the *Diversions of Purley* the author, after quoting a number of definitions of the verb, and throwing them aside as worthless or imperfect, hints at a future examination of the matter, which unfortunately he was not destined to make. Where that work ends the present inquiry begins. It is here proposed to examine the opinions on this matter most prevalent among grammarians, with a view of establishing the basis of the ensuing system of syntactical analysis, and of arriving at the same time at the final settlement of a vexed question. The issue is one the importance of which, from a scholastic point of view, it would be difficult to exaggerate, affecting as it does most materially not only the science of grammar but also that of logic; for so long as the nature of the verb remains undetermined, so long will the sciences named continue in their present unsatisfactory state of fluctuating uncertainty and manifold imperfection.

What then do approved authors teach concerning the verb? Quintilian (*Institutiones* I. 4) little anticipating the effect of his ill-considered words, defines this part of speech as *id quod loquimur*, a definition which while applying with

limitations to the predicate in logic, is quite inapplicable in countless instances to the verb in grammar. For even in assertive sentences the verb is not accurately described as that which we say of the subject. In the following, for instance,—*He rises at daybreak to enjoy the bracing air*—the verb *rises* is but part of what is said. In the rest there are a preposition, three nouns, the sign of the infinitive, an article and another adjective; which words certainly no grammarian should, to borrow Dr. Morell's expression, "clump up" and call a verb. The value of Quintilian's definition therefore, so far as grammar is concerned, is *nil*. Yet even the observant Tooke (though in the end becoming distrustful on the matter, as he approaches nearer to a consideration of the verb) in the earlier part of his work adopts it; and nearly all succeeding grammarians seem to have been led astray by it. They have in truth taken a slovenly definition of the predicate in logic as universally applicable to the verb in grammar. The causes of the error and subsequent confusion will be noticed later. Here the prevalence of the mistake is made out, and the true nature of the verb explained, after the erroneous theory has been well sifted.

Most grammarians hold that the essence of the verb consists in affirmation or assertion. Thus in Dr. Crombie's *Etymology*, Chapter V., we read:—

"The verb has been defined to be that part of speech which signifies to be, to do or to suffer; or more correctly that part of speech which predicates some action, passion or state of its subject, as *I strike*, *I am wounded*, *I stand*. Its essence consists in affirmation, and by this property it is distinguished from every other part of speech."

Further on he remarks:—

"As nouns denote the subject of our discourse, so verbs predicate their accidents or properties. The former are the names of things, the latter what we say concerning them."

These last are almost Quintilian's own words, while a few lines lower he adds :—

“The verb essentially expresses affirmation.”

That this teaching is erroneous may be shown without circumlocution. In each of the following sentences there is a verb, but no predication or affirmation :—

1. *Wake Duncan with thy knocking.*

2. *Who would not sing for Lycidas?*

Here in 1 the subject to the verb *wake* is *thou* understood ; and what affirmation or predication is made of the person represented by *thou* ? None whatever. A predication or affirmation means something stated about something, and here there is no statement. Similarly in 2 we assert nothing ; we ask something, and no two words in the English language are more distinct in their signification than *assert* and *ask*. The given sentences represent two different classes, each embracing millions of sentences continually in process of formation, in which Dr. Crombie's definition of the verb is inapplicable. If, instead of following the beaten track, which so many writers from Quintilian downwards had confined themselves to, Dr. Crombie had examined this question by aid of the simplest induction, his *Etymology and Syntax* would have been a different work. Although making no systematic examination of the matter in hand, he perceives that difficulties may be raised against his theory of the verb, and proceeds to anticipate and combat an objection in a note on imperative sentences.

“I consider,” he says, at p. 136, “that no language has more moods than are formed by inflection.”

Now verbs, if used at all, must be in some mood. But in the Chinese language there are no inflections ; therefore, according to Dr. Crombie, the Chinese have no mood of the verb, that is, no verbs at all ! In other words, a large section of the human race carry on all the functions of speech without the aid of that very part of speech which

Dr. Crombie tells us (p. 86) is "indispensably necessary to mental communication."

Dr. Crombie continues in the same note :—

"If it should be asked—Agreeably to your doctrine of the verb, as implying affirmation, what part of speech would you make the verbs in the following sentences : *Depart instantly, Improve your time, Forgive us our sins*, will it be said that the verbs in these phrases are assertions? I should answer that all moods *metaphysically considered* are in my apprehension equally indicative. Every possible form of speech can do nothing but express the sentiment of the speaker, his desire, his wish, his sensation, his perception, his belief, &c. Whatever form therefore the expression may assume, it must be *resolvable* into assertion, and must be considered as expressing in the person of the speaker what he desires, wishes, feels, thinks, and so forth. No one will surely deny *Thou oughtest not to kill, Thou shalt not kill, Thou art forbidden to kill* are affirmations. And are not these expressions so nearly equivalent to *Do not kill* that in Greek and Latin they are rendered indifferently by *οὐ φονεύσεις* or *μὴ φονεύε, non occides, ne occidito*? If then we say *Kill thou*, will it be contended that though the prohibition implies an affirmation of the speaker, the command does not? The expression I conceive to be strictly equivalent to *Thou shalt kill, Thou art ordered to kill*. Hence *ave* and *jubeo te avere* are deemed expressions of the same import. If the question be examined grammatically, or as a subject of pure grammar, I am inclined to think that where there is no variety of termination there cannot be established a diversity of mood."

This passage is a fair specimen of the confused thought which characterizes much "philosophic grammar." I shall notice only a few points immediately bearing on the subject under consideration.

1. The sentence *Depart instantly* is as much, in Dr. Crombie's estimation, of the assertive or indicative mood as *Thou departest instantly*. But if, as Dr. Crombie himself implies, in the conclusion of the note quoted, "variety of termination establishes a diversity of mood," then in these very expressions we have two different moods. For the two verbs *depart* and *departest*, each second person singular present tense, differ in termination. Yet we are told above that in English there is but one mood, and that indicative or assertive!

2. Dr. Crombie's "metaphysical consideration" of the matter amounts to this, as may be seen by a careful perusal of the passage cited,—that the verb is always assertive because every non-assertive sentence is *resolvable by periphrasis* into an assertive one equivalent in meaning. This is simply an evasion of the point at issue. *Ave* and *Jubeo te avere* may be of similar import, but their import is not in question. The mood of the verbs actually employed is the point under notice, and, as regards mood, the given sentences are entirely different. What is meant by considering this matter of fact first "metaphysically" and then "grammatically" is not clear. In each case it is considered wrongly.

Before quitting Dr. Crombie's explanation of the verb it will be necessary to notice, in connection with it, a serious misuse which he, both in the extract given and in other places, makes in common with Horne Tooke. In the *Diversions of Purley*, Vol. II, chapter 6, we read:—

"The verb . . . does not imply any assertion. No single word can. Till one single thing can be found to be a couple, one single word cannot make an *adsertion* or *adfirmation*; for there is joining in that operation, and there can be no junction of one thing."

Commenting on this passage Dr. Crombie remarks:—

"Tooke will not deny that an affirmation is implied in *ibo*."

Now it may reasonably be asked—What is meant by “implying an assertion or affirmation”? This expression is at best ambiguous. It might be taken as a confusion of terms; for the words *imply* and *assert* are antithetical. One excludes the other. If we imply a thing we do not assert it, and if we assert a thing we do not imply it.

Again, to *make* an assertion and to *imply* an assertion are two very different things, which both Tooke and Crombie here by an oversight take to be one and the same. When the poet asks—

“*Who would not sing for Lycidas?*”

we may say he *implies* that any one would sing for Lycidas; but he does not *make* this assertion: he leaves the reader to infer it. And only in some such way as this is it proper to speak of “implying an assertion.” By misusing important terms in the manner indicated, the discussion is greatly obscured. How the word *imply* is confused, by several of our ablest writers on logic and language, with the words *assert*, *affirm* and *express*, will appear in the sequel.

It should be observed meanwhile that Mr. Tooke, though accepting Quintilian’s definition, is not with those grammarians who make the essence of the verb consist in assertion. His reason for dissenting from these is worthy of notice. He says the essence of the verb cannot consist in assertion, because to make an assertion two things must be united, and the verb is but a single thing. So far, good. For if I say simply *came*, *gave*, *saw*, without reference to a subject expressed or understood, I have made no assertion. Yet here are undoubtedly verbs—verbs, according to Dr. Crombie, without their essence! But when, in the *Diversions*, *ibo* is advanced as forming a complete assertion, Horne-Tooke undertakes to show, from derivation, that *ibo* is not a single word, but consists of several combined words. Now we must remember that, properly speaking, in grammar

a verb is always *a*, that is, *one* word, though in certain languages that one word may be composed of several roots or parts. Consequently *ibo*, though so compounded, is but a single word, and if *ibo* by itself constitutes an assertion, then certainly an assertion may be made by means of a single word. But *ibo* forms no assertion unless it be spoken of some person first singular, having a word expressed or expressible to represent it and thence called the subject. And it may be stated as a universal principle, which will obviate useless discussion, that when in our language what were at one time two or more words have been so amalgamated as to lose their individuality and become one, it cannot be said strictly that the compound word thus formed contains both the subject and predicate of a proposition without either the expression or understanding of some subject or nominative. Thus the inflection *t* in *amat*, like *eth* or *s* in *loveth* or *loves*, merely indicates that the subject is third person singular, but it does not stand for the subject as a separate word would, nor can it be called the nominative to the verb. This in assertions answers to the question *Who?* or *What?* Thus—

Caesar venit. Quis venit? Caesar.

Vocat. Quis vocat? Ille.

In answer to *Quis vocat?* we cannot give the verbal termination *t*, and this therefore cannot be called the subject either in grammar or logic; and if in *Caesar venit* we make *t* a subject we should have two subjects! Yet Dr. Latham in his *Logic in its Application to Language* (Section 8) declares that the single words like *vocat* and *venit* contain both a subject and a predicate. With equal truth the *s* in *calls* might be styled a subject. The *s* and the *t* are both mere fragments of archaic pronouns according to the best philologists, and have long since lost the capability of standing as subjects. Whatever may be the derivation of such

words as *ibo* and *vocat*, usage recognizes them as verbs only. If Horne Tooke had cited *come*, *give*, *see*, in the imperative, or even *came*, *gave*, *saw* (without a subject) as verbs wanting assertion, the principle that verbs are not either by themselves or necessarily assertive would have been established. His object, however, was, not to prove this, but to introduce an ingenious derivation for the word *ibo*; for he leaves us to suppose that, at least when applied to its nominative, the verb always asserts, and this is one of the greatest mistakes prevalent in grammar.

To the rule given above about the necessity of either expressing or understanding something as subject to the verb, it might be objected that assertions are made by what are usually called "impersonal verbs." To this the reply is that there are no impersonal verbs. There are third personal verbs which frequently have no subject expressed, but a word or phrase can always be supplied as subject. It is true that to express the nominatives to some verbs of this kind is unusual. Grammarians, however, are at liberty to insert them in analysis to show the structure of the sentence, just as they do in imperative sentences for the same purpose.

SECTION 2.—ITS INCOMPLETENESS AND INCONSISTENCY.

Turn we now to a grammarian who counts his disciples by the hundred thousand, and who has long been the guide, philosopher and friend of no inconsiderable portion of the young throughout the wide-spread English-speaking races. Dr. Morell in his *Grammar and Analysis*, p. 16, says:—

"The verb is a word by means of which we affirm" various things. "The fundamental and essential idea of the verb is that of asserting." At p. 86, of participles, he writes:—"The fundamental and essential idea of the verb,

indeed, that of having the power of affirmation, they do not possess."

That verbs are used for other purposes besides assertion appears in such expressions as these :—

Who comes here? Question.

Be ready. Command.

May you prosper. Wish.

Here the verbs are not employed to assert, but to inquire, advise and express a wish otherwise than assertively ; and thus Dr. Morell's investigation of the verb is incomplete, and his conclusion, that assertion is essential to the verb, erroneous. So likewise is his account of the grammatical predicate at p. 73. There he tells the student that the predicate or verb in a sentence, that is, in *every* sentence, "asserts." Among several hundred exemplar sentences employed to illustrate his analysis there occur but three imperative sentences. They are :—

Go (thou) home ;

Hasten (ye) into the town ;

Be (you) always mindful of your promise.

Yet surely a little reflection on these might have shown Dr. Morell the imperfection of his definition of the verb or predicate in grammar. For here the verbs *go*, *hasten* and *be* nowise assert ; and if, as Dr. Morell says, "the fundamental idea or essential element of the verb consists in affirmation," we have above verbs without their essential element or fundamental idea ! These three imperative sentences appear to have got in among the others by accident ; while of interrogative and optative sentences not a single example is given ; nor does the grammarian make provision for the analysis of any but assertive sentences, at least in the work already quoted from. But in his *Analysis Explained and Systematised*, although actually pointing out

the different kinds of sentences, except conditional, and after telling us at p. 16 that—"the predicate may express action, being, and suffering, interrogatively, optatively and imperatively, as well as affirmatively," he nevertheless at p. 15 reiterates the error of the *Grammar* in defining the grammatical predicate as "something which asserts." Again, by the dexterous manipulation of an *et cetera* he escapes the annoyance of rectifying the traditionary definition of the subject and predicate in grammar which he had previously made his own. He says at p. 2:—

"Every sentence must consist of at least two parts, first the thing about which an assertion, interrogation, exclamation, &c., is made; and, secondly, that which we say respecting it."

These two things are the subject and predicate. Now it will be observed that here imperative sentences are included in the *et cetera*, and thereby the student may be led to overlook the fact that generally the subject in imperatives is not the thing about which the command or request is made. Thus in the petition—

Incline thine ear to me,

the subject is *thou* understood, and it would be absurd to say that *thou* represents that about which the entreaty is made. It would be equally ridiculous to assert that the predicate *incline* is "that which we say respecting" *thou*. In fact Dr. Morell has built his analysis upon a false basis. He begins (p. 1) by declaring that—

"The complete utterance of a single thought is called a sentence."

At p. 87 he explains that—

"A complete thought is an act of the mind which involves a judgment," and that "the expression of such a judgment *must* assume the form of an assertion."

Yet at p. 1 he instructs the learner that this same com-

plete thought "*may* take the form of an interrogative or imperative expression."

Here in a narrow compass is displayed one of the most inconsistent theories that ever enchained the minds of learned men, and which has had a large share in corrupting both mental and grammatical science, as we shall see. A complete thought or judgment, according to this theory, *must* take the form of an assertion, yet it *may* take another form of expression, as of an inquiry or a command. This is another way of saying that commands and inquiries are sentences and yet they are not sentences—a palpable contradiction, which, veiled in obscure language, has done much to render grammar "the most illogical of sciences."

It may be of some interest to know that the present writer in his first attempt at constructing a system of syntactical analysis started with the following as fundamental principles:—

1. The essence of the sentence consists in assertion, for which two things are required, a subject and a predicate.
2. The subject is that of which we assert; the predicate is that which we assert of the subject.

On this basis he erected with some trouble what he considered at the time a goodly structure. Imagine then his chagrin on becoming aware that the edifice so constructed was after all built upon sand. This unpleasant discovery was made through a vain attempt to apply the definitions laid down in the case of imperative sentences. Having previously resolved on retaining no definition in which he himself could discover a flaw, the position taken up was, after full examination, abandoned, and having found by experience how frail a reed the authority of grammarians is to lean on, he determined thenceforward to induce for himself. Having, therefore, collected specimens of the different kinds of sentences, he sorted these, and in doing so the simple fact forced itself still more convincingly on

him that there are other sentences besides those which correspond to logical propositions and in which the logical definitions of subject and predicate are inapplicable. On perceiving this his argument took the following shape :—

A sentence does *not* always contain an assertion. Therefore the verb does *not* always assert, even when applied to a nominative. Therefore the essence neither of the verb nor of the sentence consists in assertion, affirmation, or predication—a conclusion directly opposed to the most prevalent theory.

SECTION 3.—HOW DR. LATHAM DEFENDS IT.

Nor did it escape notice that Dr. Latham in his *Logic in its Application to Language* undertakes to *prove* that interrogative and other sentences are assertive. In section 17 that writer says :—

“A question in grammar is neither more nor less than a variety of the ordinary proposition with its parts transposed.”

In support of this he gives the sentence *What is this?* saying it is equivalent to *This is what*. But supposing these expressions to be equivalent, the deduction is incorrect. For take a representative of another class of ordinary questions—*Who comes here?* This is no variety of an ordinary proposition, and there is no transposition of parts whatever.

Again the same author, endeavouring to prove that imperative sentences are assertive, says :—

a. “At the first view few things can be more unlike each other than an assertion and a command.

b. “Indeed it may be admitted that the propositional character of commands is less clear than that of questions.

c. “Words like *walk*, *stand*, &c., convey neither an affirmation nor denial as a matter of direct assertion.

d. “Nevertheless they are essentially affirmative, and by

attaching to them the word *not* can be made negative; e.g.
Walk not, eat not, drink not.

e. "Again—Walk = Thou be walking.

Stand = Thou be standing.

Eat = Thou be eating.

And what is *thou* but a subject, *be* but a copula, and *walking* but a predicate?"

Remarks.

To a. At the last view, as well as at the first, "few things can be more unlike each other than an assertion and a command." The longer we look at and the more we consider such sentences as *Give me some bread*, the firmer will be our conviction that they are not statements or propositions.

To b. Since Dr. Latham admits that the "propositional character of commands is less clear than that of questions," *a fortiori* commands have no claim to the "propositional character." What this character is Dr. Latham himself, in section 1, tells us plainly. There we read that "a proposition is a statement, declaration, or assertion;" that "propositions are of two kinds, either true or false;" that "what a proposition conveys is this—it conveys what the speaker chooses to pass off as his belief." Dr. Latham's example of a proposition, *Bread is dear*, answers to his description. But how can such a sentence as *Give me some bread* partake of the "propositional character," which is to be true or false; and to "convey what a person chooses to pass off as his belief?"

To c. Words like *walk, stand, &c.*, we are told, "convey neither an affirmation or denial as a matter of *direct* assertion;" and it may be added they contain no indirect assertion, which, by the way, Dr. Latham does not seek to explain.

To d. Such expressions as *stand, walk*, are *not* affirmative

in the sense of predicative, the only sense of the word which concerns us here. It will be observed that Dr. Latham advances no proof in support of his assumption that commands are assertive. He merely repeats the statement in other words, and he does this in such a manner as to lay himself open to the charge of confusing the two senses of the word *affirmative* one with another, namely, *predicative* with *not negative*. This is a confusion of terms scarcely to be expected from a writer on *Logic in its Application to Language*.

To c. The word *thou*, in the inexcusable sentence *Thou be walking*, is not a subject at all, if the only definition Dr. Latham gives be accepted. He defines the subject as "the something we speak about." The word *thou* in the quoted sentence represents the person *to*, not *of* or *about*, whom we speak. There is often a wide difference between the person addressed and the thing spoken about, a difference which grammarians do not point out, possibly because such as considered the matter at all thought the fact too obvious to mention. Sometimes what is spoken *of* is also spoken *to*, but this occurs only in a certain class of instances. When, for example, Shelley says to the skylark,

"Bird thou never wert—"

thou the nominative to *wert*, and therefore the grammatical subject, happens to represent at once the thing spoken *to* and *of*, these being here identical. But in such a sentence as—

Stand thou,

in which there is no logical subject, it cannot be rightly said that *thou* represents that *of* or *about* which an assertion is made, for there is none made at all. As to what *thou*, *be* and *walking* are in Dr. Latham's original sentence the following analytical system will show clearly.

Meanwhile, lest the reader should not be already satisfied of Dr. Latham's failure to prove that interrogative and

imperative sentences are in any way assertive, I would observe that if a sentence does always contain an assertion, as Dr. Latham seeks to show, and if the essence of the verb, as Dr. Crombie and Dr. Morell aver, does consist in assertion, then by *assertion* must be understood something different from the ordinary meaning of the term. Yet, according to Dr. Latham himself, an assertion is nothing but a declaration or statement, and so it cannot with truth be said that interrogative, imperative or optative sentences are assertive or affirmative. In every sentence, however, there is an *application* of the verb to its subject, expressed or understood, and *herein consists the essence of the sentence*—a fact to which I would draw particular attention; but this kind of *ad-assertion* (to borrow Horne Tooke's expression) is perfectly distinct from that referred to by the writers who endeavour to make out that all sentences are assertive or predicative, and that the essence of the verb consists in assertion or affirmation.

SECTION 4.—OUTRAGES ON COMMON SENSE.

Dr. Sullivan, in his *Attempt to Simplify English Grammar* (p. 15), explaining how children should be introduced to that study, writes:—

“Their notice is next directed to the verb, which, they are told, is a word that implies action or the doing of something, as *to speak, to read, to walk, to run*. *To be* and *to suffer* are too difficult for the comprehension of children; nor is it necessary to include either in the definition of the verb. In fact *to be* or *to exist* may be said to come under the general definition, for the terms imply to do something, namely, to carry on the functions of life, to live.”

Children are to be told that a verb signifies action. If this is all they are told, how are they to distinguish such nouns as *walk, run*, from such verbs as *walk, run*? Besides saying *I walk, I run*, one may say *A walk, A run*.

Again, "It is not necessary," says Dr. Sullivan, "to include *to be* in the definition of the verb. In fact *to be* or *to exist* may be said to come under the general definition, &c." To this is appended the following note:—

"This explanation of the substantive verb is perhaps inadmissible. But even so we prefer the definition here recommended to those usually given, because it applies generally to all verbs and particularly because it is more easily comprehended by children."

How an "inadmissible explanation" of the verb can be "comprehended easily by children" is an enigma that will remain unsolved till and beyond the crack of doom. Children may give what Whately would call "a slumbering acquiescence" to such an explanation, but nothing more. If they understand what a verb is from such an "inadmissible explanation" as the above, they will be wiser than the grammarian himself.

Again, it is said in the extract that "to be and to exist imply living." In other words, according to Dr. Sullivan, inanimate things live! If this be grammar, let no parent select grammar as an "intellectual exercise" for his children.

In a note Dr. Sullivan goes on to say in words not intended as ironical:—"The *logical* account of the verb is also easily understood—namely, that its essence consists in asserting something about a person or thing."

If by a "logical" account is meant an accurate one, so far none has been given. Why the logical account should differ from the grammatical account nobody has yet shown, though many grave writers appear to think that upon entering the domain of logic liberties may be taken that would not be tolerated outside that study. A proper definition of this part of speech is yet a desideratum. The present writer has the presumption to think that he can furnish one, nay, more than one, notwithstanding what Dr.

Sullivan says of Mr. Cobbett. In a continuation of the note last quoted we read that—

“Cobbett, after stating that the mind of man is unable to bring the whole of the verbs into one short and precise description, says:—‘Verbs are then a sort of words, the use of which is to express the actions, the movements and the state of being of all creatures whether animate or inanimate.’”

This sounds comprehensive, but (putting aside the fact that verbs are used in speaking of the Creator as well as of creatures) it does not satisfy. Verbs are employed for other purposes than those named. They are used not only to express actions, movements or states, but also to command and interrogate. Moreover, many words not verbs express actions, movements and states of being, such as the nouns *cut, run, sleep*. Millions of children at the present day are taught to define a verb, according to Dr. Sullivan's direction, as a word which signifies action, and yet there are thousands of nouns which signify action likewise. The expression of action then is not a peculiar characteristic of the verb. Not only do many nouns express action but we find adjectives, adverbs and even prepositions which *imply* action, *e.g. swift, swiftly, from, towards*. That such errors as are above pointed out should escape criticism even in the hundred-and-fifth edition is simply astounding. I could show many others, but let the above suffice.

SECTION 5.—THE LOGICIANS OF PORT ROYAL.

Before giving the true definition of the verb, it will be well to notice what is said on it by one other authority, highly esteemed for “accuracy and precision” during the last two centuries in the schools of France. In the *Port Royal Logic*, Part I., chapter 2, we read of the verb as “a word the principal use of which is to express affirmation,”

and that "it is employed also to express other movements of the mind, as those of desiring, entreating and commanding, &c." But the latter we are told "is done only by the inflection of the mood," and thus, say the authors without scruple, "we shall consider the verb throughout the whole of this chapter in its principal signification alone, which is that which it has in the indicative mood."

Allowing that the *chief* use of the verb is to assert, we cannot with the Port Royalists consent to burke the equally important fact that frequently it does *not* assert. What right have they when professing to treat of "the nature and essence of the verb" to consider it in one of its phases only? By this very step they are led to a wrong definition. They make in fact the same kind of mistake they charge others with. To apply their own words—"This has prevented many persons, otherwise very able [themselves included], from clearly understanding the nature of the verb, because they have not considered it in relation to that which is essential to it."

What is *essential* to the verb will be stated presently in giving its definition. The Port Royal logicians have "misunderstood the nature of the verb" and led many thousands to misunderstand it by considering affirmation as essential to it, whereas affirmation is quite as accidental to it as commanding, entreating or desiring is. After condemning the definitions of Aristotle, Buxtorf, and Scaliger as "false and applying *neque omni, neque soli*," the same writers go on to say that—

"The essential reason why a participle is not a verb is that it does not express affirmation. . . . It appears that the presence or absence of affirmation in a word is that which constitutes it a verb or not a verb. . . . It ought therefore to be laid down that considering simply what is essential to the verb, its only true definition is *vox significans affirmationem*, a word which signifies affirmation."

If the presence or absence of affirmation in a word is that which constitutes it a verb or not a verb, then in such sentences as *Give me some bread* we cannot call the word *give* a verb, and this mood as well as participles should be excluded from that title. The mistake of the Port Royalists consists in taking that for the essence which is but a mode, no slight error in a philosophical work so much praised for "accuracy and precision." Arnauld and his school do not admit that the indicative is a mood at all, wherein they differ from Dr. Crombie, who regards the indicative as the sole mood, at least in English! When the French logicians say that desires, entreaties and commands are made only by the "inflection of the mood," I reply that assertions are made as much by inflection as these. The indicative has its full share of inflections. Verbs are commonly said to be in such and such a mood, sometimes according to the manner in which they are used, at other times according to the way in which they are inflected. In the present case, as in many others, confusion arises from this loose way of speaking. The Port Royalists leave unnoticed the fact that "the meaning [they should say the *use*] which the verb has in the indicative" is twofold, assertive and interrogative; and that these are really two moods; though the Latin grammarians, from time immemorial, have unwarrantably counted them one, the same inflection usually answering for both, e.g. *Caesar venit, Unde venit?*

Again, to hold with Arnauld that imperatives are necessarily formed by inflection is to ignore induction. For, to pass by the Chinese language, in several dialects of which there never occurs a single inflection of the verb, even in English this particular mood is *never* formed by inflection. Inflection pertains chiefly to transpositive languages like Latin; partly to mixed tongues like English; not at all to the monosyllabic dialects of China. The theory of the verb adopted by the logicians of Port Royal is taken from the

Grammaire Générale. In the present age, when so much light has been thrown on the nature of various languages, it is strange that such theories as theirs should not meet with prompt condemnation. See how the French authorities of the old school theorize on what they are pleased to term "general grammar." "Men," they say, employing this word unrestrictedly, "have added some attribute to the verb as *Petrus vivit* for *Petrus est vivens*; and in some cases the subject of the proposition as *Sum homo*; . . . and thirdly a relation of time as *Caenasti*; . . . all which has prevented many," &c., as before. All which, it may be added, is an apt illustration of the manner in which many philosophers lay down laws for languages in general after a partial examination, if it deserve the name, of a particular language. The model or standard set up by the old French school is Latin, by which all languages are to be squared. In this there may be some excuse for men whose native tongue is based on the language of ancient Rome, and to whom Comparative Grammar was at most a name. But what shall be said in vindication of those modern English writers who submissively accept this Roman yoke without any extenuating circumstances? They have a language with a greater similarity to the purely monosyllabic tongues than to the composite Latin, and if they continue to hold the wide-spread but erroneous principle, framed by the logicians of France and England, as represented respectively by Arnauld and Whately, that "men" have added something to every verb, or that "every verb is a compound word" (Whately's *Logic*, pp. 38-9), they must admit that in their own language several thousand words, which children are invariably taught to call verbs, are in reality no verbs at all. For the verbs in all such expressions as *I love*, *Love thou*, *We love*, are remarkable for absence of inflection; have had nothing added to them so as to form part of the same word and are not therefore "compound."

SECTION 6.—THE DEFINITION OF THE VERB.

Seeing then that several of those who are reckoned among the profoundest intellects that have enlightened the world by their researches have signally failed in defining the verb and ascertaining in what its essence consists, the writer pauses in some tremor before giving his own definition, which he has not met in the works of any author nor heard from the tongue of man. Where the profundity of even Aristotle is at fault, how can he hope for success? With a feeling of relief he answers this question by another. What avails profundity for the discovery of those treasures that lie near the surface? The spade of the unscientific miner unearths a Welcome Nugget covered by a mere tuft of grass, while science often with all appliances and means in vain sinks deep into the bowels of the earth for that which is not there. So with this definition. So simple, so plain is it that while some will ask—"Why did we not see this before? Others will say—"Everybody knew it." To the latter it may be objected—"If everyone knew it, why did no one proclaim it?" The merit of the discovery may be little, the value of it must be great, for reasons already stated. What then is this much wanted definition. Smile not, reader, when told that—

A verb is a word which with a noun, or equivalent, forms a sentence.

This definition is at once simple enough for the comprehension of children, and will be found to bear philosophic investigation. It applies *omni, et soli et semper*, to all verbs, to verbs alone and to verbs in all their uses, excepting the *suppositio materialis*. Logicians will here perceive the *genus* and *differentia* of the thing defined. How near some have come to recognizing this distinguishing and ever-accompanying characteristic of verbs, and yet have missed it, may be seen in Dr. Crombie's *Etymology and Syntax*. At

p. 94 we read indeed that "a verb joined to a noun forms a sentence ;" but immediately after we are told that "affirmation is essential to the character of the verb," while lower down he adds that "affirmation is *inseparable* from the verb," and in the same page he exclaims—"Destroy this characteristic and it is immediately confounded with the participle or adjective." Dr. Crombie knows better than to confound verbs in non-assertive sentences with participles or adjectives—except in theory. So much confusion exists among grammarians about the essential characteristic of the verb that it is impossible from what they say to make out what this part of speech really is. It was only by examining the verb in all its uses that the present writer was enabled to induce its distinctive mark and to give the definition, one that a child may learn in a few minutes, but which philosophers have for centuries expected to obtain without systematic search. No stronger confirmation of the value of the principle laid down in the previous chapter for the classification of words according to their uses is needed than that afforded by its present application.

A second definition having regard to the different moods of the verb may be given as follows—"A verb is a word which, with a noun, or equivalent, expresses either a direct or indirect assertion ; a command, request or entreaty ; an inquiry ; a wish ; or a condition."

Here we neither limit the verb to the mere assertion or expression of being, doing or suffering ; nor do we exclude the verb *be* ; while in one tolerably short and precise description are included the verbs in every sentence man is capable of forming, at least in the English language.

Again, it may be said that a verb is a word which stands as the grammatical predicate in a sentence. What is meant by the grammatical predicate ? It is a word which with a grammatical subject forms a sentence. This explanation is not intended for children commencing grammar. The

words *subject* and *predicate* are borrowed from logic, but in grammar they do not retain their original meaning. Through the writings of modern analysts these terms have obtained a footing in grammar which they are not likely to lose, since at least one of them answers a purpose no other word in the language does. The term *predicate* in grammar might be dispensed with; but the word *subject* cannot be well spared, for, as will be shown, it prevents the frequent repetition of a cumbrous phraseology and has besides a radical signification well expressive of the office it fills as the foundation of the sentence, το ὑποκείμενον, *subjectum*; for take it away and the sentence collapses.

The simplicity, comprehensiveness and accuracy of the given definitions are such as will probably commend them to the matured judgment of most readers. How much depends on their acceptance it would be hazardous to determine. Before the conclusion of this book, however, it will be seen that there are questions involved in the right definition of the verb which a cursory view of the matter would not lead one to suppose. Not for centuries only, but for more than two thousand years, has the philosophic world been divided with itself concerning the nature of verbs; and it is not going too far to anticipate that should the explanation of the matter here attempted be received, nothing less than a radical reformation may be looked for in what is too frequently "the most illogical of sciences." Objections of course will arise, and the most important is anticipated in the following section.

SECTION 7.—CONSISTENCY IN GRAMMAR.

No provision, it will be remarked, has been made in defining the verb for what grammarians, ancient and modern, delight to call the "infinitive mood." Some authors, like Dr. Crombie and Dr. Morell, are at great pains to impress

upon students that "the infinitive is *always* used as a noun," and "has all the essential characteristics of that part of speech;" likewise that it is entirely wanting in what they style the essence of the verb, namely, assertion. Yet in spite of all this they themselves persist in calling it a verb! It is just as easy, and infinitely more consistent, to call it what it really is. What is called the infinitive "mood" has been a bone of contention for ages, and so will continue if the present inconsistent habit of treating it prevails. There is no infinitive *mood of the verb*. Infinitives are not verbs; they are excluded even by the definition most prevalent.

Dr. Crombie (*Etymology*, p. 106), after maintaining that the infinitive is always used as a noun, says:—

"It matters little what designation be assigned to it, provided its character and office be fully understood. . . . To proscribe terms which have been long familiar to us, and by immemorial possession have gained an establishment, is always a difficult and frequently an ungracious task."

To this I reply that unless we give words their right designation their character and office will not be fully understood; that it is of little advantage to compose new works on etymology unless previous imperfect classifications of words be amended; and that although it may be a difficult task to substitute a correct phraseology for a faulty one, which has for centuries obtained even among the best writers, no clear-minded person will look upon such an attempt as "ungracious:" in fine, unless some such endeavour be crowned with success, grammar must continue to be "the most illogical of sciences," and, as such, the least adapted to the culture of the intellectual faculties. Dr. Crombie's sentiment about "establishments" does not breathe the spirit of reform. "Establish what you please," says Horne Tooke, "do but establish; and while that establishment shall last, we shall be perfectly convinced of

its propriety." Surely it is time a consistent grammatical phraseology should be established, and inconsistent expressions be unsparingly excised. Dr. Crombie in particular should be one of the last to retain such an incongruity as that noticed above, since in arguing against Horne Tooke he himself says, at p. 72, in a note :—

"It is desirable that in every art or science not only should no term be employed which may convey to the reader or hearer an incorrect conception of the thing signified, but that every term should assist him in forming a just idea of the object which it expresses."

Why then continue to call that a verb which is no verb at all? This is the common practice. Some might say it is more convenient to retain the old, familiar, illogical way of speaking. This, however, would be a sorry plea, and indeed a fallacious one; for in the long run it will be found much more convenient to speak strictly and logically, though to do so may necessitate the breach of many time-honoured abuses besides the one here pointed out.

Dr. Crombie is one of those who believe there are greater faults than inconsistency in grammatical science; for in taking Dr. Beattie to task he speaks in a note at p. 98 of that grammarian's teaching being "chargeable with objections of a more serious nature" than that of inconsistency. This is a grand mistake. For as soon as grammar becomes inconsistent not only is there positive error, but it fails in affording desirable subject matter for mental training, and fosters the most pernicious habit of reconciling the youthful mind to accept contradictory statements, thereby leaving it an easy prey to the sophist. Such a habit has a deteriorating effect on the intellect precisely analogous to that which a familiarity with vice has on the moral sense.

That I do not stand alone in advocating consistent accuracy in grammar, the following from Mr. Mason's preface shows :—

"In grammar, as in every other science, the accuracy of the definitions is of vital importance. They must be such that there shall be no ambiguity in their terms, and that they shall be convertible, that is, that the description given as a definition of the thing defined shall apply to it and to nothing else; so that the definition remains true when read conversely. To say that a square is a plane rectilinear figure with four equal sides, would not be to give a definition, because it is not true that *a*, that is, *any* plane rectilinear figure with four equal sides is a square. No doubt it is often difficult to give perfectly accurate grammatical definitions, and still more difficult for a pupil to understand them thoroughly; but difficulties are not surmounted by being evaded; and the clumsy, slipshod attempts at definition, with which most of the school grammars in current use abound, are worse than useless. If a rough, inexact notion of grammatical terms and principles is sufficient, the study of grammar becomes superfluous, because a reasonably intelligent pupil can make such for himself. The object of the study of grammar is to shape these rough notions into accuracy. The faults referred to are inexcusable, because more correct statements might have been obtained from sources easily accessible."

No one who reads Mr. Mason's work will attribute to him carelessness as a characteristic, nor is he, it is clear, of that supremely illogical cast of mind which several writers on "philosophic grammar" are the victims of. Far from it: he is the reverse of this. What fatality then is there besetting the construction of grammatical works that causes an acute reasoner and careful writer to fall into the grossest possible contradiction on one of the most vital points in the science of which he treats? The extract from Mr. Mason's preface gives no promise of "slipshod definitions" or "rough notions" or "inexcusable faults." Yet what is this?

In paragraph 173 Mr. Mason defines the verb as "that part of speech by means of which we are able to make an assertion about something." In paragraph 188 he tells us that "it is impossible to make an assertion by means of the infinitive;" yet in paragraph 187 he speaks of the infinitive as a "form of the verb," and he parses the infinitive as a verb!

One can hardly believe that such contradictions are inevitable or that grammar is necessarily "the most illogical of sciences." But unless we give up the practice of calling certain words verbs and not verbs at the same time, the theory of grammar will always remain a stumbling block to old and young. There is no characteristic which infinitives have in common with verbs that is not also common to words of some other class. If there is, let it be named, and there will then be something whereby verbs and infinitives may be embraced in one consistent definition. Some grammarians speak of *finite* verbs and oppose them to infinitives, but they do not escape the difficulty, for they retain a definition which does not apply to the latter.

The only statement in the extract from Mr. Mason's preface to which exception need be taken is that in which the grammarian says it is more difficult for the pupil to thoroughly comprehend perfect definitions than for the grammarian to make them. The verb may be referred to as a case in point. No one but the present writer knows what difficulty he had in obtaining the definition of the verb, but who will say it is hard to understand? A verb is a word which with a noun, or equivalent, forms a sentence. It has taken the world more than two thousand years to arrive at this definition, which any educated person may understand in two minutes, unless his ideas have been confused by years of illogical teaching.

CHAPTER III.

THE PARTS OF SPEECH.

SECTION I.—AMBIGUITY OF THE TERM.

CASTING a glance back over the way travelled, I find that while something has been done towards laying the foundation of the science of grammar, that foundation is not yet completed. The corner-stone has been laid, and some of the heaviest work accomplished, but those troublesome "parts of speech" are not yet disposed of. We have, however, established the principle, which will enable us to complete sufficiently for the purpose in hand that which is begun. The following points especially have been placed in a conspicuous light—that usage is the basis of grammar—that whatever rules or principles are to be established must be drawn from the observation of usage—that the classification of words is to be regulated by their uses, and not by their form, derivation or signification—that many of the differences and errors of grammatical writers arise from a non-recognition of or deviation from these principles; that in order to place grammar on a proper footing it is necessary only in certain respects to depart from the general practice, but that untenable and useless definitions, such as are current of verbs, must be wiped out of grammatical treatises before the science of words can be simplified in such a way that even philosophers may obtain clear views thereof. Moreover, unless I mistake, definitions have been obtained of the noun, adjective and verb which show that there is no necessity whatever for that "perplexity" in which Dr. Crombie (*Etymology*, p. 73, note) says "the classification of words has been and still continues to be involved," and which that author attributes to the fact that

“the metaphysician and the grammarian consider words in a different manner, the former looking upon them merely as signs of thought, while the latter regards chiefly their changes by inflection.” In the place from which these words are taken, Dr. Crombie has a long discussion about the noun, in the course of which he does indeed throw some light upon its nature, but the light is such as proceeds on a dark night from the flashing of a lantern right and left alternately and its complete final withdrawal. Discussions of this kind tend rather to throw grammar into deeper gloom than to clarify it. There is no reason why the grammarian and the metaphysician should look upon words in different lights when considering their nature and classification. Until philosophers consent to lay aside the green and blue spectacles they are in the habit of putting on alternately, and to view things with their natural eyesight, they will never see them in their true colours. But when they agree to consider the points under discussion, not so much as questions of grammar or of metaphysics but of fact, they may come to satisfactory conclusions.

No answer has yet been given in these pages to the oft-repeated question—How many are the parts of speech? The question appears simple, but its complexity is still a barrier to progress in the grammatical art. First, what is a “part of speech?” This phrase is commonly employed to signify sometimes a class of words and sometimes a single member of a class. I employ it in both senses, and I trust without causing confusion. But some have taken the phrase under notice to mean a “part of a sentence,” as though all speech consisted of sentences. In fact Dr. Morell tells us (*Grammar*, p. 1) that—

“All language is composed of sentences.” Language consists of isolated words and phrases as well as of complete sentences. Still on Dr. Morell’s acceptance of the phrase, some authors exclude a whole class of words from the title

of "part of speech." These unfortunate words, the interjections, have long been a cause of strife. All the ire of that turbulent spirit, Horne Tooke, is roused by them.

"The dominion of speech," he writes (*Diversions*, I. 61) "is erected upon the downfall of interjections. Without the artful contrivances of language mankind would have nothing but interjections to communicate orally any of their feelings. The neighing of a horse, the lowing of a cow, the barking of a dog, the purring of a cat, sneezing, coughing, groaning, shrieking and every other involuntary convulsion with oral sound, have almost as good a title to be called parts of speech as interjections have. Voluntary interjections are often employed when the suddenness of some affection or passion returns men to their natural state and makes them forget the use of speech; or when from some circumstance the shortness of time will not permit them to exercise it. And in books they are only used for embellishment. But where speech can be employed they are totally useless, and are always insufficient for the purpose of communicating our thoughts. And indeed where will you look for the interjection? Will you find it among laws or in books of civil institutions, in history or in any treatise of useful arts or sciences? No; you must seek for it in rhetoric and poetry, in novels, plays and romances."

Many writers have a weakness for comparing when they should contrast. A sorry compliment to our great poets is this of likening some of the most telling words in their works to the neighing of a horse and the lowing of a cow. Mrs. Siddons, as Lady Macbeth, thrilled a thousand hearts by the sympathetic utterance of a single interjection, which, according to the recluse of Purley, is little better than "the purring of a cat." Ajax and Medea, hide your diminished heads, nor venture with your ceaseless *aias* near the prison bars of this "victim of two prepositions and a conjunction;" for such sounds to him are no better than "groaning, cough-

ing and sneezing," and he is troubled with fine-strung nerves. Seriously, however, no reason can be given why the employment of words in legal, historical and scientific compositions should entitle them to the distinction of being "parts of speech" more than their use in dramatic and poetic works. Besides, interjections frequently occur in histories and in many scientific works on language. Yet here, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, we find Dr. Crombie (*Etymology*, p. 179) taking up the same absurd idea. He gravely informs the present generation of youth that the interjection, by which we frequently convey more than a sentence would express of our thoughts and feelings, is simply "a physical emission of sound," and has "no more claim to be called a part of speech than the neighing of a horse." Such information comes to us in this age of progress under the garb of "philosophic grammar," and is reverently received.

Professor Earle, in his *Philology of the English Tongue*, on other grounds denies to the interjection the title of part of speech. In Chapter III. he writes:—

"When we speak of grammar as the handmaid of logic, the interjection must stand aside. Emotion is quick, and leaves no room for logical thought. . . . It is a confusion of thought to rank it among the parts of speech. . . . We rightly call an adjective or an adverb a part of speech, because they have no meaning by themselves without the aid of nouns and verbs. . . . The use of the interjection is very much reduced by civilization."

Remarks.

1. Grammar is no more the handmaid of logic than logic is the handmaid of grammar. Some logicians, indeed, look upon their sphere as a higher one than that occupied by the grammarian, and appear at times to think they are at liberty to step down from their eminence, send grammarians to the

right-about, and re-order the laws of grammar according to the exigencies of their own peculiar logical systems. This they would never have been suffered to attempt were it not for the division existing among grammarians; and it has been a fertile source of confusion.

2. Emotion is not necessarily "quick," but often very slow in arising, as well as lasting; and it often leaves abundant room for both "logical" and "illogical" thought. Many besides Horne Tooke and Mr. Earle make the interjection expressive always of *sudden* emotion, though it frequently expresses in a deliberate manner emotions the reverse of sudden, the result or accompaniment of long pre-meditation and sufferance of grief, pleasure, admiration, &c. Some phlegmatic people will sit through a splendid opera before a single *bravo* escapes them; and then the interjection comes, perhaps with a drawl, from those who either could or would do nothing suddenly. This prevalent idea of the necessary suddenness of interjections is an instance of how people go on repeating the same thing without reflection. Dr. Morell, who regards grammar as "a purely intellectual exercise," insists that words of this class signify *sudden* grief, *sudden* pain, &c., as though grief and pain were always sudden. With admirable inconsistency, Dr. Morell admits the interjection as a "part of speech," yet is careful to inform us that is an "extra-grammatical utterance."

3. We do *not* "rightly call an adjective or an adverb a part of speech because they have no meaning by themselves;" for they have all a meaning by themselves, as lexicographers agree by assigning in their dictionaries to each word the separate meaning men commonly give it. Professor Earle calls Horne Tooke's treatment of Harris's theory that some words are singly non-significant but become significant by combination "saucy," but he does not dislodge Mr. Tooke from his position, which is in fact impregnable.

4. The statement that "the use of interjections is very much reduced by civilization" has nothing to support it. A thousand writers from Sophocles to Shakespeare and from Ovid to Tennyson give contrary evidence. For my part, novel as the statement may appear, I venture to assert that there is usually a greater variety of interjections among polished nations than among savages. As there is a greater abundance of nouns and verbs among nations rich in ideas, so there is a larger variety of interjections among those whose feelings are cultivated and refined. In no savage tribe do we find such a variety of interjections as among the denizens of May Fair.

Mr. Earle has such an attractive way of putting things that it is a pity he does not take the right side in these little matters. He is again infelicitous when, dividing interjections into those whose origin we can trace and those we cannot, he makes the former the "fruits of culture" and the latter remnants of barbarism. Among the "fruits of culture" he places *Fudge*, which by the way is no interjection at all but either a noun or a verb. *Fudge* as a noun means nonsense, exaggeration, lying. If we say *You fudge it*, the word *fudge* is a verb and signifies exaggerate or make up lying tales like those of Captain Fudge. Never is *fudge* an interjection more than *nonsense* is. We may, as is commonly said, "interject" any word in the language; that is, we may break into discourse with any word or utter it alone, as *Hear* in parliament. But when we come to scientific grammar we must not by this be led to confuse any noun or verb so employed with an interjection. The expressions *Fudge* and *Hear* in Professor Earle's illustrations are elliptical, and without due regard to ellipsis grammar as a science falls to the ground. An interjection is a word that forms no part of a sentence but is used to express some mental act, state or emotion. Neither *fudge* nor *hear* nor *hush* nor *silence* comes under this definition.

Why the interjection should be regarded as an "extra-grammatical utterance" is not easily answered to satisfy. Every grammarian is bound to treat of it, show the mode of its employment and its value in discourse. For myself I retain it as a part of speech on the ground that it is an articulate sound used by man to indicate mental acts and states as well as to express emotions without naming them and independently of other words. It is thrown into discourse without forming an element of a sentence, except when quoted ; but if the title of "part of speech" be denied it on the ground that it does not form an integral part of a sentence, then all nouns in the nominative of address should be regarded as "extra-grammatical utterances" also. This Professor Earle and Dr. Morell overlook.

Under the term *interjection* come the words *yes, no, aye, nay, ah, &c.*, expressive of assent, dissent, doubt and other mental acts or states. We often use the interjection *eh?* to denote interrogation. What grammarian points out this fact?

In many grammars *yes* and *no* are reckoned as adverbs. Horne Tooke with some justice styled the adverb "the common sink of grammarians" into which they were in the habit of casting all words they could not satisfactorily account for. Not only are *aye* and *no* at times interjections but we find them used as nouns also. Thus Mr. Speaker says:—"The ayes or the noes have it." *No* is likewise an adjective as in—*No bread, No friends, No money, No use, No good.*

Having surmounted the preliminary difficulty regarding interjections and established their claim to rank among the parts of speech, I proceed to the remaining classes of words, postponing the question of their number till all have been passed in review.

SECTION 2.—THE CLASSES.

Definitions of the noun, adjective, verb and interjection have been already given, marking off such words clearly from all others. Among the remaining classes comes the pronoun. Under this designation are included—

1. Words commonly used as substitutes for nouns, or for any expression used like a noun, to indicate things without naming them, thereby avoiding awkward repetition of names :

2. Words resembling the above, and discharging in sentences some function, which a noun can discharge, such as that of being subject to or object after a verb.

I say *for any expression used like a noun*, because pronouns stand for all such, e.g. "*And* is a conjunction, it joins words, phrases and sentences." "*You will succeed* ; I do not doubt *it*." In the last example the pronoun *it* stands for a sentence ; in the first for a quoted conjunction employed as subject.

A pronoun may be briefly defined as a word not itself a name but always forming the same element in a sentence as a noun can. In the definition I say *not itself a name* because nouns are often used instead of others to prevent repetition. The definition given includes personal, relative and interrogative pronouns, the two last not being substitutes at all. We cannot call *who* a substitute for a noun in *Who comes here ?* since there is as yet no name given. It is employed to find a name, not to prevent its repetition.

Mr. Mason points out that some words as *each* and *own* are not really pronouns though often put down as such. Nevertheless he calls these words "adjective pronouns," alleging the convenience of the term, while admitting its inconsistency. But he writes, as we have seen, strongly on the need of accuracy in defining, and of what value are

accurate definitions if they be not adhered to? The only hope of reforming grammar is through consistency, and it is quite as convenient to call words what they are as what they are not. Mr. Mason (*Grammar*, p. 22) says :—

“It is only in deference to the common (and it is feared inveterate) practice of grammars in all languages that the self-contradictory term *adjective pronoun* is here introduced. It must be allowed, however, that in the case of two or three of the demonstrative adjectives the noun understood is commonly so entirely lost sight of that it is convenient to call them pronouns, though, strictly speaking, they have no right to that appellation.”

Of course such practices will become “inveterate,” if grammarians, who know better, do not “speak strictly” and stem the popular current by proscribing “self-contradictory terms.” The main body of the nation are amenable to reason, and only want the right thing put before them in the proper manner to grasp it eagerly, especially in regard to studies which they cannot systematize themselves, and which they hand over to the safe keeping of writers whom they often reward for setting them right. Mr. Mason in the present instance sacrifices his consistency by agreeing to call certain words what they are not in deference to the common phraseology. With due respect to current opinion, I have no intention of humouring it by such a concession. Wherever established ideas are at variance with fact, the latter should be closely adhered to. In point of consistency a grammarian should nail his colours to the mast, and though he may trip unwittingly, he should not do so adventurously. A thoroughly consistent course entails trouble, but for a good end pains should be taken even with the driest details.

“It is very doubtful,” says Mr. Mason (p. 32, seventeenth edition), “whether *hers*, *ours*, *yours* and *theirs* should be called adjectives at all.”

There ought to be no doubt about the matter. They cannot, like adjectives, be placed beside nouns to qualify them, and they come under the definition of the pronoun. These words can stand as subjects or objects, and are therefore in either the nominative or objective case, though grammarians generally put them down as possessive.

On the other hand *my*, *thy*, &c., which are commonly set down as pronouns, are nothing but adjectives formed from pronouns. *My*, *thy*, &c., correspond to *meus*, *tuus*, &c., not to *mei*, *tui*, &c., the latter being pronouns, the former genuine adjectives.

Mr. Mason in several places teaches "the identity of the relative and interrogative pronouns," remarking that the former are often used interrogatively. This is inaccurate. Certain pronouns, as *who* and *which*, are sometimes relative and sometimes interrogative, but these uses are mutually exclusive, and therefore never identical. Dr. Crombie and several others make the same mistake. The relative pronoun is so called because it refers to something before indicated, thence called the antecedent; whereas interrogative pronouns have no such antecedent.

ADVERB.—Under this head are included all words which, not coming under any class already defined, modify a verb, an adjective, or another adverb.

Here again we are compelled to have recourse to the principle of exclusion, for adjectives often modify verbs, *e.g.* *Crassus was rich*, where the adjective *rich* modifies the verb *was*; but since *rich* comes under the definition of the adjective, and through the verb distinguishes the person named, it is no adverb. Moreover, without any change of meaning, it can be placed beside a noun to qualify it.

PREPOSITION.—A part of speech not included in any previous class, governing nouns or pronouns and relating them to other words.

Many words are employed both as adverbs and prepositions, but these uses are easily distinguished, the latter always taking an objective case.

Examples—"There is nothing to laugh *at*." "Laugh *at* him."

CONJUNCTION.—A word, not included in any previous class, standing between words, phrases or sentences to connect them by expressing an intermediate idea.

If all words that have a conjunctive force were called conjunctions, several other kinds of words would come under this title, *e.g.* "This is the man *whom* I want." Here the relative pronoun connects. Prepositions also connect, *e.g.* "A man *of* prudence." Verbs also, in the way above specified, connect, *e.g.* "Man *is* mortal." Exclusion, therefore, is here absolutely required, though it may be tacit, when there is no fear of misunderstanding.

PARTICIPLES.—As yet no mention has been made of these. Many words are commonly termed participles which really come under the definition of the adjective. True participles in English cannot be placed beside nouns as adjectives can to affect their meaning. When we talk of *spilt milk* or *milk spilt*, *spilt* is a true adjective, not a participle. Participles are words not included in any previous class and in sentences attached to verbs, to infinitives, or to adjectives formed from verbs, *e.g.*—"He has *walked*," "To have *gone*," "Having *been* deceived," "He is *fled*." Some of these participles (for instance *been*) partially resemble a noun, but they are not names and therefore not nouns. Similarly *fled* resembles an adjective, inasmuch as it is attributive to the subject through the verb, but it cannot in good English be placed by a noun to qualify it and therefore wants the essential characteristic of the adjective. The term *participle* well expresses these resemblances to parts of speech from which it essentially differs.

As to Infinitives, they are names of action used in the nominative and objective, but have no possessive form. I do not, it may be noticed, allow the word *to*, often prefixed to the infinitive noun, to be considered as part of the same word. The infinitive and its sign are always written separately, and so are invariably accounted in this grammatical system as distinct words. This at first may seem a needlessly rigid method of procedure. Some would stigmatize it as "purism." It will be found, however, on examination that much misconception concerning the nature of words in our tongue and of the theory of grammar has arisen from and been maintained through the lax, mischievous and inconsistent habit of taking several words together and calling them one, while on other occasions the same words are treated as separate parts of speech. There is not, so far as I know, a single grammarian who does not do this to a greater or less degree. Throughout the whole of this book care is taken never to call two words one, except in criticising or quoting other works. There is no science of grammar till language becomes written, and it is only when written that we can judge how some words are to be taken. The ear cannot decide in many instances whether words are intended as separate or not, and it is only when written that this can finally be decided.

The infinitive with *to* forms a Phrase, just as the word *man* does with *a* or *the* prefixed. The word *to*, known commonly as "the sign of the infinitive," should on no account be styled a preposition, since its use is essentially different from that of the preposition. Like *a*, *an* and *the* it is an article, and being placed beside a noun to affect its meaning is to the full as much an adjective as they are. A phrase formed of *to* and an infinitive noun may be either Nounal, Adjectival or Adverbial according to the mode of its employment, as in "I desire *to learn*," "There is money

to spare," "We should eat *to live*." We see from this how wide of the mark are those grammarians who say that the infinitive with its sign is "always used as a noun," and the advantage of separating it from its sign, the article *to*. In the nounal, adjectival and adverbial phrases given above the infinitive without *to* remains the name of an action throughout, and is therefore a noun.

I find then in the English language nine classes of words used in distinctly different ways. They are—

- | | |
|------------------|-----------------|
| 1. Noun. | 5. Adverb. |
| 2. Pronoun. | 6. Participle. |
| 3. Adjective. | 7. Preposition. |
| 4. Verb. | 8. Conjunction. |
| 9. Interjection. | |

Adopting the plan of exclusion already explained we get satisfactory definitions of all the parts of speech in a brief form as follows:—

1. A noun is a name consisting of a single word.
2. A pronoun is a word not itself a name but always forming the same element in a sentence as a noun can.
3. An adjective is a word, other than a noun or pronoun, capable of standing with a noun to distinguish it and form with it a nounal phrase.
4. A verb is a word which with a noun or pronoun can form a sentence.
5. An adverb is a word (not included in any class defined above and) used to modify a verb or adjective or a word of its own class.
6. A participle is a word (not included above) resembling in some respects an adjective or a noun, in other respects differing from both, and depending in a sentence on a verb, an infinitive noun, or an adjective formed from a verb.
7. A preposition is a word (not included in any previous

class) governing nouns or pronouns, and relating them to other words.

8. A conjunction is a word (not included in any previous class and) joining words, phrases or sentences.

9. An interjection is a word that does not form an element of a sentence, except when quoted, but is used to express a mental act, state or emotion.

In forming the above classes it will be seen that not a single unfamiliar term has been introduced, while all such expressions as *substantive verb*, *adjective verb*, *noun substantive*, *noun adjective*, and *adjective pronoun* have been scrupulously avoided as useless and resting on a confusion of principles. Sub-classes of course may be formed provided the first main division be duly regarded, and other technical terms indicative of various functions may with advantage be introduced on the same condition. I would for instance, in a grammar, employ the word *Verbal* as a name to embrace infinitive nouns, participles and nouns or adjectives formed from verbs and retaining the governing power of verbs whether they exercise that power or not. The term *Interrogative* might also be employed as a name to comprehend such words as *Why*, *How*, *Who*, *Which*, &c., when used in questions.

Phrases are found to correspond with each of the nine parts of speech.

EXAMPLES.

1. *Nounal Phrase*, { A splendid mansion.
To have been deceived.
2. *Pronounal Phrase*, I myself.
3. *Adjective Phrase*, Very beautiful.
4. *Verbal Phrase*, Has been described.
5. *Adverbial Phrase*, Right merrily.
6. *Participial Phrase*, Been gone.
7. *Prepositional Phrase*, Round about (the house).

8. *Conjunctive Phrase*, In as much as.

9. *Interjectional Phrase*, { *Alack a day!*
 Ah me!

Of these phrases the most important are the Nounal, Adjectival, and Adverbial. Phrases, like Words, are distinguished by their uses, not by merely *beginning* with any particular part of speech, as some grammarians at times would lead us to suppose.

Sentences too, and Clauses, are found corresponding to the Noun, Adjective, Adverb, and Interjection, but not to the other parts of speech. For examples, see Part II.

Here concludes my attempt to systematize one of the chief parts of grammar. If there are any words in our language which do not consistently come under one of the given categories, they have escaped my notice. Much more might be said that would swell this volume beyond its intended size. Many objections may be made to my infringement of the existing order (?) of things. Some of these I foresee, but do not feel called on to anticipate further than has been done. Still it is possible that part of what is written will have to be modified, for words are indeed difficult to treat scientifically, as those can best judge who have made the attempt. As the work progresses it will deviate somewhat from the beaten track. Yet with all opposition to the current teaching it will be found, I trust, of a really conservative spirit, merely advocating reform where it is needed and never introducing useless technicalities.

PART II.

THE SYNTACTICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

CHAPTER I.

THE ANALYSIS OF SENTENCES.

SECTION 1.—DEFINITIONS.

ALL language—meaning thereby all that men speak or write—consists of WORDS used either singly or in combination. Words are combined to form PHRASES ; both words and phrases are formed into SENTENCES and these last into PERIODS.

To gain a systematic knowledge therefore of the syntactical structure of any language, it is necessary to examine these four kinds of expression. The analysis of the structure of individual words belongs to etymology ; that of the other expressions to syntax. In this system of syntactical analysis it is intended to treat only incidentally of the structure or composition of words ; nor is it proposed to make that of phrases a subject of minute investigation. Both words and phrases are here considered as the elements of sentences, and accordingly are examined that it may be seen how sentences are formed of them, rather than to show how they themselves are constructed, though the plan adopted does reveal much of the structure of both.

Sentences occur either singly or in combination. Sen-

tences are combined to form Periods. Putting aside then the structure of Words and Phrases, grammatical analysis naturally falls into two parts, the first relating to the structure of Sentences, the second to that of Periods.

WORDS are articulate or distinct spoken or written signs of ideas or emotions or mental acts or states. The words *good* and *man* for instance are signs of ideas; *alas* and *hurrah* indicate emotions of grief or pleasure; *ah* often expresses a state of doubt; *yes* and *no* are signs of the mental acts of assent or dissent; while *eh?* signifies interrogation. Those grammarians, who define words as signs of ideas or notions only, put into the background half of man's nature. Most grammarians do this.

A SENTENCE is an expression consisting of at least a verb and a grammatical subject, as *Men think*, *Fish swim*, *Flowers fade*. As may be plainly seen in these instances, a sentence is *formed* simply by the application of the verb to a subject. The subject may consist of one or more nominatives. By a *nominative* is meant a noun or pronoun in the nominative case or a quoted word or a nounal phrase similarly employed.

Commonly the term Sentence is applied in a freer manner than above so as to include Periods, and sometimes even Phrases; but here, for purposes of exact analysis, each of these three terms receives a distinct signification, and they are therefore not to be confounded or on any account used interchangeably. In Syntactical Analysis the nominative or conjoined nominatives are usually, for brevity and convenience and a reason specified at page 49, styled the SUBJECT; while the verb applied thereto is called the PREDICATE of the sentence.

These two (Subject and Predicate) are called ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS, since they suffice without anything else to form a sentence, and without either of them, at least understood if not expressed, there is no sentence.

If both Subject and Predicate be expressed the sentence is termed technically *full*; if either be understood the sentence is said to be *elliptical*.

FULL SENTENCES.

1. Now *is* the *winter* of our discontent
Made glorious summer by this sun of York.
2. Oh, what a *fall was* there, my countrymen !
3. *Be thou* lightning in the eyes of France.
4. *Who passes* by this road so late ?
5. *May thy billows* roll ashore
The beryl and the golden ore.

ELLIPTICAL SENTENCES.

1. Do not (*thou*) give heed to the enchantress.
2. Advance (*you*).
3. Art (*thou*) mad ? 4. Dost (*thou*) hear ?
(*Who lies* in the second chamber ?)
5. Donaldbain. 6. Who ? 7. The king's son.

By supplying a subject or predicate, as the case may demand, many phrases and single words become sentences, as in 5, 6, 7.

A PHRASE is an expression consisting of several connected words, among which there must not be both a verb and a subject, though either of these, unapplied, may occur in it.

EXAMPLES.

*Cæsar and Pompey. Men of prudence. Is received.
Henry the First. Riding along the road on a black horse.*

As often as a subject and predicate are placed in connection with each other, either mentally, by word of mouth, or on paper, a new sentence is formed.

Two or more sentences in combination and ending with a full stop or equivalent point form a PERIOD.

Two or more connected sentences forming *part* of a period constitute a **CLAUSE**.

We have then in Syntactical Analysis to regard five kinds of expression—namely, Word, Phrase, Sentence, Clause and Period.

In addition to the **Essential Elements** of a sentence there are often others, as in the examples given above, which are not necessary to constitute a bare sentence. All these **Non-essential** or **SECONDARY ELEMENTS** are divided into two classes—(1) Those which affect the Subject; (2) Those which affect the Predicate.

The Subject when affected by a secondary element is said to be *enlarged*, and the word or phrase affecting it is called its **ENLARGEMENT**.

EXAMPLES.

1. *A man riding on a bay horse* overtook me.
2. *Few* people are perfectly content.

The Predicate when affected by a secondary element is said to be *completed*, and the expression affecting it is called its **COMPLEMENT**.

EXAMPLES.

1. He arrived *last Sunday*.
2. You were *fast asleep*.

The elements which are here merely pointed out and defined will be examined in detail later on, when it will be shown of what each in particular may consist and how they are placed together.

TABLE OF ELEMENTS.

TABLE OF ELEMENTS.			
SENTENCE	{	<i>Essential.</i>	<i>Secondary.</i>
		SUBJECT ... PREDICATE ...	ENLARGEMENTS. COMPLEMENTS.

Beginners should be practised well in analyzing sentences into these four headings before being introduced to the various kinds of elements under specific names.

SECTION 2.—THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF SENTENCES.

Sentences that occur singly, that is, not in combination with others, are of four kinds—Assertive, Interrogative, Imperative, and Optative.

An Assertive sentence is a statement or declaration ; *e.g.*

1. The planets move round the sun.
2. The lilies of the field spin not.

The above are *directly* assertive sentences. Others are *indirectly* assertive, the statements in which are so qualified as to express and excite admiration, surprise, fear, wonder, horror, consternation, delight and other emotions, rather than to draw attention to a real or supposed fact. Indirect assertions of this kind are called Exclamatory ; *e.g.*

1. How beautiful is night !
2. What sights of ugly death were in my eyes !

An Imperative sentence is a command, request or entreaty, not, however, expressed as a statement ; *e.g.*

1. Of the three hundred grant but three
To make a new Thermopylæ.
2. Incline thine ear to me.

An Interrogative sentence is one that contains an inquiry ; *e.g.*

1. Hold you the watch to-night ?
2. Why did the earl quit the presence ?

An Optative sentence is a wish expressed by placing the word *may* or *mayest* before its subject ; as—

1. May thy brimméd waves for this
Their full tribute never miss.
2. May thy lofty head be crowned
With many a tower and terrace round.

Conditional sentences, and others which do not occur singly, are treated elsewhere, and each of the varieties above specified is noticed at greater length in the following sections. Here the distinction is pointed out as of the highest importance to the student both of language and of mental philosophy, though usually neglected by both grammarians and logicians to their own serious disadvantage, as will appear.

SECTION 3.—ASSERTIVE SENTENCES.

These are examined first for three reasons:—First, because they are the most important and of most frequent occurrence; second, in order that other kinds of sentences may be compared and contrasted with them; and third, because it was to these sentences that analysis was first applied, and through them the terms *subject* and *predicate* were introduced into grammar from logic, to which alone they originally belonged.

There being a close connection between Grammar, the science of words, and Logic, the science of reasoning expressed in words, it is necessary to distinguish clearly the logical from the grammatical elements in assertive sentences, otherwise we shall be involved in a maze of incongruities.

A directly assertive sentence is called by logicians a proposition; and is, *or rather should be*, regarded by them as composed of only two elements or terms, namely, a subject and a predicate; the former being the word or words representing the thing or things of which an assertion is made; the latter term being the word or words containing what we assert of the same thing or things. In analyzing a proposition logically, therefore, as to its form, we have merely to separate the subject from the predicate as in the following

EXAMPLES.

SUBJECTS.

PREDICATES.

- | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|
| 1. Imperial Cæsar dead and
turned to clay | } | { | might stop a hole to keep
the wind away. |
| 2. Wellington, having sta-
tioned his army on the
heights, | } | { | awaited the approach of
the enemy. |

In analyzing the same sentences grammatically, however, it would be necessary to do something more than this, viz., to point out in these logical elements the grammatical subjects and predicates, and then their enlargements and complements.

To all who have read the preceding sections it will be evident on a moment's reflection that the definitions just given of the subject and predicate in *Logic* do not correspond with the definitions given in Section 1 of the essential elements in *Grammar*. And not only is this the case in regard to interrogative, imperative and optative sentences, but very frequently in assertives, which alone answer to the description of logical propositions. The terms *subject* and *predicate*, it has been said, belonged originally to logic, and were at one time confined to that science. Modern grammarians, however, have extended the use of the terms for analytical purposes to grammar; and, so far as I have searched, they have done this without ever distinguishing accurately between the logical terms of a proposition and the essential elements of a sentence, the result being much confusion. To this they seem to have been led by neglecting to consider duly the following facts:—

First.—While it not unfrequently happens that the logical and the grammatical subjects are identical, and so likewise are the logical and the grammatical predicates, still this occurs only when there are no enlargements or complements; e.g.

3. *Gold glitters.*

4. *Snow melts.*

In such cases both the logical and the grammatical definitions of the terms *subject* and *predicate* apply to the same words precisely.

Second.—But whenever there are enlargements or complements, it is clear that what are called in logic the terms and in grammar the essential elements do not entirely correspond ; that these expressions are not convertible ; that the same definitions will not answer for both, and yet for both the same definitions have been given by writers of no mean repute. In some such sentences, it is true, there is a partial correspondence between them. For instance, in Example 1 the word *Caesar* alone might be called the subject, in so far as it represents that of which we assert. We do not, however, make the assertion of Caesar simply, but of Caesar under certain conditions expressed by the enlargements *imperial, dead, and turned to clay*. In like manner we do not assert simply that Caesar *might*, but that he *might stop a hole to keep the wind away*. All the words *Imperial Caesar dead and turned to clay* taken together therefore form the logical subject, the word *Caesar* alone being the grammatical subject. Similarly, all the words after the grammatical predicate, *might*, go with it to form the logical predicate.

Third.—In many propositions the grammatical subject or nominative to the verb does not represent “that of which we assert,” but the very opposite, as in

5. *No man is immortal ;*

and consequently it will not do to define the subject in grammar, even in assertive sentences, as “that which expresses the thing about which we are speaking.” (Morell’s *Grammar*, p. 66.)

In like manner the grammatical predicate, or verb,

cannot be defined universally as "that which contains what we affirm of the subject;" for frequently it contains just the opposite, as in—

6. *Charity robs no man.*

Here the grammatical predicate is *robs*, and that certainly does not express what we affirm of its subject. Nor will the quoted definition be mended if, instead of *affirm* alone, we say *affirm* or *deny*; for very often in statements the grammatical predicate or verb contains neither that which is affirmed nor that which is denied. For example, in

7. *The farmer ploughs not in harvest time,*

we neither affirm nor deny that the farmer *ploughs*. We affirm that he *ploughs not in harvest time*, or we (may be said to) deny that he *ploughs in harvest time*.

Fourth.—No such terms as *enlargement* or *complement* are used in logic. Grammarians employ these words, requiring, as they do, to submit sentences to a different and in some respects more minute formal analysis than logicians aim at. The reason of this may be seen by calling to mind the object with which a grammarian sets out, and contrasting it with that a logician proposes to himself.

The object of Logic, the science of reasoning, is to clarify the mind so as to enable it to distinguish true from false statements so far as this can be done by reasoning. Grammar on the other hand regards not, except for some special purpose, the truth or falsehood of the proposition it analyzes. A sentence may express an untruth, and be at the same time grammatically perfect. Thus *Two and two are five* is a grammatically correct sentence, though a false proposition. Grammatical analysis takes no direct account of the error of thought, or intent to deceive, or absurdity of what is asserted. It looks primarily to the structure of the sentence and the due observance of the laws of concord, government, order and good usage generally. The logician,

to effect his purpose, sometimes needs the aid of the grammarian, and the grammarian that of the logician to effect his. The latter, however, looking primarily to the truth or falsehood of the assertion, analyzes its form incidentally that he may the better expose its meaning with the ultimate view of approval or discussion. The grammarian, on the contrary, looks not so much to the value of the assertion as to the way in which the words are put together to form it.

Taking now the sentences we have already dealt with, and extracting from them the essential grammatical elements, we get the following :—

SUBJECTS	and	PREDICATES.
1. Caesar		might.
2. Wellington		awaited.
3. Gold		glitters.
4. Snow		melts.
5. Man		is.
6. Charity		robs.
7. Farmer		ploughs.

About these are disposed the secondary elements, consisting of all the other words or phrases in each sentence.

From the above it is evident that in assertive sentences the grammatical elements essential to their formation, when not coincident or identical with the logical terms, are of necessity included in the latter, and are under all circumstances inseparable from them.

This section, it should be remembered, treats not of all sentences but of the assertive kind only. In the others, whether interrogative, imperative, or optative, it will be seen there are no such things as *logical* subjects or predicates, none of these sentences being recognized in logic as propositions or containing elements which correspond to the

logical definitions, either as commonly given or as given above.

With regard to those indirect assertions called Exclamatory, they are not logical propositions. The latter always contain a *direct* statement admitting of assent or denial, whereas in such an expression as

Oh, what a fall was there, my countrymen,

the fact of the fall is taken as beyond denial, and the speaker asserts it indirectly not to acquaint his hearers with something they already know, but to convey his feelings on the matter in an impressive manner so as to excite in them emotions of indignation and regret.

SECTION 4.—NON-ASSERTIVE SENTENCES.

The different kinds of these which occur singly have already been named. To anyone not familiar with the technicalities of modern grammars, it will appear almost incredible that many of the highest authorities, who treat of the nature of sentences, begin their syntax by instructing students that every sentence is the expression in words of a complete thought or mental act, such as is usually styled a judgment, and has in it elements answering to the subject and predicate of a logical proposition. It is clear that these grammarians either did not perceive their mistake, or were content to follow in the wake of their predecessors, deterred perhaps by the difficulty of bringing theory and fact into perfect accord, or not chancing to hit upon the clue which should lead them out of the intellectual labyrinth into which the error led them.

A.—INTERROGATIVE SENTENCES.

Of non-assertive sentences these bear the greatest resemblance to the assertive; yet there are irreconcilable

differences between them. Assertives always contain a statement; interrogatives contain an inquiry, which is the reverse of a statement. A logical statement presupposes an exercise of judgment in the mind of the speaker; an inquiry implies a suspension of judgment. A statement is susceptible of truth or falsehood; an inquiry is not. Occasionally a question is asked instead of an assertion being made, and *vice versa*; but the question does not thereby cease to be a question, nor the assertion to be an assertion. Sometimes also, by a variation of tone in speech or mark in writing, an assertion is made to *imply* an inquiry; but the assertion does not thereby *become* an inquiry, which in such cases is understood: *e.g.*—

It was you (was it not)?

Often the same words with different intonation may constitute either an assertion or an inquiry; but no expression can be a question and statement at the same time. Each of these two excludes the other; they are in their nature antagonistic; nor can the definitions of the logical subject and predicate be applied to the verb and its subject in a question.

We have seen already the collapse of Dr. Latham's attempt to prove that questions are a kind of assertion. No argument is needed to convince those who have not been for long years accustomed to admit the contrary error, and to accept the phraseology of its supporters, that questions are not assertive. No ordinary person will set down the following as statements:—

1. Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased?
2. Who lies in the second chamber?

Unless, therefore, grammarians are prepared to assert that Interrogative sentences are not sentences at all, but something else which it would be superfluous for them to treat of, they must abandon the position commonly taken up at

the commencement of their syntactical systems, and admit that a sentence is not necessarily the expression of a complete thought or judgment; that there are other sentences besides the assertive, with much that would involve a thorough revision of their works. The same penalty would fall upon those, who, like Mr. Mason, take *one* kind of sentence as the type of *all* the various kinds, and who retain definitions of the essential elements applicable only to the elements in one species.

B.—OPTATIVE SENTENCES.

These sentences, which by the great majority of grammarians are almost ignored, are direct expressions of a wish made not assertively, but by means of the verbs *may* or *mayest* before the subject: *e.g.*—

1. May I never need such help.
2. Mayest thou be fortunate.
3. May it please your highness.
4. May we meet in happier days.
5. May you prosper.
6. May they escape the perils of the deep.

This usage of the words *may* and *mayest* is unique. No other verbs answer the same purpose in the same manner. The expressions *May I*, *Mayest thou*, &c., are mere formulary sentences afterwards completed by infinitives and other words.

N.B.—The expression “Would thou couldst” is not an optative *Sentence*, but an assertive *Period*, the subject to the first verb being *I* understood. Thus—“(I) would (that) thou couldst.”

In optative sentences the subject represents that of which we express a wish, not that of which we assert; and so in sentences of this kind also it is impossible to find elements answering to logical subjects and predicates.

Simple as it may appear, it should be noted that the word *say* or *speak* and *assert* or *predicate* are not perfectly synonymous. The former are of wider application than the latter, which they include. The confusion of these words has helped to foster mistaken theories. Some logicians, as Dr. Latham, define the subject as "that of which we speak," or as "that of which we say something." This is an inaccurate definition and affords a loop-hole for escaping the truth that many sentences are non-assertive; for in all optative sentences are found elements answering to the above definitions. Thus in *May you be happy* the pronoun *you* represents the person of whom we *speak*, not, however, the person of whom we *assert*, for no assertion at all is made. To express a wish about any one it is quite unnecessary to make an assertion of him. Our language affords a better and more direct method of doing this. It would be a waste of words instead of *May you be happy* to say *I wish that you may be happy*. Here indeed we make an assertion of which the subject is *I* and the logical predicate *wish that you may be happy*. The assertive manner of expressing ourselves has this advantage over the others, that by it we can often dispense with the rest. Thus we can express our wishes assertively, as instanced. We can also substitute assertions for commands, as,

Thou shalt not covet,

instead of

Covet thou not ;

or for questions, as,

I wish to know who came,

instead of

Who came ?

This, however, involves a sacrifice of directness and effect, and introduces a circumlocution, useless, and which might even be dangerous. If, for instance, in the shock of battle,

or in a storm at sea, when the most expeditious manner of doing things becomes necessary, the officers were to indulge a taste for periphrasis by *asserting* where they should *command*, the consequences would be disastrous to their cause. Yet some able writers, and notably Horne Tooke, commence their "philosophic," or "universal," or "general" grammar, as they call it, by teaching in effect that the sole object of language is "to communicate our *thoughts* with dispatch," overlooking the undeniable fact that it is also given to enable us to express our *wishes* with dispatch, to issue *commands* with dispatch and by inquiry to search after truth. Man is not only a thinking being; he has a will, and an impulsive thirst for happiness, and consequent curiosity after the means of obtaining it. And as no philosophy, having man for its object, can claim to be complete which confines itself to the consideration of the human understanding alone, so no grammar should omit to notice those operations of the mind which find a direct and peculiar manner of expression. Still less should grammarians, for no better purpose than to substantiate foregone conclusions, endeavour to obliterate natural distinctions like that existing between assertive and non-assertive sentences. An attempt of this nature deprives grammar of its scientific character and renders its cultivation as an intellectual exercise in great measure abortive.

C.—IMPERATIVE SENTENCES.

These are still more unlike assertives than interrogatives or optatives are. For while the two latter differ equally in mood from assertives, imperatives differ from all others in two things beside mood, namely, more frequent ellipses of the subject, and, in English, a total absence of verbal inflection. The subject in imperatives is usually understood. In all other sentences it is generally expressed. Thus while in assertions, to avoid misconception, the thing spoken of

should generally be named or indicated, in most imperative sentences the subject represents the person addressed and present, and so the same need does not exist. Some grammarians, however, go too far in teaching that the imperative mood is used only in the second person. (See Dr. Latham's *English Language*, II., 387.)

Mr. Howard Smith also (*Grammar*, p. 168) says :—"No one can command himself: there is therefore no form of the first person singular (imperative)."

But it is as easy to command oneself as to command a third person; and I find in Scene 1, Act ii., of Shakspeare's Richard III., no fewer than four instances of the first person singular imperative, as follow :—

Hastings.—So thrive I as I truly swear the like.

So prosper I as I swear perfect love.

Rivers.—And (so prosper) I as I love Hastings with my heart.

Q. Elizabeth.—So thrive I and (so thrive) mine.

Here certainly we have verbs used in the imperative mood or manner and in the first person singular.

Subjoined are examples of imperatives of all persons, both singular and plural :—

First Singular.

1. So thrive I.
2. So prosper I.

Second Singular.

1. Roll on thou dark but deep blue ocean.
2. Incline (thou) thine ear to me.

Third Singular.

1. Mine be a cot beside the hill.
2. Be there light.
3. Long live the king.
4. Blessed be the author of this deed.

5. *Suffice it to say.*
6. Full of guile *be he* to me.
7. *Perish the thought.*

First Plural.

1. *Search we* the springs.
2. Backward *trace we* the principles of things.
3. *Turn we* to survey a nobler race.
4. *Retire we* to our chamber.

Second Plural.

1. *Hear (ye)* me, my lords.
2. *(You)* *Let us* retire.

Third Plural.

1. *Be these things* so.
2. All the *plagues* of Sycorax *light on you*.

By supplying the word *may* many imperatives in the third person are changed into optatives, as in—

1. Ruin seize thee, ruthless king.
2. Confusion on thy banners wait.
3. Peace be in her halls.
4. Heaven keep thee safe.
5. Ill luck attend thee.

When this is done, the word which was at first a verb becomes an infinitive. Thus in 1, *seize* is third singular imperative; but when *may* is prefixed, *seize* becomes an infinitive complement, and the grammatical predicate or verb is *may*.

In many such sentences of the third person *may* cannot be supplied without violating the order of words proper to the imperative mood, *e.g.*—

1. Happy be thy dreams. *Imperative.*
2. May thy dreams be happy. *Optative.*

Both these examples would commonly be called expressions of a wish. This, however, is inaccurate. No. 1 is the result or consequence of volition, not the expression of the wish itself.

The second peculiarity of the imperative verb in English is that it has no inflection. It is the verb in its simplest form, without any personal or temporal affix or any change of form. Assertive, interrogative and optative verbs, even in English, where there is so little inflection, are all in some one or more of the persons subject to inflection; but imperatives stand in our language immutable.

The imperative takes its name from the fact that it is used to command. It is, however, also used to entreat, request and exhort. Should there not be a precative, a requisitive and hortatory mood to correspond?

"If any person," says Dr. Crombie (p. 137), "be inclined to call these forms of expression—[*Write thou* and *Do thou write*—by the name of imperative mood, I have no objection. Only let him be consistent and call *Dost thou love* an interrogative mood, adopting also the precative, the requisitive, the hortative, &c. . . . I should only apprehend that language would fail to assign them names."

It is one aim of this analysis to purge grammar of some glaring inconsistencies, and so it is of importance to vindicate the reformed terminology. In regard to moods and sentences, which are here confined to five species, this may easily be done. There is no sentence in the English language which does not come under one of the five headings—Assertive, Interrogative, Imperative, Optative and Conditional. The last named, which does not occur singly, is noticed in the analysis of Periods. With regard to the other four all sentences occurring singly are of one of these kinds. And observe I do not say that they are resolvable into them, but actually belong to them without undergoing any periphrastical process such as that resorted to by

Dr. Crombie in his futile attempt to prove that imperative sentences are assertive. Assertives, as already explained, are direct and indirect, the latter being noticed later. In accordance with Dr. Crombie's recommendation to be consistent, the interrogative and optative moods (the latter of which that grammarian leaves unnoticed) have been properly retained. The only difficulty left is with regard to imperatives. How under this one title can we consistently include precative, hortatory and requisitive sentences? This difficulty, like several others, will melt away on application of the principle for the distinction of moods and sentences. The kind of sentence depends on the mood of the verb, and verbs, properly speaking, are said to be in such and such a mood, not according to their inflection, as Dr. Crombie amongst others would have it, but according to the manner in which they are employed. Now the verbs in commands, requests, exhortations and entreaties are used in one and the same manner. Thus the expression *Give me a book* is either a command, request or entreaty according to circumstances under all of which the mood of the verb remains the same, and it is proper to denote this fact by a single term. Now there being no word in English which at once expresses all these varieties of the same act, it is necessary to fix upon some technical term to supply the deficiency; and the word chosen is *imperative*, the most appropriate that can be found. To this there need be no objection, since a useful purpose is served without engendering confusion. On the other hand, not only is there an essential distinction between every assertive and non-assertive expression, inasmuch as one is susceptible of truth or falsehood and the other is not, but the verb in each of these two great divisions is employed in quite different ways.

SECTION 5.—THE ELEMENTS.

Not only may each element in a sentence consist of a single word, but whole phrases are frequently counted as single elements. Such Phrases are Nounal, Adjectival or Adverbial, when discharging functions of the corresponding parts of speech. At times whole sentences are equivalents of single words ; but, in this system of analysis, sentences are not considered as the elements of sentences. Whenever a Nounal, Adjectival or Adverbial Sentence occurs, it is always in subordination to some other sentence, and so is treated as an element of a Period.

Again, there is no defined limit to the number of the Secondary Elements in a sentence. There may be a number and variety of enlargements attached to a single subject and of complements affixed to a predicate. But with regard to the Essential Elements it should be distinctly understood that there can neither be two subjects nor two predicates in a single sentence. Every subject has a predicate expressed or understood, and every predicate a subject. When, therefore, there are two predicates or two subjects, there are two sentences and the whole expression is a Period.

A.—THE SUBJECT.

The subject, when a single word, is either a noun, pronoun or quoted word.

Examples.

1. Noun.—*Caesar* was slain.
The *good* is oft interred with their bones.
The *now* is passing away.
2. Pronoun.—*Yours* will suit.
Who comes here ?
May *you* prosper.

3. Quoted Word.—*If* is not a verb.*Thorough* was his motto.

In the last examples it may be noted there is no *representative* subject, that is, the word-subject does not *represent* that of which we speak, but actually *is* that of which we speak.

When the Subject consists of more than one word it is always a nounal phrase containing no noun or pronoun nominative to the verb ; e.g.—

Never Too Late to Mend is the book's title.

Whenever a phrase contains a noun or pronoun nominative to the verb, the words affecting the noun or pronoun are to be set down as enlargements. Thus in *Walking in the fields is pleasant*, *in the fields* enlarges the subject *walking*.

COMPOUND SUBJECT.

In the foregoing examples the subject consisting of a single word is called *Simple*. But frequently several words or phrases are combined to form a *Compound* subject: e.g.—

1. *Hawking and hunting* are royal sports.2. *Early to bed and early to rise*

Makes a man healthy, wealthy and wise.

But though the subject may consist of several words or phrases, as before noticed, no single sentence has more than one subject. Thus in *John and Robert are here* the subject is *John and Robert*. If these two nouns formed two subjects, one of them would have its verb understood. There would be an ellipsis of the first verb and this supplied would make the whole sentence run thus—*John (was or were) here and Robert were here*—where there is at least one gross violation of the law of numerical concord. Ellipsis, therefore, is inadmissible here.

Similarly in *The men and boy begin work early* no verb

can be supplied after *men* without entailing a solecism. The words *men and boy* therefore must be counted as one compound subject, not as two separate subjects.

In such an expression as *The trade winds and monsoons are constant*, by supplying the words *are constant* after the first noun, two sentences may be formed ; but if the two nominatives be singular this cannot be done. The following from Macaulay's preface to the *Lays of Ancient Rome* is an instance of the extent to which a subject may be compounded :—

“The loves of the vestal and the god of war, the cradle laid amid the reeds of the Tiber, the fig-tree, the she-wolf, the shepherd's cabin, the recognition, the fratricide, the rape of the Sabines, the death of Tarpeia, the fall of Hostus Hostilius, the struggle of Mettius Curtius through the marsh, the women rushing with torn raiment and dishevelled hair between their fathers and their husbands, the nightly meetings of Numa and the nymph by the well in the sacred grove, the fight of the three Romans and the three Albans, the purchase of the Sibylline books, the crime of Tullia, the simulated madness of Brutus, the ambiguous reply of the Delphian oracle to the Tarquins, the wrongs of Lucretia, the heroic actions of Horatius Cocles, of Scævola and of Clœlia, the battle of Regillus won by the aid of Castor and Pollux, the defence of Cremera, the touching story of Coriolanus, the still more touching story of Virginia, the wild legend about the draining of the Alban lake, the combat between Valerius Corvus and the gigantic Gaul, are among the many instances which will at once suggest themselves to every reader.”

This Period consists of two Sentences, the subject in the former consisting of no fewer than twenty-six nouns. If we regard each of these as a separate subject, we shall be in an awkward position. Not only would there be an ellipsis of twenty-five verbs, but the last sentence would

contain a solecism. In such expressions but one assertion is made of a Compound Subject.

Frequently an assertion holds true of the things represented by the nominatives only when in conjunction. Thus an officer might name twenty men as forming his company. He would say "John Smith, Robert Jones," &c., naming eighteen others, "form my company," and it would be nonsense for him to say that Smith or Jones, or any other man, formed the company. So that, whether the question be considered from a grammatical or a logical standpoint, whether the structure or value of the expression be regarded, it is evidently wrong to call a number of nouns nominative to one verb so many subjects instead of parts of one subject. Moreover, the inaccuracy is mischievous, for it had led grammarians to put forward wrong principles. Several teach that conjunctions do not connect words, but only sentences. This fundamental error is laid down explicitly in Dr. Morell's *Grammar*, p. 23. There we read:—

"Even when the conjunction *appears* only to connect two words, it really connects two sentences. Thus in the phrase *William and Mary ascended the throne* two distinct assertions are made, although the verb is not twice repeated."

But it is evident to all who can read English and count that but one assertion is made above, for, though the given sentence can be "resolved," as they say, into two equivalent assertions, until this actually takes place by repeating the verb, there is but one assertion *made*. There are, however, sentences, as already shown, in which, with several nominatives to the verb, no such resolution can be effected without breach of concord; others in which it cannot take place without violating sense and truth as well. Here are instances in which, if we attempt to resolve, by Dr. Morell's method of "repeating the verb," concord, sense and truth are sacrificed at a blow:—

1. *Robert and Richard were two pretty men.*
2. *The boy and his father are a pair of rascals.*
3. *One and one are two.*
4. *Five and one are six.*

B.—THE PREDICATE.

The Verb, being a word which, when applied to a grammatical subject, forms a sentence, is in this analysis made synonymous with the Grammatical Predicate. In assertive sentences, as soon as the verb is applied to its nominative, a sentence is formed, and every word or phrase afterwards added and forming part of the logical predicate does but complete or modify the assertion previously made. Thus in—

The steamer leaves the wharf every day at sunrise—

as soon as the verb *leaves* has been uttered or written, a sentence is formed, an assertion made, and *the wharf, every day* and *at sunrise* go to complete the expression of our thought. Similarly in—

John is well—

when the verb *is* has been pronounced or written, an assertion has been made, and the word *well* does but modify the statement. In the whole expression *well-being* is asserted of John, the verb *is* conveying the idea of being and *well* the mode of being. In every statement it may be seen that the assertion is made by bringing the subject and predicate together, that is, by applying a verb to its nominative or conjoined nominatives.

Again, in all Non-assertive sentences, as soon as the verb is applied to its subject, the sentence is formed, while all the words not belonging to the subject are complements.

In the current systems of analysis it is usual to reckon participial and infinitive complements as integral parts of

the grammatical predicate or verb. This is done because the translations of the Greek and Latin tenses are commonly set down as "verbs" though they really consist of several distinct parts of speech, and form *Verbal* or *Tense Phrases*. One of the chief differences, as regards structure, between the Classical and the English languages lies in the fact that the former frequently contain in a single word what the latter requires several to express. Thus *amavero* = (*I*) *shall have loved*. The analysis of *amavero* is etymological, that of its translation is syntactical, and this noteworthy difference should not be slurred over.

An inconsistency analogous to that pointed out above occurs in Dr. Morell's *Analysis*. The italicized words in the sentences

1. Europe is *a continent* ;
2. He is *of sound mind* ;
3. They are *in the garden* ;

are given as integral parts of the grammatical predicate, while precisely similar expressions in—

1. Harold became *king* ;
2. Pyrrho despaired *of truth* ;
3. He walks *in the garden* ;

are set down as separate elements. No useful purpose is served by this, while the syntactical structure of the language is obscured by it.

C.—ENLARGEMENTS.

Frequently the subject has no Enlargements and requires none. It may, however, have a number and variety of Enlargements consisting of single parts of speech or of phrases. The Enlargement is always either an adjective or expression used similarly.

Examples.

Adjective.—*Little* strokes fell *great* oaks.

She *wondering* looked at me.

Hither Gaul was invaded.

The *then* government was oligarchical.

Noun.—1. Nominative in apposition.

Prince Charles escaped.

2. Possessive governed by subject.

The *bookseller's* shop is closed.

3. Objective governed by subject.

Reading *Shakespeare* is delightful.

Pronoun.—1. Nominative in apposition.

I *myself* was present.

2. Possessive governed by subject.

Whose book is that.

3. Objective governed by subject.

To convince *him* is impossible.

Adjective Phrase.—Love of *money* is degrading.

One subject may have a number and variety of Enlargements independent of one another ; as—

1. *Brave, young, handsome, rich, admired,* he wanted nothing to complete his happiness.

2. *A discreet man of tried valour* is wanted.

Enlargements of the subject similar in kind and connected by conjunctions are Compound, as—

A man, *riding on a black horse and leading another by the bridle,* overtook us.

In Compound Subjects each nominative frequently has its own Enlargements, as—

1. Charles *the Twelfth* and Peter *the Great* were rivals.

2. *Gorgeous* dames and statesmen *old*

In bearded majesty appear.

Here the last Enlargement is clearly not applied to the first nominative.

D.—COMPLEMENTS.

Often the Predicate has no Complements and requires none, as in *Fish swim*, *Deer graze*. It may, however, have a number and variety of Complements. Indeed there is a greater variety of these than of any other element. When a single word the Complement may be—

1. A noun nominative ; as, He is *king*.
2. A noun objective ; as, Henry rides the *horse*.
3. A pronoun nominative ; as, It is *yours*.
4. A pronoun objective ; as, Give me *mine*.
5. An adjective ; as, It is *good*.
6. A participle ; as, I have *been*.
7. An adverb ; as, It is *there*.

Phrases used as Complements are Nounal, Pronounal, Adjectival, Participial, and Adverbial.

Examples.

1. He desires *to travel*.
2. The arbiter appointed was *King Christian*.
3. He wishes *me to go*.
4. They compelled *him to serve*.
5. It is *I myself*.
6. All were *possessed of fortune and repute*.
7. It is *very much better*.
8. The men have *been badly treated*.
9. I came *in ten minutes*.

Frequently, by supplying an ellipsis, what appear as two separate complements become merely parts of one completing nounal phrase ; *e.g.*—

1. They made *him* (to be) *king*.
2. He appointed *me* (to be) *his* *executor*.
3. The judge pronounced *him* (to be) *innocent*.
4. We heard *the* *thunder* (to) *roll*.

Like Subjects and Enlargements, Complements may be compounded of any two or more of the above parts of speech or phrases.

The predicate has often *different kinds* of Complements, as—

He taught ¹*me* ²*Latin* ³*in two years*.

Taking a comprehensive view of the Complements specified above, it will be seen that they may consist of—

1. Precisely the same kind of expressions as the subject, simple or compound, with or without adjuncts. These are sometimes termed *Nominative Complements*. They form a very important class, and receive scant attention from some analysts.

2. Expressions differing only in case from the above, being objective instead of nominative. These are *Objective Complements*, or more briefly *Objects*, this term being restricted to them.

3. Expressions like enlargements. These are *Adjectival Complements*, in many grammars ignored.

4. Expressions which stand neither as subjects nor enlargements. These are *Participial* and *Adverbial Complements*. The latter are sometimes called *Extensions*, from the fact that they often, in a certain sense, extend a sentence already completed.

It should be noticed that the articles *a*, *an*, *the* and *to*, together with a few other adjectives such as *own*, *thy*, *my*, and *no*, cannot, except when quoted, stand by themselves as other adjectives do to complete a predicate or verb. On the other hand the pronouns *his*, *mine*, *yours* are very common as complements.

E.—MISCELLANEOUS EXPRESSIONS.

In addition to the elements of sentences, there occur, as observed before, certain kinds of expression, without indicating which the analysis would be incomplete. These are—

1. *Words or Phrases of Address.*
2. *Interjectional Words or Phrases.*
3. *Connecting Words or Phrases.*

The first class consists of nouns or pronouns in the nominative of address (*Latin*, *Vocative*), or equivalent noun phrases.

The second class consists of interjections or interjectional phrases.

The third class consists of conjunctions and conjunctive phrases. These are used between words or phrases to form them into compound elements of Sentences, and in Periods they connect Sentences. Briefly they are styled Connectives.

The two former kinds of expression are not noticed in most systems of analysis ; yet they are, as shown elsewhere, well worthy of notice. Sometimes they introduce sentences, at other times they occur at the middle or end, but in all cases they form no part of the sentences to which they are attached.

Examples.

1. *O woods, O fountains, hillocks, dales and bowers,*
With other echo late I taught your shades
To answer and resound far other song.
2. *Ay me !* while the sounding seas wash far away.
3. Hunting *and* swimming are good for health.
He plays cricket *but* not football. (Period.)
4. I will stay *in as much as* you wish it. (Period.)

SECTION 6.—ORDER OF THE ELEMENTS.

Having defined the elements and pointed out of what each may consist, it becomes necessary to see in what order they stand. This, though one of the chief offices of syntax, is all but ignored in grammatical works, whose authors nevertheless know that syntax signifies arrangement in order. A marked deficiency in the Latin grammars is that they, as a rule, afford the student no help whatever in overcoming the main difficulty he has to contend with in acquiring that language, arising from the remarkable contrast in this respect between Latin and English. The Latin grammars divide syntax into concord and government, leaving order to shift for itself. English grammarians, not content with ignoring order, actually violate it, particularly in analyzing sentences; for, whatever kind of sentence is given them to dissect, they ruthlessly force the elements into positions they do not naturally occupy. Forms are tabulated to suit ordinary assertions, and into these forms commands, questions, wishes and hypotheses must be forced. This practice is calculated to draw attention from the nature of mental operations and their verbal expressions, worthy the examination both of the psychologist and of the student of language.

Order is of two kinds, Natural and Inverted. In Assertive Sentences the natural order is—

1. The Subject with its Enlargements.
2. The Predicate with its Complements.

This order in assertives is called Natural, not so much because it is most usual as because it is only natural that words representing that of which we assert should precede the words spoken thereof.

Inversion is properly employed for many rhetorical and poetical purposes such as emphasis, variety, metre, or euphony; *e.g.*—

1. Great *is Diana*.
2. Fallen *is Babylon*.
3. Nor *left he* a soul alive.
4. By this *may you* obtain your wish.
5. Fair *shines the sun* on Carlisle wall.

In Exclamatory Sentences order varies chiefly according to the demands of euphony. The subject in these follows as often as it precedes the verb : *e.g.*—

1. How beautiful *is night* !
2. What a statue the *Colossus was* !

In Non-assertive Sentences the arrangement of verb and subject is generally the reverse of that called natural in assertives : *e.g.*—

- | | |
|-----------------|---|
| Interrogative.— | 1. <i>Didst thou</i> not hear a noise ? |
| | 2. <i>Hold you</i> the watch to-night ? |
| Optative.— | 3. <i>May you</i> be fortunate. |
| Imperative.— | 4. <i>Be it</i> so. |
| | 5. <i>Retire we</i> to our chamber. |

When, however, the subject is an interrogative pronoun this order is reversed, *e.g.*

6. *Who would* not sing for Lycidas ?

The most usual order in imperatives is Verb first, Subject second ; but this order is not invariable. Often, colloquially, the subject precedes the verb, as—

1. *You be* off.
2. *You hold* the horse for him.

NOTE.—There is no need of understanding *do* before *you*, the sentence being in every way complete without that word.

In Optatives the order of Verb and Subject is invariable the former preceding ; *e.g.*

1. *May you prosper*.

This sentence in precisely the same order may express not only a wish but a question or a statement, that is, the same collocation of words may at times answer for either Optative, Interrogative or Assertive Sentences, the mood in every case being decided by the *manner* in which the verb is employed.

SECTION 7.—THE SYSTEM EXEMPLIFIED.

EXAMPLE I.—ASSERTIVE.

Nelson, disappointed in his expectation of the enemy's attacking him in his advantageous position, led his fleet, in a single line, straight through the opposing crescent of French and Spanish vessels, these being both in size and number superior to those of the English admiral.

Analysis.

NELSON	-	-	-	-	SUBJECT.
disappointed in his expectation of the enemy's attacking him in his advantageous position	-	-	-	-	} Enlargement.
LED	-	-	-	-	
his fleet	-	-	-	-	PREDICATE.
in single line	-	-	-	-	Object with Adjunct.
through the opposing crescent of French and Spanish vessels	-	-	-	-	Extension, Manner.
these being both in size and number superior to those of the English admiral	-	-	-	-	} Extension, Direction.
	-	-	-	-	
	-	-	-	-	} Extension, Circumstance.
	-	-	-	-	

EXAMPLE II.—EXCLAMATORY.

Oh, what a fall was there, my countrymen !

Analysis.

Oh	-	-	-	-	Interjection.
what a FALL	-	-	-	-	Enlarged SUBJECT.
WAS	-	-	-	-	PREDICATE.
there	-	-	-	-	Extension.
my countrymen	-	-	-	-	Phrase of Address.

EXAMPLE III.—INTERROGATIVE.

What cause
 Moved our grand-parents in that happy state,
 Favoured of heaven so highly, to fall off
 From their Creator and transgress His will,
 For one restraint lords of the world beside ?

Analysis.

What CAUSE	-	-	-	-	Enlarged Subject.
MOVED	-	-	-	-	Predicate.
our grand-parents in that happy state, favoured of heaven so highly, to fall off from their Creator and transgress His will, for one restraint lords of the world beside	-	-	-	-	Object with Adjuncts.

EXAMPLE IV.—OPTATIVE.

Virgin daughter of Locrine,
 Sprung of old Anchises' line,
 May thy brimméd waves for this
 Their full tribute never miss.

Analysis.

Virgin daughter of Locrine, sprung of old Anchises' line	-	-	-	-	} Phrase of Address, with Attributive Phrase.
MAY	-	-	-	-	
thy brimméd WAVES	-	-	-	-	PREDICATE.
their full tribute never miss	-	-	-	-	Enlarged SUBJECT.
for this	-	-	-	-	Infinitive Complement.
					Extension, Reason.

EXAMPLE V.—IMPERATIVE.

Bid Amarantus all his beauty shed,
 And daffodillies fill their cups with tears,
 To strew the laureate hearse.

Analysis.

(THOU)	-	-	-	-	SUBJECT.
BID	-	-	-	-	PREDICATE.
Amarantus all his beauty shed, and daffodillies fill their cups with tears,	-	-	-	-	} Compound Object.
to strew the laureate hearse	-	-	-	-	
					Extension, Reason.

NOTE.—One advantage of the above simple plan of analyzing is that the order of words peculiar to various kinds of sentences need never be violated. Complete sense too is made by reading down the divided elements, which frequently is not the case in the tabulated forms exhibited in several grammars. In one of these (Mr. Mason's) as many as *thirteen* columns are provided for various headings, and yet the nominative complement finds no place! Words supplied should be put in brackets, and no more words should be supplied than are required to show the construction. Sometimes it is advantageous to reduce complicated sentences to the natural order before analyzing.

CHAPTER II.

THE ANALYSIS OF PERIODS.

SECTION I.—THE THEORY.

A PERIOD has already been defined as two or more sentences in combination and ending with a full stop or equivalent point. A critic in the *North American Review*, No. COXX., in an able notice of Becker's analytical system, remarks that grammarians "are still at sea as to what a period is." The above is offered as a simple solution of the difficulty.

Dr. Crombie (*Syntax*, p. 181) defines a period as "a complex sentence so framed that the meaning is suspended till the whole be finished;" and he adds—"The criterion of a period is that you cannot stop before you reach the end of the sentence, otherwise the sense is incomplete." His example of a period is—

"If Hannibal had not wintered at Capua, by which circumstance his troops were enervated, but had, on the contrary, after the battle of Cannæ, proceeded to Rome, it is not improbable that the great city would have fallen."

But if to this we add, without a full stop at *fallen*,—"and that the history of the world would have been changed"—the whole expression would, according to Dr. Crombie, cease to be a period and become what he styles, in contradistinction to a period, "a loose sentence." Of what value then is his definition of a period?

PERIODS are Assertive, Exclamatory, Interrogative, Imperative, Optative or Mixed, according to the character of the principal sentences forming them.

Examples.

Assertive.—He said that you might come.

Exclamatory.—How I would that I were there!

Interrogative.—Who art thou that comest !

Imperative.— { Go where the havoc of your kern
Shall float as high as mountain fern.

Optative.—May he succeed in all he undertakes.

Mixed.— { Roll on thou dark but deep blue ocean, roll :
Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain.

PERIODS are also Compound or Complex, the former consisting of sentences all Co-ordinate, the latter of Principal and Subordinate. There must be at least one principal sentence in every Period. In subordination there are degrees, *e.g.*

“ Alas, alas,” a low voice full of care

Murmured beside me ;

“ I am that Rosamond whom men call fair,

If, what I was, I be.”

Natural Order.

- | | |
|---|---------------------|
| 1. A low voice full of care murmured beside me, | |
| 2. Alas, alas, I am that Rosamond, | |
| 3. Whom men call fair, | } Objective Clause. |
| 4. If I be, | |
| 5. What I was. | |

Here the second sentence is subordinate to the first, the third and fourth to the second, and the fifth to the fourth.

A CLAUSE has been defined as an expression consisting of two or more connected sentences forming part of a Period.

Subordinate sentences are Nounal, Adjectival or Adverbial, according to their mode of employment, and are found where the corresponding parts of speech might occur :
e.g.—

Noun Sentence as Subject—

1. *That you should come* is my wish.

Noun Sentence as Object—

2. He said *that you would come*.

Noun Sentence as Complement.

3. Can it be *that we are deceived* ?

Adjective Sentence as Enlargement to Subject.

4. The man *that hath no music in himself*
Is fit for treasons.

Adjective Sentence as Adjunct to Object.

5. Bring me the horse *that I bought*.

Adverbial Sentences occur as Extensions of time, place, manner, degree, cause, condition, concession, purpose, result, &c.; e.g.—

Time.—I will call *when I want you*.

Reason.—I wish to rest, *for I am weary*.

Of adverbial sentences the **CONDITIONAL** demand special notice. There are two varieties of the Conditional sentence: The more common variety is that in which a conjunction introduces the Conditional sentence, e.g.

1. If I alone were concerned —
2. Unless you comply —
3. Though he be poor —

The less usual, but more impressive, variety of the Conditional mood is that in which the verb comes first and there is no introductory word, e.g.

1. Were I alone concerned —
2. Had I but my wish —
3. Might I say all —
4. Could love fulfil its prayer —

Those grammarians who confuse *form* with *mood* have been perplexed by the word *were*, some holding that this word in the singular is never assertive (or indicative), but only conditional. Subjoined are examples of both its assertive and conditional uses :—

- A. If it were done - - Adverbial Sentence, Condition.
 B. When 'tis done - - " " Time.
 C. Then it were well - - Princ. Sent., Direct Assertive.
 D. 'Twere done quickly - Noun Sent., Indirect Assertive.

If the student is to avoid an *inextricabilis error* concerning moods, it should be impressed on him that sentences like C are direct assertions. In it the speaker does not assert that it *is* well, but he does unmistakably assert that it *would be* well, under specified conditions, for *were* = *would be*.

Similarly the French *j'irais*, commonly styled the conditional mood, is quite as much assertive (or indicative) as the future *j'irai*. It is in truth that variety of the future assertive which *implies* a condition. It does not, however, *express* a condition, and has strictly no claim to be entitled a separate mood. It is merely the future conditional as opposed to the future unconditional—a point worthy the attention of the world-renowned French Academy, for the writers of French grammars completely ignore the fact alluded to.

The only kind of indirect assertive sentences which occur singly are the *Exclamatory*, previously explained. In combination many subordinate sentences have the verb used in a similar manner, and so are styled indirectly assertive, *e.g.*—

1. *The more we learn*, the more we see there is to learn.
2. The man, *who came yesterday*, is here now.
3. The vision, *as it were*, melted away.
4. I wish to know *who removed the horses*.
5. And some, *whatever you may say*,
Can see no evil in a play.
6. It is certain *that Newton valued metaphysics*.
7. Do to others *as you would be done by*.

The Sentences italicized above are all Subordinate, and the Periods are therefore Complex.

The co-ordination of sentences is of three kinds, according to the nature of the Connectives : *e.g.*—

Copulative Co-ordination.

1. Alexander conquered Asia *and* Napoleon Europe.

Alternative Co-ordination.

2. You must try *or* you will not succeed.

Adversative Co-ordination.

3. Virtue brings peace, *but* vice misery.

Some writers speak of *illative* co-ordination as in—*The shadow of the earth is round ; therefore the earth is round.* In all such periods, however, the supposed connective is in reality an adverbial complement, the real connective being *and* understood. Such sentences are in *Copulative* co-ordination ; and it may here be noted that the word *therefore*, so often used to introduce the conclusion to premises, is always in reality part of the full or logical predicate ; and so, in a syllogistic argument, when a *non-sequitur* is put in, the truth of the proposition without the illative extension is not necessarily denied, but that of the proposition with the illative extension is. Thus, one, who would not dispute the sphericity of the earth, might possibly deny that this attribute is deducible from the roundness of its shadow. *Therefore* is an adverb, not a conjunction, being attributive to the verb and movable.

SECTION 2.—EXAMPLES.

To give examples of all the various combinations that come under the name of *Period* would be impossible. A few instances will suffice. The following stanza consists of three Periods ending respectively at *are*, *where* and *harmonies*.

ECHO.

Sweet Echo, sweetest nymph that livest unseen
 Within thy æry shell,
 By slow Meander's margent green,
 Or in the violet-embroidered vale,
 Where the love-lorn nightingale
 Nightly to thee her sad song mourneth well,
 Canst thou not tell me of a gentle pair
 That likest thy Narcissus are ?
 Oh, if thou have
 Hid them in some flowery cave,
 Tell me but where,
 Sweet queen of parley, daughter of the sphere.
 So mayst thou be translated to the skies
 And give resounding grace to all heaven's harmonies.

The first period is Interrogative, the second Imperative, and the third Optative, regard being had to the character of the principal sentence in each. They may be analyzed as follows :—

Analysis.

FIRST PERIOD, INTERROGATIVE.

A.—ADJECTIVE SENTENCE TO C.

Sweet Echo, sweetest nymph,	- -	Phrases of Address.
THAT - - - - -	- -	SUBJECT.
LIVEST - - - - -	- -	PREDICATE.
unseen - - - - -	- -	Enlargement.
within thy æry shell, by slow Meander's	}	Extensions, Place.
margent green, or in the violet-em-		
broidered vale - - - - -		

B.—ADVERBIAL SENTENCE TO A.

Where - - - - -	- -	Connective.
the love-lorn - - - - -	- -	Enlargements.
NIGHTINGALE - - - - -	- -	SUBJECT.
nightly - - - - -	- -	Extension, Time.
to thee - - - - -	- -	Complement.
her sad song - - - - -	- -	Object with adjuncts.
MOURNETH - - - - -	- -	PREDICATE.
well - - - - -	- -	Extension, Manner.

C.—PRINCIPAL SENTENCE, INTERROGATIVE.

CANST	-	-	-	-	-	-	PREDICATE.
THOU	-	-	-	-	-	-	SUBJECT.
not tell me of a gentle pair	-	-	-	-	-	-	Infinitive Complement.

D.—ADJECTIVE SENTENCE TO C.

THAT	-	-	-	-	-	-	SUBJECT.
likest (to) thy Narcissus	-	-	-	-	-	-	Adjectival Complement.
ARE?	-	-	-	-	-	-	PREDICATE.

SECOND PERIOD, IMPERATIVE.

A.—ADVERBIAL SENTENCE TO B.

Oh,	-	-	-	-	-	-	Interjection.
if	-	-	-	-	-	-	Connective.
THOU	-	-	-	-	-	-	SUBJECT.
HAVE	-	-	-	-	-	-	PREDICATE.
hid them in some flowery cave,	-	-	-	-	-	-	Object with adjunct.

B.—PRINCIPAL SENTENCE, IMPERATIVE.

TELL	-	-	-	-	-	-	PREDICATE.
(THOU)	-	-	-	-	-	-	SUBJECT.
(to) me	-	-	-	-	-	-	Complement.
but where,	-	-	-	-	-	-	Object.
sweet queen of parley, daughter of the sphere -	-	-	-	-	-	-	Phrases of Address.

THIRD PERIOD, OPTATIVE.

A.—PRINCIPAL SENTENCE, OPTATIVE.

So	-	-	-	-	-	-	Extension.
MAYEST	-	-	-	-	-	-	PREDICATE.
THOU	-	-	-	-	-	-	SUBJECT.
be translated to the skies	-	-	-	-	-	-	Infinitive Complement.

B.—PRINCIPAL SENTENCE, OPTATIVE.

and	-	-	-	-	-	-	Connective.
(so)	-	-	-	-	-	-	Extension.
(MAYEST)	-	-	-	-	-	-	PREDICATE.
(THOU)	-	-	-	-	-	-	SUBJECT.
give resounding grace to all heaven's har- monies	-	-	-	-	-	-	Infinitive Complement.

Upon the period so analyzed the student may make many useful observations. When pupils have mastered the

analysis of Sentences, it is not always necessary to analyze Periods in detail as above, and then the following plan will be of service. In it the sentences are separated, their relationship shown, and the essentials marked in italics.

ASSERTIVE PERIOD.

The man, that hath no music in himself,
Nor is not blest with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils ;
The motions of his spirit are dull as night
And his affections dark as Erebus.

Analysis.

A.—PRINCIPAL SENTENCE.

The *man* is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils,

B.—ADJECTIVE SENTENCE TO A.

That hath no music in himself,

C.—ADJECTIVE SENTENCE TO A.

Nor (*that*) is not blest with concord of sweet sounds ;

D.—PRINCIPAL SENTENCE.

The *motions* of his spirit *are* dull

E.—ADVERBIAL SENTENCE TO D.

As *night* (*is* dull),

F.—PRINCIPAL SENTENCE.

And his *affections* (*are*) dark

G.—ADVERBIAL SENTENCE TO F.

As *Erebus* (*is* dark).

N.B.—All Principal Sentences are co-ordinate with one another. In other sentences when co-ordination exists it can be indicated by the letters of reference. Thus above B, C, E, and G are co-ordinate with one another.

CHAPTER III.

SUPPLEMENTARY.

SECTION I.—THE UTILITY OF ANALYSIS.

HERE something may be said on the value of Syntactical Analysis, for there are those who deny, doubt or underrate its utility, and others who misapply it. Some classical scholars are tempted to put this kind of analysis aside as useless, because they themselves have done without it, overlooking the fact that they might have done better with it, and that those who have not the benefit of a Classical education find in it one of the most powerful aids grammar affords for grappling with the difficulties met in the study of the English language. This branch of grammar is of comparatively recent origin, and received, I believe, its first noteworthy development at the hands of the German grammarian, Becker. Though enshrouded by him and others in several fantastic vagaries, it has commended itself as a thing of practical worth to men of the highest capacity and of great experience. The following are among the chief uses of the reformed system :—

1. Taken by itself, it gives an insight into the nature of the language such as cannot be had by any other means. By its aid the student is enabled to detect errors of a certain class in what he reads and to avoid them in his own composition, to examine critically his own utterances, and to view the capabilities of the language, as exemplified in the writings of different authors, to note the excellence or mark defects of construction occurring in them.

Moreover, in conjunction with Parsing, which it does not supersede and by which it cannot be superseded, it reveals fully the structure of the language in every particular, so

far as syntax is concerned, while no syntactical system is complete without it. In parsing we take words singly, in analysis we view them frequently in groups. Analysis touches many points of importance which parsing fails to reach.

Then, too, Analysis, like Parsing, is a test of comprehension. No one can perform either of these operations properly without understanding what he reads. In this respect Analysis is a study which "defies cram," as Professor E. E. Morris has shown in an able article in the *Melbourne Review*.

Again, the very effort made to analyze difficult passages leads to a fuller appreciation of their meaning, and the practice of analyzing tends to increase the flexibility and power of the language by making writers accurate and acquainting them with useful turns of expression that might otherwise be lost or go out of use. This really enriches the language as much as the addition of new words to its vocabulary. The construction of a language is gradual, and is determined, in the first instance, chiefly by great original composers. But primitive authors seldom leave a language in a finished form suitable to the requirements of a more advanced civilization. Succeeding writers improve upon their work in this respect, while the labour of the professed grammarian comes in as a valuable help when judiciously applied. The study of Syntactical Analysis certainly spreads a taste for clearness of construction. It may even be brought to bear on those perplexing difficulties which arise from the unnecessarily complicated wording of legal documents; and if the technicalities of law are curtailed and its provisions simplified, no slight practical benefit will ensue. It has become a matter of complaint among English judges that many of the statutes can with difficulty be interpreted. Whether the same complaint is made by French judges, I do not know but the French have a proverb that what is

not clear is not French, and if the law-makers of that country were guided by that admirable principle it is easy to understand how French law should be more simple in its interpretation than English. Clearness of construction is a characteristic of the French tongue, and this quality should be cultivated by the writers of all nations. Some English poetical writers spoil good compositions by the introduction of vague ideas vaguely expressed to give their writings an air of profundity. When a passage will not analyze, there is often about it a suspicion that its author, even if he ever knew exactly what he meant, was, at the time of writing it, oppressed with a superfluity of ideas conflicting with each other for priority of expression; and, though such passages often sound well, they cannot be intellectually satisfying.

2. Another use of Syntactical Analysis is found in its application to the acquisition of foreign languages. An English scholar, who has learned to analyze his own language, will find that knowledge a valuable aid to a quicker and more thorough apprehension of the nature of other tongues. The system already explained may *mutatis mutandis* be so applied. Students of Latin will find analysis of immense service, and teachers still more so. The nomenclature of Analysis gives one, so to speak, a power of leverage in explaining Latin constructions.

3. Syntactical Analysis also affords a basis for a systematic comparison of languages in a manner not yet, I believe, attempted. We hear much of "comparative grammar" and of "comparative etymology," which terms are made practically co-extensive by distinguished philologists; but of "comparative syntax" we hear little. When it comes to be dealt with systematically it will yield important results. See an article by the present writer on *Professor Max Müller and the Chinese Language* in the *Melbourne Review*, No. 8.

4. Not the least merit of the system of Analysis developed in this book is that it leads to a fuller appreciation of the task lying before both the grammarian and the logician and affords the means of rectifying several wide-spread errors which have eaten their way into and corrupted the twin sciences of Grammar and Logic, and other branches of knowledge intimately connected with them. The attempt to remodel the current system of Syntactical Analysis showed me the necessity of placing in a conspicuous light the principle for Word-classing. This led to a precise definition of the Verb and clearer views of the nature of Sentences, and so to a most important and necessary innovation, if it may be so called, in the science of Logic, as will appear in Part III.

SECTION 2.—ITS CONNECTION WITH PARSING.

As may be gathered from what has been said, the connection between Parsing and Analysis is expressed in the statement that they mutually supplement each other. They should therefore be in perfect accord. Subjoined is a scheme of parsing to agree with the reformed analysis.

METHOD OF PARSING.

1. *Noun.*

1. *Kind*—Proper, Common.
2. *Gender*.—Masculine, Feminine, Neuter, Common.
3. *Number*.—Singular, Plural.
4. *Case*.—Nominative, Possessive, Objective.

- | | | |
|------------|---|--|
| Nominative | { | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. to Verb, as in <i>John came</i>. 2. Complementary to Verb, as in <i>This is the house</i>. 3. in Apposition, as in <i>King James fled</i>. 4. of Address, as in <i>Come here, Charles</i>. 5. Absolute, as in <i>Morn approaching, we rise</i>. |
| Possessive | { | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. governed by Noun, as in <i>Jane's house</i>. 2. in Apposition, as in <i>Caoch the piper's dog</i>. |

- Objective {
1. after Verb, as in *He lost the horse.*
 2. after Noun, as in *Shooting grouse is pleasant.*
 3. after Preposition, expressed or understood, as in *He went to London, Give it (to) me.*
 4. in Apposition, as in *He slew the king, his father.*
 5. by Analogy, as in *The tree is six feet round.*

2. Verb.

1. *Kind.*—Transitive or Intransitive.
2. *Form.*—Regular or Irregular.
3. *Mood.*—Assertive, Interrogative, Imperative, Optative, Conditional.
4. *Tense.*—Present, Past, Indefinite.
5. *Person.*—First, Second, Third.
6. *Number.*—Singular, Plural.
7. *Subject*—with which it agrees.

3. Adjective.

1. Degree (if admitting comparison by inflection), Positive, Comparative, Superlative.
2. Expressive of—Quality, Quantity, Position, Number, &c.
3. Distinguishing or Attributive to —.

4. Adverb.

1. *Kind.*—Manner, Time, Place, Degree, Order, Cause, Condition, Concession, &c.
2. Affecting Verb, Adjective or Adverb —.

5. Pronoun.

1. *Kind.*—Personal, Relative, Interrogative.
2. *Person.*—First, Second, Third.
3. Otherwise like Noun, q.v.
4. Antecedent (if a Relative).

6. Participle.

1. Depending on —.

7. Preposition.

1. Governing —.

8. *Conjunction.*

1. *Kind.*—Copulative, Adversative, Alternative, Causal, or Conditional.

2. Joining Words, Phrases or Sentences.

9. *Interjection.*

1. Expressive of	{ Mental Act	Interrogation—Eh?
		Assent—Yes.
	{ State	Dissent—No.
		Doubt, &c.—Ah.
	{ Emotion	Joy—Hurrah.
		Surprise—Oh.
		Grief—Alas.

The cardinal point in this system is to parse *each word singly*. Many grammarians profess to do this, but none keep consistently to it. When each word is taken alone parsing becomes simplified and as a means of giving an insight into the real nature of words more effective. The chief simplification occurs in the manner of treating the verb. The distinction of *Voice* disappears, as foreign to the English tongue. The moods are rectified, the indicative being rejected as ambiguous and in its place we have the Assertive and Interrogative, which are essentially distinct moods. The Optative, which most grammarians do not deign to notice, is inserted. The Potential, so called, is excised, as resting on a false principle. The Potential is so called from signifying power; but if signification be admitted as the test of mood, then there would be as many moods as there are verbs of different meaning, so that in *I long to go* we should have a "longing mood" and in *I like to ride* we should have a "liking mood," just as in *I can go* there is said to be a "potential mood!"

There are in English but two definite tenses, (taking words singly) present and past. In some expressions neither of these times is indicated, *e.g.*

1. I would if I could.

2. I might succeed were I to try.

Here the verbs are indefinite as regards time. In the first example we might understand either *now*, *yesterday* or *to-morrow*; in the second *now* or *to-morrow*.

SECTION 3.—SYNOPTICAL VIEW OF THE SIMPLIFIED ANALYTICAL SYSTEM.

A synoptical glance at the system of Analysis explained in the preceding pages may be had from the following brief

Mnemonic Tables.

1.

EXPRESSION	1. Word.
	2. Phrase.
	3. Sentence.
	4. Clause.
	5. Period.

2.

ELEMENTS.

SENTENCE	<i>Essential.</i>	<i>Secondary.</i>
	SUBJECT ... Enlargements.	COMPLEMENTS.

3.

SENTENCES	KIND	ASSERTIVE	Direct	Indirect ... Exclamatory or Subordinate.
		NON-ASSERTIVE	Interrogative Imperative Optative	
	RANK	PRINCIPAL	... No degrees admissible.	Found only in combination.
		SUBORDINATE	... Degrees admissible.	

4.

PERIODS	ASSERTIVE ...	Direct and Exclamatory.
	NON-ASSERTIVE	Interrogative. Imperative.
	MIXED.	Optative.

5.

SUBJECT	SIMPLE ...	1.—Noun.	2.—Pronoun.	3.—Quoted Word.
	COMPOUND ...	4.—Nounal Phrase. Two or more of above connected.		

6.

ENLARGEMENTS { SIMPLE ... 1.—Adjective. 2.—Noun. 3.—Pronoun.
4.—Adjectival Phrase.
COMPOUND ... Two or more of these connected.

7.

PREDICATE ... VERB.

8.

COMPLEMENTS	}	SIMPLE ...	1.—Noun. 2.—Pronoun. 3.—Adjective. 4.—Participle. 5.—Adverb. 6.—Phrase Nounal, Pronounal, Adjectival, Partic- icipial, or Adverbial.
		COMPOUND ...	Two or more of these conjoined.

9.

ORDER ... Natural and Inverted.

SECTION 4.—TABULATED FORMS.

Though I consider the simple plan of analyzing Sentences and Periods as exemplified at pages 100 and 108 the best, I am aware that some examiners prefer tabulated forms, and accordingly subjoin one for Sentences and one for Periods, simpler and more comprehensive than any I have seen. The only objectionable feature in these forms is the frequent dislocation of elements.

SENTENCES.

1. Many men build houses for others to dwell in.
2. Who passes by this road so late?
3. Bid me discourse.
4. May thy lofty head be crowned
With many a tower and terrace round.
5. How beautiful is night!

PERIOD.

The coin most current among mankind is flattery; the only use of which is that by seeing what we are not we learn what we should be.

EXAMPLES OF SENTENCES.

SENTENCE.	KIND.	SUBJECT.	ENLARGEMENTS.	PREDICATE.	COMPLEMENTS.
1. Many men build houses for others to dwell in.	Assertive.	MEN	Many	BUILD	houses for others to dwell in.
2. Who passes by this road so late ?	Interrogative.	WHO		PASSES	by this road, so late.
3. Bid me discourse.	Imperative.	(THOU)		BID	me (to) discourse.
4. May thy lofty head be crowned with many a tower and terrace round.	Optative.	HEAD	thy lofty	MAY	be crowned with many a tower and terrace round.
5. How beautiful is night !	Exclamatory.	NIGHT		IS	How beautiful.

EXAMPLE OF PERIOD.

PERIOD.	RELATION.	SUBJECT.	ENLARGEMENTS.	PREDICATE.	COMPLEMENTS.
<i>A.</i> The coin most current among mankind is flattery,	Prin. Sent.	COIN	The, most current among mankind,	IS	flattery.
<i>B.</i> the only use of which is	Adj. Sent. to <i>A.</i>	USE	the only, of which,	IS	
<i>C.</i> that we learn by seeing	Noun Sent. to <i>B.</i>	(that) WE		LEARN	by seeing
<i>D.</i> what we are not	Noun Sent. to <i>C.</i>	WE		ARE	not what
<i>H.</i> what we should be.	Noun Sent. to <i>C.</i>	WE		SHOULD	be what.

PART III.

THE STRUCTURE OF PROPOSITIONS

CHAPTER I.

THE TWO THEORIES.

IN the foregoing system of Syntactical Analysis the Verb and the Grammatical Predicate have been considered as synonymous and the expressions treated throughout as convertible terms. What becomes then of the copula, which so many writers speak of, upon which they build so much, and upon which they are as divided in their opinions as grammarians have been, but need no longer be, upon the nature of the verb? In the reformed Analysis the copula has been utterly ignored. Is this justifiable or not? If not, of course the system which ignores and excludes it cannot be sound. That there may be no misunderstanding, I will state at the outset the result of my investigation into the nature of propositions, and will endeavour to show, to those who care to examine the question on its merits, the grounds upon which I reject the theory current among philosophic writers as to the tripartite nature of propositions or assertive sentences.

Whereas then it is commonly held that propositions consist of three parts, subject, predicate and copula, I hold that there are but two parts, subject and predicate; and the main ground on which I base this doctrine is the

acceptance as valid of the definition usually given of the predicate in logic, and allowed by the ablest logicians to pass current without protest. The predicate of a proposition, when defined at all, is commonly said to be that which we assert of the subject. The new theory—for it has been so long lost sight of as to merit being called new—may be further expressed in the following thesis.

1. The copula, as anything apart from either the grammatical or the logical predicate in an assertive sentence, has no real existence: it is a mere myth or fabrication of certain logicians.

2. The term *copula* is not of the slightest utility either in grammar or logic, and should therefore be discarded.

3. The amount of confusion caused by its adoption amongst logicians and grammarians is stupendous. It has led great scholars, not only into great mistakes, but often into palpable contradictions, uncomfortable dilemmas, miserable evasions and patent absurdities. It has in fact done as much to corrupt philosophy as any single error, while it is held at present almost universally, if not quite so.

To establish the position here taken up, it will be necessary to see what grammarians and logicians teach concerning the copula, and it will probably be admitted that the various explanations selected for treatment fairly represent the prevalent teaching. Among the authorities from whom I am compelled to differ are some whose names stand among the first for the treatment of philosophical questions; while the theory here supported regarding the bipartite nature of propositions will, if accepted, render many systems of logic, as systems, valueless, though portions of several are very valuable. The avowed aim of this investigation is, while vindicating the system of Analysis already explained, to free philosophy from an incubus which has for centuries oppressed it.

It should further be premised that I employ the word

tripartist to denote one who holds the copula to be anything apart from the predicate, the latter being defined as that which is asserted of the subject, or who maintains that there are three parts necessary for the structure of a proposition.

The examination commences with Dr. Morell, to whose grammatical analysis I am indebted for the first idea of the present work.

CHAPTER II.

DR. MORELL'S EXPLANATION OF THE CURRENT THEORY.

A. "The mind in the art of thinking unites two ideas together. For example, *gold* and *glitter* are two ideas which we possess singly. If we now bring them together so that one is affirmed of the other, we create the sentence *Gold glitters*, which is the due expression of our thought.

B. "The real essence and life of a sentence lies in this union of two ideas. The bond which unites them is called the copula.

C. "The copula, which contains the affirmation, is most frequently included in the same word with the predicate ; as, *Time flies*.

D. "Frequently, however, the copula is expressed by a distinct word ; as, *Man is mortal*.

E. "In compound verbs the copula is always contained in the auxiliary ; as *Never shall I forget him*. Here the affirmation is evidently included in the auxiliary *shall*.

F. "In grammatical analysis it is more convenient to regard the copula as belonging to the predicate ; so that instead of having three essential elements, as is the case in logic, we shall have only two, namely—

1. "The subject, which expresses the thing about which we are speaking ; and

2. "The predicate, which contains what we affirm of the subject."—(*Grammar*, p. 66.)

REMARKS.

1. This grammarian proposes to analyze sentences, and he sets about his work in this way. He tells us (*B*) that the essence or life of a sentence lies in the copula, and that in logic there are three essential elements to every

proposition, one of which is the copula. Yet, on the ground of *convenience*, Dr. Morell deliberately excludes this same copula from his system of grammatical analysis. He prefers to consider this "essential element" as "belonging to" another element! (*F.*) This, I should say, is not analysis at all, whatever else it may be.

If Dr. Morell carried out his theory of the tripartite nature of sentences by analyzing his examples so as to show the three parts named by him as essential, the practical value which his syntactical system undoubtedly possesses would be seriously impaired. Not only the form, but also the meaning, of the sentences would be wholly or partially destroyed; and it is no part of either grammatical or logical analysis to do this. By way of illustration let us attempt to separate the copula from the predicate in the following of Dr. Morell's chosen examples:—

- (1.) Wise men employ their talents rightly.
- (2.) He acts well.
- (3.) William the Conqueror died in 1087.
- (4.) Remote from towns he ran his godly race.
- (5.) Charity covereth a multitude of sins.

If we inquire how the separation of copula from predicate is to be accomplished in sentences like these, neither Dr. Morell nor any other tripartist gives satisfactory instructions. Dr. Whately, however, instructs us that when the copula is not visible, it is to be made visible by "resolving" the verb into some part of *be* and a participle or adjective. Adopting this method, the given sentences "resolved" read thus:—

- (1.) Wise men are employing their talents rightly.
- (2.) He is acting well.
- (3.) William the Conqueror was dying in 1087.
- (4.) Remote from towns he was running his godly race.
- (5.) Charity is covering a multitude of sins.

By comparing the "resolved" with the original sentences,

it will be seen that in no instance is the meaning precisely the same; in some it is widely different; several are rendered ridiculous, and the *form* of every one has been altered. In "resolving" as above we really substitute certain expressions for others, instead of showing how the originals are constructed. Now the main object of syntactical analysis is to show how words are put together to form sentences, and, far from accomplishing this by "resolving" as above, we actually defeat it. Dr. Morell does well, therefore, to reject the copula in practice; but he would have done better to reject it also in theory, and this not on account of convenience alone.

It is not to be imagined that the tripartists keep to any fixed method of *resolving*, or, as Dr. Morell might call it, *expansion*, or as it really is, *paraphrasing*. As a rule they resolve *ad libitum*, e.g.—

- (1.) *He raves* into *He is a maniac*.—Morell.
- (2.) *The sun shines* into *The sun is shining*.—Sullivan.
- (3.) *The world is* into *The world is something which exists*.
- (4.) *John thinks* into *John is a person thinking*.
- (5.) *It is pleasant to know* into *All knowing is pleasant*.

Now *raves* is not compounded of *is* and *a maniac*; nor *shines* of *is* and *shining*. Let us then recognize the fact that the process above exemplified is but a *substitution* of one expression for another.

2. Dr. Morell speaks in *A* of the *mind* uniting the two ideas in a sentence, and then in *B* of some *bond* or copula uniting them. According to this, the mind and the copula perform the same function. Either then the mind and the copula are one and the same thing (!), or the former uses the latter as a means, instrument or bond wherewith to join two ideas together.

Now, the real essence of a proposition consists in such a union as results from the bringing together of the subject

and predicate as defined by me in Part II. c. 1, but there is no *bond* required to so unite them, whether in the mind of the thinker, the utterance of the speaker, or the penning of the writer. The thinker unites the ideas, *so far as they are united*, by the aid of no instrument, but by his own intellectual act in bringing them together or entertaining them successively. The speaker unites the subject and predicate, *so far as they are united*, by uttering them in due sequence; and the writer by committing them to paper in such collocation as the usage of the language dictates, allows or renders intelligible. I say *so far as they are united*, because, as a Professor of Logic once observed to me, the subject idea and the predicate idea in a proposition do not unite, but stand in the mind judging distinctly apart.

As to the supposed necessity of a copula and the purpose it is imagined to fulfil in a proposition, I would here observe that all propositions commonly treated of are of two types, one represented by *Fish swim*, and the other by *Man is mortal*. In the first of these there is absolutely nothing which the tripartists can identify with the copula, and as a bond or copula is dispensed with here, it follows that such bond or copula is not *essential* to the formation of a judgment either entertained or expressed. The importance of this conclusion will be appreciated by those who are familiar with the current logical teaching.

Again, in the expression *Man is mortal*, the subject *man* and the predicate, strictly so called, *is mortal* are united only by an intellectual act to form the proposition. And if it be urged that in the given expression the copula *is* unites the subject *man* and the predicate *mortal* by bringing them together, my reply is twofold :—

- (1.) It would be as correct to say that the word *is* separates *man* from *mortal*, inasmuch as it stands between them and actually prevents their being united.
- (2.) There is absolutely nothing, *save the power of the mind*,

to unite firstly *man* with *is*, and secondly *is* with *mortal*. Not one of our logicians seems to have considered this. Some tripartists have compared *is*, in its supposed character of copula, to a bridge uniting the banks of a river. The second reply above shows that this bridge of theirs, like that in Mirza's vision, is broken at both ends, and so unites nothing.

3. Dr. Morell says in *C* that the *copula* "contains the affirmation." What then is the affirmation in *Never shall I forget him*? It is that *I shall never forget him*. Is all this contained in the copula *shall*? Clearly Dr. Morell has not decided what he means by that important word *affirmation*. It means either (1) that which is affirmed, declared, stated or predicated, or (2) the act of affirming or predicating. The first of these significations cannot apply to *shall* in *Never shall I forget him*; and if Dr. Morell accepts the second meaning, let him look to the consequences, one of which is this:—

If the act of affirming or predicating were contained in *shall*, then in *I shall never forget him*, as soon as the word *shall* has been uttered or written, an affirmation has been made, and the words following do but modify or qualify the affirmation made before they are added. Consequently, when these words are added, *shall* forms an inseparable part of the predicate; and so the copula, as anything apart from the predicate in the proposition, has no real existence. It is, in the words of my thesis, a myth or fabrication of certain logicians.

If it be objected that, after pronouncing the words *I shall*, nothing has yet been affirmed or predicated, I should reply, If so, there has been no act of affirmation, and therefore the word *shall* could contain or express no affirmation. But in reality there has been an act of affirmation. In pronouncing these words I affirm that *I shall*, without specifying what I am about or intend.

It may be noticed here that Dr. Morell in the quoted passage makes no distinction between assertive and non-assertive sentences, but speaks as though he thought sentences of all kinds have a copula, while he at the same time regards the supposed copula as a sign of affirmation ! He is by no means the only writer of note who does this. What makes this inconsistency particularly remarkable in him is that in his *Analysis Explained and Systematized* he speaks of various kinds of sentences. Yet even in that work he at times treats all sentences as affirmative, assertive or predicative.

One misfortune common to Dr. Morell with all other tripartists is that he never set about to determine what the copula must in *all cases* consist of. He tells us that in *Man is mortal* the copula is the word *is*. Lower down he says—"In compound verbs the copula is always *contained in the auxiliary*," and that "in *all other cases* the copula is supplied by the inflection of the verb," as in *Time flies*. But, as a grammarian, Dr. Morell should be aware that English verbs take inflections in the present tense in the second and third persons singular only. Thus—

PRESENT TENSE.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>
1. I love.		1. We love.
2. Thou lovest.		2. You love.
3. He loves.		3. They love.

In the other persons, then, where is the copula ? *I love*, *You love*, *We love* and *They love* all want inflection ; and since in these expressions there is no auxiliary, it follows, from what Dr. Morell says above, that in them there is no copula whatever !

Again, in the past tense, though in regular verbs each person is inflected, the inflections in that tense are of a

different character to those met with in the present, except the *st* in the second singular. Thus—

PAST TENSE.

1. I loved.	1. We loved.
2. Thou lovedst.	2. You loved.
3. He loved.	3. They loved.

For the nature of these terminations, see Max Müller's Lectures. The *st* is personal, the *ed* signifies past action. One of the grand mistakes of the tripartists is that they have not cared to investigate the nature of verbal terminations, but speak of them in the crudest manner, as if philology had done nothing in their regard. Attention to the points here noted would have shown Dr. Morell that the inflections in question are in no sense *copulae*. They merely indicate the number and person of the subject.

But, it has been said to me by a gentleman whose opinion on such a matter is entitled to consideration—"The copula in such sentences as *I love* is wrapped up in the verb." Wrapped up! How? No reply. How do you know that it is wrapped up? Still no reply. Unwrap it, if you can, and tell me what that is which is wrapped up. Is it a word, or an inflection, or a myth? Certainly the last, for of all the famous men who have attempted to explain it, not one has been able to give an intelligible account of it.

Here it will be well to observe the ambiguity of Dr. Morell's expressions "contained in" and "supplied by." He does not say that the copula is *contained* in *is*, but that this word is itself the copula in those propositions in which it occurs. But when he comes to *shall* and *will*, he does not venture to say that these words *are* copulae, but that they *contain* the copula. By this vague use of words he escapes a difficulty. For many logicians teach that the copula must always be some part of the verb *be*. Now,

Dr. Morell knows that *shall* and *will* are no parts of *be*. If then he were to say that *shall* and *will* are copulæ, he would come into collision with the logicians referred to. From this encounter he shrinks; yet there is nothing to fear in it. The question of the structure of propositions is one which the writers alluded to have not fully considered, as will appear abundantly in the following chapters.

CHAPTER III.

DR. CROMBIE.

OF all the philosophic grammarians I have held converse with, none displays the power of compressing into a single paragraph a larger number of incongruities than Dr. Crombie. His explanation of the copula, however, is as good as that of most writers on the subject.

At p. 86 of his *Etymology and Syntax* he implicitly accepts the common opinion that the copula is always some part of the verb *be*, while at p. 210 he says:—

“It particularly deserves the attention of the classical scholar that in English almost any verb may be used as a copula. . . . Thus we say ‘It *tastes* good,’ ‘It *strikes* hard.’”

But if in these examples *tastes* and *strikes* are copulæ, then *good* and *hard* alone, on the tripartite theory, would constitute the predicates, and the ideas of tasting and striking would be eliminated from the predicates.

At p. 86 we read:—

“The simplest of all verbs is that which the Greeks call a verb of existence, namely, the verb *to be*. This frequently denotes pure affirmation, as *God is good*, where the verb or copula, as it has been termed, serves to predicate of the Deity the attributes denoted by the following word. Hence, as it expresses mere affirmation, the Latins call it a substantive verb, in contradistinction to those verbs which with an attribute denote assertion, and were called by some grammarians adjective verbs. Sometimes it predicates pure or absolute existence, as *God is*, that is, *God exists*. In the following example it occurs in both senses:—‘We believe that Thou art, and that Thou art the rewarder of them who diligently seek Thee.’”

A little attention to this passage will help to show how "the simplest of all verbs" has become as much the subject of dispute and discord as all other verbs collectively.

The Greeks, Dr. Crombie says, called the verb *be* a verb of existence. If they did so, it must have been for the benefit of those who imagined that it signified anything else. But is it true that the Greeks called *be* a verb of existence? Dr. Crombie knows that the Greeks spoke Greek; but how in the Greek language they could call *be* a verb of existence, he never paused to inquire. The language of Hellas, with all its richness, has no pair of synonymes corresponding to our *be* and *exist*. This fact it may have been which led Mr. Mill to imagine that the greatest Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, did not know their own language well enough to philosophize in it properly. See the chapter on Mr. Mill's explanation of the tripartite theory.

Again, Dr. Crombie says that *be* sometimes denotes "pure or mere affirmation," at other times "pure or absolute existence," and that in the following example it occurs in both senses :—

"We believe that Thou art, and that Thou art the rewarder of them who diligently seek Thee."

Now in neither of these sentences does *art* denote affirmation, while in both it denotes existence, the proof of which is that, without alteration of the meaning, we can substitute *existest* for *art*, thus—

"We believe that Thou existest, and that Thou existest as the rewarder of them who diligently seek Thee."

The English verbs that "denote" affirmation are *affirm*, *assert*, *declare*, *state* or *predicate*, and as for "making" an affirmation, every verb in the assertive mood applied to a subject does that as "purely" as *art*, *is*, &c. The word *affirmation* Dr. Crombie, like Dr. Morell, makes out to be of the most mysterious character. At times both allow it to

be an assertion or statement ; but instead of keeping to this explanation, which is easily understood, they, to support the tripartite theory, on occasions treat it as something "mystic, wonderful," from which it would be profanity to draw the veil. The way Dr. Crombie qualifies the word is also absurd. He talks of "pure affirmation" and "mere affirmation," as if the words *pure* and *mere*, so applied, make a difference. Equally absurd are the phrases "pure existence" and "absolute existence." The meaningless employment of such terms serves only to throw a glamour round a simple question, and to render the elucidation of truth tedious. We might as well talk of a "pure" spade, or a "mere" spade, or an "absolute" spade. Philosophy will become much simpler than it is when philosophic writers acquire the habit of calling a spade a spade, and of adhering to their own definitions.

Observe above how Dr. Crombie speaks of the Greeks doing this and the Latins doing that, as if perfect unanimity prevailed among the writers of those two nations respectively on these topics. Amongst those who will disagree with Dr. Crombie when he says that the Latins called *be* the substantive verb on the ground that it "expresses *affirmation*" is

PROFESSOR EARLE,

who tells us (*Philology*, p. 271) *be* is called the substantive verb because it "confines itself to the assertion of *existence*."

Now, I would respectfully submit to Professor Earle, and all whom it may concern, that, if any word in the English language is to have the title of "substantive verb" on the ground of its signifying nothing but existence, no word has a claim prior to that of the verb *exist*. Yet Professor Earle does not call *exist* a substantive verb, at least in the place where he would be expected to do so.

There is another difficulty for Professor Earle. After

telling us (p. 270) that the substantive verb "expresses nothing but to have existence," he assures us in p. 273 that in such propositions as *John is running* "It is the mere instrument of predication, and conveys by itself *no idea whatever!*" So that the very verb which Professor Earle calls substantive, on the ground that it "confines itself to the assertion of existence," is of all verbs the only one which, in its most frequent use, does *not* signify existence!

With regard to Dr. Crombie's example, *God is good*, I would observe that in it the word *is* predicates the existence of the Deity, while *good* expresses the mode of His existence; and of this same word *is* I would here further observe, what later on I shall prove, that it has in reality but one meaning in every proposition in which it occurs, and that this meaning is expressed, so far as the meaning of one word can be expressed by another, by the word *exists*, its synonyme.

CHAPTER IV.

DR. SULLIVAN.

A. "A proposition consists of three parts, the subject, the predicate and the copula. That which is spoken of is called the subject of the proposition ; that which is said of it is called the predicate ; and that which affirms or denies the predicate of the subject is called the copula.

B. "Thus in the propositions *Sugar is sweet* and *John is not tall*, the words *sugar* and *John* are subjects ; *sweet* and *tall* are the predicates ; and *is* and *is not* are the copulas.

C. "And when the substantive verb is not expressed, as in the propositions *The sun shines*, *The sun does not shine*, the copula *is* or *is not* is included in the signification of the verb used.

D. "Thus *shines*, in the first proposition, is equivalent to *is shining*, and *does not shine*, in the second, is equivalent to *is not shining*.

E. "The subject and predicate of a proposition are called the *terms* of it. A *term* is a word expressing a notion or idea." (*Grammar*, p. 152.)

F. "In every simple sentence, however short, the three essential parts of a proposition will be found ; . . . for every sentence is resolvable into something of which we are speaking, and something which we say about it." (P. 154.)

G. "In analyzing a sentence grammatically we should in the first place resolve it into its principal or essential parts.

H. "The principal parts of a sentence are the nominative, the verb and the object." (P. 155.)

REMARKS.

1. No tripartist appears to have considered this simple fact, to them of vital import, that if in such propositions as *Sugar is sweet* it be agreed among them to call the word *sweet* alone the predicate, then they should define the predicate not as "that which is said of the subject," but as "that which the subject is said to be." Their overlooking this noteworthy point is by itself suggestive of the little reflection bestowed by them on their theory.

2. While *A* defines the predicate as that which is said of the subject, *B* tells us that in *Sugar is sweet* and *John is not tall*, *sweet* and *tall* alone form the predicates. Now we do not say *sweet* of sugar, but *is sweet*; nor do we say *tall* of John, but *is not tall*. This clearly shows that, if Dr. Sullivan's definition be correct, *is* forms part of the predicate and is not a separate element.

3. We are told in *C* that—"When the substantive verb is not expressed, the copula *is* included in the signification of the verb." This very vague expression involves a perfectly gratuitous assumption. Dr. Sullivan is too good an etymologist to say that *is* is included in *shines*. *Shines* may be equivalent to *is shining*, but the proposition *The sun shines* is bipartite, and even the periphrasis cannot make it tripartite, according to Dr. Sullivan's definition of the predicate.

4. Observe how Dr. Sullivan makes *three* out of *two*. According to *F* "in every sentence the three essential parts of a proposition will be found;" "for," says *G*, "every sentence is resolvable into something of which we are speaking, and something which we say about it." So then a sentence must have *three* parts because it is resolvable into *two*! Fancy a lecturer on chemistry saying—"Water consists of three elements, because we can resolve it into two—namely, 'oxygen and hydrogen;" and, when asked what the third is, replying—"Oh, the third is that which

unites the two gases together." With equal wisdom an anthropologist might say—"Man consists of three parts, mind, body, and that which unites them together." This would be fully as scientific as Dr. Sullivan's account of the unaccountable third element in propositions.

5. According to *E* "a *term* is a word expressing a notion or idea;" and since the subject and predicate only are defined as "terms," we may conclude that the copula expresses no idea or notion! If it expresses no idea, why do some logicians tell us it expresses the idea of predication? If it does express an idea or notion, why do others teach that propositions contain only *two* notions?

6. After reading in *A* and *F* that the three essential parts of a sentence or proposition are the subject, predicate and copula, we are told in *G* that "in analyzing a sentence grammatically we should in the first place resolve it into its principal or essential parts." These we find in *H* to be, not subject, predicate and copula, but the nominative, the verb and the object!

CHAPTER V.

ARCHBISHOP WHATELY.

A. "A syllogism being, as aforesaid, resolvable into three propositions, and each proposition containing two terms; of these terms that which is spoken of is called the subject; that which is said of it the predicate, and these two are called the terms or extremes, because logically the subject is placed first and the predicate last.

B. "And in the middle is the copula, which indicates the act of judgment, as by it the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject. The copula must be either *is* or *is not*, which expressions indicate that you affirm or deny the predicate of the subject.

C. "The substantive verb is the only verb recognized in logic, inasmuch as all other verbs are compound, being resolvable by the verb *to be* and a participle or adjective, e.g. *The Romans conquered*: the word *conquered* is both copula and predicate, being equivalent to *were* (copula) and *victorious* (predicate).

D. "It is proper to observe that the copula, as such, has no relation to time, but expresses merely the agreement or disagreement of two given terms. Hence if any other tense of the substantive verb besides the present is used, it is either understood as the same in sense, the difference of tense being regarded as a matter of grammatical propriety only; or else, if the circumstance of time really do modify the sense of the whole proposition, so as to make the use of that tense an essential, then the circumstance is to be regarded as a part of one of these terms, *at that time*, or some such expression, being understood; as *This man was honest*, i.e. *He is one formerly honest*. In some cases an

emphasis, accompanied with a peculiar tone, is usually laid on the substantive verb.

E. "Sometimes the substantive verb is both copula and predicate, i.e. where existence only is predicated, e.g. *Deus est, There is a God. One of Jacob's sons is not.*

F. "And observe, the copula, merely as such, does not imply *real* existence, e.g. A faultless man is a being feigned by the Stoics.

G. "A verb (all except the substantive verb used as a copula) is a mixed word, being resolvable into the copula and predicate, to which it is equivalent."—(*Elements of Logic*, p. 38.)

REMARKS.

1. The first thing to observe in Dr. Whately's theory of propositions is that he defines the predicate as "that which is said of the subject." This definition excludes any third element. In the example *The Romans were victorious*, what we say of the Romans is that they *were victorious*. These two words therefore constitute the predicate, and so the copula finds no place. It has a name indeed, but no local habitation. The Archbishop's illogical theory leads him into many difficulties, among which are the following:—

In *B* we are told the copula stands *between* the subject and predicate, while in *C* we learn that all verbs, except the substantive verb, unite in themselves the functions of both copula and predicate; and in *E* we find that "sometimes the substantive verb itself is both copula and predicate," as in *Deus est, God is*. But I would submit that to be predicated and to indicate the fact are functions essentially different, even on the tripartite theory, and these functions cannot possibly be amalgamated so as to be discharged by a single word. How can *is* indicate that itself is predicated? If *is* be here the predicate, it cannot

be the copula ; and if, on the other hand, it be the copula, there is no predicate which it can attach to the subject.

Again, if "the only verb recognized in logic" were the verb *be*, those nations who have no such verb would be excluded from the science of logic and debarred the privilege of syllogistic reasoning, and so the disciples of Confucius would be shut out of philosophy ! How can verbs in such a language as theirs be resolved into some part of a verb which is not found in it and a participle or adjective ? The Chinese have no verb corresponding exactly to our *be* ; and it may be noted in passing that it was in great measure through an attempt on the part of the translator of the English Bible into Chinese to introduce equivalents of this word in his rendering that the book referred to became a laughing-stock to the educated portion of that immense empire into whose hands the translation fell. See the *Mission Grammar*.

In what sense is it true to say that every verb except *be* is a compound or mixed word ? In such verbs as *swim*, *benl*, *take*, and a thousand others no etymological composition can be shown. Evidently then such verbs can be "resolved" only by periphrasis ; and if a supporter of the tripartite theory should urge that every verb *implies* being, and in English and cognate languages every verb can accordingly be resolved into some part of the substantive verb and a participle or adjective, and so a copula can always be exhibited in these languages, I should reply :—

(1.) Verbs no more imply the meaning of the word *be* than nouns do that of the word *thing*, and therefore in a logical analysis there is no more need of extracting some tense of this verb from every other verb and calling it a copula, than there is of extracting some case of the noun *thing* from every subject, giving it a distinctive name and making it a *fourth* element in propositions.

(2.) So far as signification goes, nouns are as much

"compound" or "mixed" words as verbs are, since they are equally capable of resolution. Thus if *runs* is resolvable into *is running*, *runner* is resolvable into *one who runs*, and is therefore no less compound or mixed.

2. Dr. Whately says—"The copula, merely as such, does not imply *real* existence," from which one might infer that it does imply some kind of existence, such as imaginary or possible existence. Other tripartists do not allow that the copula signifies existence at all.

But why does not Dr. Whately inform us also that the word *exists*, equally with *is*, does not always "imply *real* existence," as in *A faultless man exists only in the imagination of the Stoics*?

The Archbishop says the copula must be *is* or *is not*; but if any other tense, such as *was*, occurs "the difference of tense is a matter of grammatical propriety only." Why then should he postulate the substitution of one of these tenses for the other, that what he supposes to be *logical* propriety may be observed?

Dr. Whately's failure to give a scientific or consistent account of the supposed third element is the more remarkable that in the attempt he had the assistance of

DR. J. H. (CARDINAL) NEWMAN.

In the preface to the *Elements* an acknowledgment of indebtedness is made "to the Rev. J. H. Newman, Fellow of Oriel College, who actually composed a considerable portion of the work as it now stands from manuscripts not designed for publication, and who is the original author of several pages." The very part Dr. Newman admits to be his is the *Synthetical Compendium* from which I have quoted. See *Memoirs of Whately*, p. 47. Allusion to the subject is made here to draw attention to the fact that Cardinal Newman commences his *Essay in Aid of a*

Grammar of Assent by a reiteration of the prevailing theory on the nature of propositions : thus—

“Propositions (consisting of a subject and predicate united by a copula) may take a categorical, conditional or interrogative form. (1.) An interrogative when they ask a question,” &c.

Dr. Newman does not, in the work named above, build much on the mistaken idea regarding the supposed existence of a third element in propositions and indeed in *all* sentences ; but the statement is there made apparently as a sort of fulcrum to the mighty lever which is to upheave new treasures in Mental Science. How, it might be asked of him, if he contributes to a work on logic which defines a proposition as “a sentence indicative, the characteristic difference of which is its affirming or denying,” can he consistently publish in another logical work that “propositions may take an *interrogative* form?” Cardinal Newman is not the only great writer on logical topics who has given but scant attention to the specific differences of sentences. In regard to this he is in company with Mr. J. S. Mill.

CHAPTER VI.

MR. J. S. MILL.

A. "A proposition is a portion of discourse in which a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject. A predicate and a subject are all that is necessarily required to make up a proposition ;

B. "But as we cannot conclude from merely seeing two names put together that they are a predicate and a subject, that is, that one is intended to be affirmed or denied of the other,

C. "It is necessary that there should be some mode or form of indicating that such is the intention ; some sign to distinguish a predication from any other kind of discourse.

D. "This is sometimes done by a slight alteration of one of the words, called an inflection ; as when we say, *Fire burns*, the change of the second word from *burn* to *burns* showing that we mean to affirm the predicate *burn* of the subject *fire*.

E. "But this function is more commonly fulfilled by the word *is* when an affirmation is intended, *is not* when a negation, or by some other part of the verb *to be*. The word which thus serves the purpose of a sign of predication is called, as we formerly observed, the copula.

F. "It is of the utmost importance that there should be no indistinctness in our conception of the nature and office of the copula ; for confused notions respecting it are among the causes which have spread mysticism over the field of logic and converted its speculations into logomachies.

G. "It is apt to be supposed that the copula is much more than a sign of predication, that it also signifies existence. In the proposition *Socrates is just* it would seem to be implied not only that the quality *just* can be affirmed of

Socrates, but moreover that Socrates is, that is to say, exists.

H. "This, however, only shows that there is an ambiguity in the word *is*, a word which not only performs the function of the copula in affirmations, but has also a meaning of its own, in virtue of which it may itself be made the predicate of a proposition.

K. "That the employment of it as a copula does not necessarily include the affirmation of existence appears from such a proposition as this, *A centaur is a fiction of the poets*; where it cannot possibly be implied that a centaur exists, since the proposition itself expressly asserts that the thing has no real existence."—(*Logic*, I. 4.)

REMARKS.

1. Mr. Mill declares it to be of "the utmost importance that there should be no indistinctness in our conception of the nature and office of the copula, for confused notions respecting it are among the causes which have spread mysticism over the field of logic and converted its speculations into logomachies." What then if Mr. Mill's own conception of the copula is not merely indistinct, but altogether erroneous? Such unfortunately is the case, as I proceed to show.

Mr. Mill tells us "all that is necessarily required to make up a proposition is a subject and a predicate." This is precisely what I hold. But Mr. Mill further adds that a third thing, the copula, is needed not to "make up" the proposition, but to render it when "made up" distinguishable from other kinds of discourse. That is to say, logicians can construct propositions which, till a certain sign is added, are indistinguishable as propositions! Thus *Fire burn* is, according to Mr. Mill, a proposition "made up" but indistinguishable from other kinds of discourse!

It does not appear to have occurred to Mr. Mill to inquire how many kinds of discourse besides predication there are, and what sign, if any, there is in each of them to distinguish them from predication and from one another. This is an unexplored region to him, and so he fares no better than those who fall into the widespread error that *all* discourse is predication. Mr. Mill says the copula is a sign to distinguish predication from any other kind of discourse. But how does the copula *is* distinguish the predication *Socrates is just* from the interrogation *Is Socrates just?* Or how can the inflection of the verb, in its office of copula, distinguish the statement *He does* from the question *Does he?* The verb *is* and inflections are as much signs of "other kinds of discourse" as they are of predication.

Again, in the sentence *Fire burns*, the inflection is a sign, not of predication, but of the third person singular, being not predicative but demonstrative in its nature, the fragment of an archaic pronoun, according to philologists.

Professor Max Müller (*Lectures*, I. c. 6) gives us an insight into the real value of such verbal endings, and, following him, I append a brief comparative table :—

<i>Sanskrit.</i>	<i>Greek.</i>	<i>Latin.</i>	<i>English.</i>
As-mi,	Eu- μ ,	S-um,	A-m,
A-si,	Et- σ ,	E-s,	Ar-t,
As-ti,	Es- τ i,	Es-t,	Is(t).

Tables similar to this have been before the world for many years, yet I know of no grammarian who takes occasion from them to teach *why* a verb must agree with its subject in number and person. In the above instances the affixes are fragments of pronouns first transposed, then agglutinated, then corrupted in some instances by phonetic decay; and they remain simply as indicators of the person and number of the subject with which on this account

they must correspond. This becomes more evident still in Hebrew, where the identical pronouns prefixed as subject recur often as verbal affixes. Logicians have benefited no more than grammarians by such philological teaching, appearing in truth utterly unacquainted with it.

If Mr. Mill had tried to determine what the copula or sign of predication must in *all* cases consist of, he might have discovered his error. He tells us in *D* that sometimes predication is indicated by *inflection*, forgetting that the same inflections are common to several kinds of discourse. Again, he says in *E* that the sign of predication is more commonly some part of the verb *be*, overlooking the fact that this word also is common to more than one kind of discourse. And when both the verb *be* and *inflections* are absent, as in *Men think*, *Fish swim*, what is then the sign of predication? Mr. Mill leaves this question to settle itself. If either an inflection or the verb *be* were necessary to render predication distinguishable from other kinds of discourse, then nations like the Chinese, who have no such verb and no inflections at all, would be destitute of the power of expressing their thoughts! If Mr. Mill, when treating of the structure of propositions, had turned for a moment from the language of books to the language of life, he might have discovered that in the country parts of England the lower orders of the people are quite expert at "distinguishing predication from other kinds of discourse" without the aid of the verb *be* or inflections, even in sentences where educated people would employ the latter. Thus, in Hampshire they say, *He go* for *He goes*, *John do* for *John does*; and though Dr. Crombie might call this "the language of the vulgar," no worse charge can be brought against it. It is quite as intelligible as anything said in the best society, or even by writers on logic. Whoever chooses to make the experiment will find that, however "ungrammatically" they may talk in Hampshire

and other counties, and however much they may dispense with inflections or contort them, there is no danger of their mistaking an assertion, made in words familiar, for a question or a command. But without laying aside our books, without going to the Hampshire Downs or the remote confines of Asia, we may read or hear daily thousands of predications, perfectly distinguishable from other kinds of discourse, without auxiliary or inflection, among educated and uneducated alike, in the most polite and in the least polite usage. From what has been said, it is clear then that no exaggeration was made in former parts of this work regarding the importance of distinguishing the different kinds of sentences and of apprehending the true nature of verbs. Logicians would have been spared many a serious error, had they thoroughly sifted such questions when they came across them. Through not doing so Mr. Mill's theory of the structure of propositions is rendered valueless, and the arch of which it is the keystone falls.

2. "We cannot," as Mr. Mill rightly observes, "conclude from seeing two names put together that they are subject and predicate." Because two *names* are often put together without being subject and predicate. But when we see a nominative and a suitable assertive verb put together, we know at once, without the aid of any further sign, that they are subject and predicate, *e.g.* *Men think, Flowers bloom, Deer graze.* Here are predications, but no philosopher can point out in them any *sign* of predication beyond the verbs themselves, which are here *used* to predicate.

Again, the word *is* in such propositions as *Socrates is just* may be called a "sign of predication," in so far as every assertive verb is a sign and predicates, but it is more-over the grammatical predicate, that is, the verb divested of all complements, and is likewise an inseparable part of the full or logical predicate, that is, the verb with all

complements. When we have said *Socrates is*, we have already predicated *being* or *existence* of Socrates, and the predication thus made is afterwards qualified by the word *just*. This, however, does not accord with what we read in *G* and *K*. The truth is that Mr. Mill, in common with many other logicians, is under a palpable misapprehension with regard to the meaning of the words *be* and *exist*, and, as the meaning of these words is intimately connected with the present inquiry, an understanding on the matter is not only desirable, but indispensable.

Mr. Mill says (*K*) that in the proposition, *A centaur is a fiction of the poets*—"It cannot possibly be implied that a centaur exists. But a centaur does exist as a fiction of the poets, that is, it has an imaginary existence. The real point here is the meaning of *is*. It means *exists*, and this idea is qualified by the completing phrase, *a fiction of the poets*. Logicians have no right to take the terms *existence* and *real existence* as always convertible.

It is similarly inaccurate of Mr. Mill to say that the quoted proposition "*expressly asserts* that a centaur has no real existence," for it merely *implies* this. Like several other philosophers, Mr. Mill fails on the one hand to see that *imply* and *express* are antithetical, and on the other hand to recognize *is* and *exists* as convertible terms. The latter pair of terms are synonymes, one of Saxon, the other of Latin origin. They differ not only in derivation, but also in this, that it would be in many instances unidiomatic and awkward to employ *exists* instead of *is*, the former having come into the language at a comparatively recent period, when the verbal combinations were already fixed. Nevertheless, *is* and *exists* always signify alike. Some, it is true, maintain that no two words in any language convey precisely the same idea. Others hold that convertible terms are perfect synonymes, and express exactly the same idea. This difference of opinion may be adjusted in the following

way. It is impossible, as both parties will probably admit, to draw a distinct line of severance between a sensation and an idea so as to say where one begins and the other ends. Applying this to the question under consideration, it is to be remarked that in pronouncing words commonly and rightly taken as convertible (say *is* and *exists*), these in utterance have different sounds. These sounds produce different sensations in the hearer, and the difference in sensation thus produced is inadvertently taken for a difference of idea. Some might say the difference is of sensation rather than of idea. Similarly the corresponding words in different languages, though producing in the hearer distinct sensations, nevertheless convey the same idea. Thus the Greek *ἔπος*, the Latin *gladius*, the French *épée*, the Spanish *espada*,

Πολλων ὀνοματων μορφη μια,

alike signify the same as our English *sword*, and are truly said to convey the same idea.

To this it may be well to add that the derivational meaning of *exist* (from *ex* and *sisto*) is not now its accepted meaning in the English language. The great majority of those who use the word *exist* have no idea of its origin, and rightly take it as an equivalent—the only one our language affords—of the word *be*.

As to “the ambiguity of the word *is*,” then, which Mr. Mill in *H* supposes, there is none except that the tripartists create. This word conveys the idea of existence in every statement in which it is employed; and the device of attributing to it a twofold meaning is one of those futile efforts the tripartists are constantly making to disentangle themselves from the meshes woven by means of the third unaccountable element. It is noteworthy that Mr. Mill does not attempt to *define* the second meaning of “the verb to be,” besides that of existence; but at p. 104 he gives as

examples of its second meaning the phrases, "to be a man, to be Socrates, to be seen or spoken of, to be a phantom, even to be a nonentity." Now the word *be* in each of these expressions conveys the idea of existence, in the last instance negatived. To be a man is to exist as a man, to be Socrates is to exist as Socrates, to be seen or spoken of is to exist in certain predicaments, to be a phantom is to exist as a phantom, and to be a nonentity is to exist as nothing. Surely, if the word *be* has a second meaning, it will bear definition; from Mr. Mill, however, we get none. If, as he implies, the word *is*, "when a copula only," lays aside its signification of existence, we may fairly ask, What does it then mean? In reply to this question we are told that, in such cases, it is "a sign of predication." This, however, is evasive; for the word *is* does not *signify* predication, though it is *used* to predicate—a very important distinction utterly unnoticed by Mr. Mill.

Mr. J. S. Mill claims for his father, Mr. James Mill, the unenviable honour of being the "discoverer" of the fancied ambiguity of the word *is*. Alluding to "the fog, which arising from this narrow spot diffused itself at an early period over the whole surface of metaphysics," he adds that "it does not become us to triumph over the gigantic intellects of Plato and Aristotle," for not having perceived such ambiguity; and he considerably offers an apology for the same "gigantic intellects" in this wise:—

"The Greeks seldom knew any language but their own. This rendered it far more difficult for them than it is for us to acquire a readiness in detecting ambiguities."

Most people are taught to regard the Greeks as the subtlest of nations. Their sophists are reported to have brought the art of idea-splitting to perfection; and, I think, several striking examples already presented in this book show that some modern philologists and logicians have fallen victims to notable ambiguities. In view of all this,

can it be said the Greeks were "less ready at detecting ambiguities" than we? Was Mezzofanti, who knew upwards of sixty languages, more expert at detecting ambiguities than Aristotle, who, Mr. Mill supposes, knew but one? Here is room for speculation, but hardly for positive assertion.

But Mr. Mill, the elder, has not even the barren honour of first pointing out the supposed ambiguity. The claim set up for him merely shows there is a limit to his son's philosophical reading, as will appear later. It would be some comfort to me to reflect on the circumstance (could it be definitely established) which is advanced by Mr. Mill, but denied by Mr. Grote, that my explanation of the meaning of the word *is*, though antagonistic to that of modern logicians, has in its favour the two foremost names in Greek philosophy. Aristotle and Plato, according to Mr. Mill, hold that *εστι*, *is*, has but a single meaning. That is exactly my contention. I have no desire to triumph over these illustrious men, but I shall be happy to triumph with them, if so it may be. It would be difficult to select from all Mr. Mill's writings a part more infelicitous than the few pages here dealt with. He is particularly unfortunate in this apology; for, even if Aristotle knew no language but Greek—a most improbable supposition—at least he was thorough master of that, and the various cultured Greek dialects would of themselves have sufficed to awaken him to the minutest niceties of expression. It is difficult to see how Aristotle could escape knowing something of several foreign languages, especially if, as some suppose, he derived his syllogistic theory in part from the Hindoos. This he could hardly have done except by acquaintance with their language, unless indeed he were content to take things at second hand through interpreters. But the Stagirite was hardly the man to take things at second hand, and no one ever had greater facilities for obtaining access to Asiatic

lore. All the treasures of Zend and Sanskrit were open to him ; and there is only negative evidence against his having availed himself of these resources. It is bad enough to place Aristotle among the number of those Greeks who “knew no language but their own,” but the climax is reached when he is denied an intelligent knowledge of his mother tongue.

MR. GROTE.

It will be interesting here to notice what Mr. Grote, in his elaborate work on Aristotle, says regarding the supposed ambiguity of *is*. Mr. Mill, as we have seen, denies that Aristotle perceived such an ambiguity. Mr. Grote holds that he did perceive it, and says (p. 181)—

“We may truly say *Homer is a poet* ; but we cannot truly say *Homer is*. We see by this last remark how distinctly Aristotle assigned a double meaning to *est*, first *per se* as meaning existence : next relatively as performing the function of the copula.”

Could Aristotle come back to explain himself, I think he would not hold that *est* or *esti* is ambiguous *except through the understanding of some other words*, as in *Homer is*, where he understands *living* ; and it is a positive error to attribute to one word the meaning of others which are understood. This many of the tripartists do. By laying stress on the word *is* we may give the auditor to understand something more than meets the ear, such as *living* or *in reality* ; and by a similar use of intonation we can do the same with any word in the language. Thus if I ask—

Did you say one or two ?

I may put stress on each word successively, and by doing so in each case *imply* something which the sentence does not *express*, as treatises on elocution abundantly show. But the meaning so conveyed is not strictly attributable to

the word emphasized, otherwise our dictionaries would have to exemplify all such ellipses !

As for the sentences quoted by Mr. Grote, it is quite as true to say *Homer is as Homer is a poet* ; for he cannot be a poet unless he is (living). The latter of the two statements is literally false. Homer was a man, that is, a being made up of body and mind in conjunction. That body and mind are long since separated, and the man, Homer, no longer really exists, either as a poet or in any other way. The pragmatist grave-digger, who told Hamlet that "no man nor woman neither" was to be buried in the grave at Elsinore, was more precise than the occasion demanded ; but he was right in what he said. We may speak without expressing limitations when there is no fear of misunderstanding ; but in logic "equivocation will undo us." The first thing Aristotle sets about in his logic is to prevent equivocation by explaining the various meanings of several important terms. In regard to the meaning of *is*, he does not go far enough, that is, supposing Mr. Grote represents him accurately. Aristotle made a grand oversight if he did not perceive that an indefinite number of complements may be understood after the word *is*, and that in this manner not only could the word *is* have a double meaning, but it might have two thousand meanings—a fact not at all contemplated by Mr. Mill or Mr. Grote. Try how we may, we shall never get more than one signification out of the verb itself, which signification the whole English-speaking race attach to it, some logicians alone excepted, and they only when explaining the copula or theories built on its supposed existence. *Is* means *exists*, and it means nothing else. If it had any other meaning, logicians in justice to themselves should give it. This they fail to do.

CHAPTER VII.

DR. LATHAM.

THERE is this difference between Dr. Latham and the other writers previously dealt with, that while they attach as great importance to the supposed copula as he does, he devotes almost as much space to the explanation of the tripartite theory as the whole of them collectively. In his *Logic in its Application to Language*, Dr. Latham devotes near a hundred pages to the structure of propositions, and the more he tries to explain the more does he become entangled in difficulties. Of these I shall point out only a few. Section 2 begins thus :—

“If we have clearly seen what is *not* essential to the structure of a proposition, we shall all the better understand what *is* essential to it. There must be two somethings, the something we speak about and the something we say concerning it.”

These two things are the subject and predicate, the latter being defined as “the something we *say* concerning” the subject. Section 3 runs thus :—

A. “It now remains for us to ask whether *these same parts*, members, constituents or elements of a proposition are more than two ?

B. “It is by no means impossible to frame an intelligible sentence out of the two elements which have been the subject of the foregoing remarks alone. Indeed children do so very often. The child says *Sun bright* or *Fire burn* and is understood. So are the upgrown men of more countries than one, in the languages of which the third part, member or element of a proposition is omitted. It is not, however, the business of men and women who use language to make propositions that are simply intelligible

or capable of being understood. It is their business to make propositions which cannot be misunderstood. And to do this they must use something more than the words expressive of our two somethings.

C. "No man can conclude to a certainty that because he sees certain words in juxtaposition they are in a given relation. No man can conclude to a certainty that they are in any relation at all. He can make a good guess, but he can do no more.

D. "There is then a third part, member, constituent or element generally found in most propositions and without which many propositions cannot be constructed. This expresses over and above the two somethings already mentioned an intervening link between them. In all previous examples this part, member or element has been the word *is*."

REMARKS.

1. This logician asks in *A* whether two parts are more than two parts, and in section 7 he sets to work to turn *two* into *three*! Taking, as an example of propositions which have really three parts, but appear to have only two, the sentence *Summer comes*, he informs us this is equivalent to *Summer is coming*, and therefore the former proposition has three parts! But it is to be noted that the proposition *Summer comes* is not the proposition *Summer is coming*. By what right does Dr. Latham, when undertaking to analyze the former, as to its form and number of parts, substitute a paraphrase and analyze that instead?

Surely it is "the business of men and women" in all countries alike "to make propositions which cannot be misunderstood." Why then do upgrown English men and women omit the third indispensable element in such sentences as *Fish swim*, *Roses bloom*? When a tripartist is told—Here is a sentence, *Fish swim*, in which there are only two parts, he replies—"Oh, dear no; there are three; for *swim* is

equivalent to *is swimming*." *Equivalent to it* may be, but *composed of or the same as it* is not. Twelve pence are equivalent to one shilling, but they are not the same in form or number. So *Fish swim*, though sometimes equivalent to *Fish are swimming*, is constructed differently, having only two parts, not three.

2. In reply to *C* it may be said that any Englishman who can read is able to make something better than a "good guess"—is able in fact to "conclude to a certainty" that the words—

Fish swim—

as thus written, stand to one another in the relation of subject and predicate. If these two words be not written in proper juxtaposition they form no sentence; and if they be not uttered in due sequence, they make no assertion. But brought together on paper, or uttered consecutively, they constitute a most unmistakable proposition, without the aid of that "third part, member, constituent or element" which the tripartists for centuries have insisted on.

3. In *D* we are told that a third element "is generally found in most propositions" (*sic*), and that without it "many propositions cannot be constructed." Here it is evidently implied that there are propositions in which it is not found and for the construction of which it is not necessary. Yet Dr. Latham, in section 7, assures us distinctly that a "proposition consists of three parts and *no fewer*."

It is due to Dr. Latham to say that no one tries to write plainer than he does; but it is impossible to explain clearly things we happen never to have looked at from the right point of view. Here is an instance of his plain speaking. In section 12 he says, in reference to the number of parts required to construct a proposition—

"Such importance too has been given" [by him during the course of fifty pages] "to the number *three*, that it almost looks as if, after the fashion of the old cabalistic philosophers,

we found something mystic in it. Nevertheless there are good reasons for the prominence this number has assumed."

It does really seem that the tripartists have imagined there is something cabalistic in the number three. Dr. Latham hardly denies it. It would be interesting to read his "good reasons" for making it so prominent in treating of the structure of propositions. The witches in Macbeth give it considerable prominence. They are continually saying—

"Thrice to thine and thrice to mine,
And thrice again to make up mine :
Peace, the charm's wound up :"—

or something similar; but even they give no "good reasons," possibly because there were none to give. Dr. Latham, we have seen, gives no good reason why there should be *three parts and no fewer* in every proposition. He tells us that in every proposition there must be something spoken about and something said of that. Well, grant but these two things and we have a complete proposition, *e.g.*

Caesar came.

We speak of Caesar, the first thing, and what we say of Caesar is that he *came*, the second thing. No third is required to unite these two. Whatever union there is between *Caesar* and *came* arises from their being brought together on paper, in utterance or in the mind. There is no way of avoiding the obvious conclusion that three parts are *not* necessary for the construction of propositions.

It should be noted here that Dr. Latham, philologist and lexicographer, in section 12, misinterprets, in regard to this matter, one of the simplest Latin words. He says :—

"The meaning of the word *copula* is link, union, tie or connection."

The word *copula* does mean link or tie, but not union or connection, except, by metonymy, as a legal term. The

Latin for union or connection is *copulatio*. This is an important distinction, which the tripartists frequently overlook, and much of their misunderstanding of the nature of propositions has arisen from it.

MR. HOBBS

appears to have had a partial glimpse of the true state of affairs. After speaking of the subject and predicate, he says :—

“Signum connectionis in plerisque gentibus vel est vox aliqua, ut illa *est*, ut in propositione *homo est animal*, vel vocis casus sive terminatio aliqua, ut in hac propositione *homo ambulat* (quae idem valet quod *homo est ambulans*). . . . Sunt autem gentes nonnullae, vel certe esse possunt, qui vocem respondentem verbo nostro *est* nullam omnino habeant; formant tamen propositiones sola nominis unius post aliud positione. . . . Neque ob eam rem quod careant voce *est*, minus ad philosophandum idonei sunt. . . . Itaque in omni propositione tria considerata occurrunt, viz., duo nomina, subjectum et predicatum, et *copulatio*.”—(*Opera* I. 27).

In Dr. Latham's treatment of propositions the influence of Mr. Mill is apparent, and in Mr. Mill's that of Hobbes is no less visible. The two last not being professed philologists, as Dr. Latham is, need not be expected to investigate the structure of propositions among foreign nations; but as Dr. Latham tells us there are “languages in which the third element of propositions is omitted,” and people “who never express the affirmative copula,” we might expect him to go a little further and gratify our curiosity, thus awakened, by giving fuller information on so interesting and important a phenomenon. Instead, however, of doing this he treats us to a variation of Mr. Mill's idea regarding the supposed “double function” of the word *is*. In section 14 he says :—

"We have seen that a predicate under certain conditions can be something more than a predicate, *i.e.* a predicate and copula as well."

Without entering into the explanation of this phenomenon, we know *a priori* that no thing can be more than itself: therefore that the predicate cannot be more than itself: therefore that the predicate cannot be a copula under any condition save this, that the predicate and copula be inseparably one, in which case the proposition is bipartite.

After demonstrating, apparently to his own satisfaction, that the predicate can at times be something *more than itself*, Dr. Latham strangely takes exception to the opinion of those who hold a similar idea. "Can a copula," he asks, "under any condition or modification, be anything more than a copula? Especially can it be a copula and predicate also?" To this inquiry "in common with Mr. Mill and many other logicians," he gives "a decided negative," and goes on to repeat Mr. Mill's very words on the supposed "double function," or ambiguity of *is*, adding to them some of his own as follow:—

"The word *is* (a word which not only performs the function of the copula in affirmations, but has also a meaning of its own in virtue of which it may itself be made the predicate of the proposition) is not a copula which has enlarged its powers, but the sign of the copula which has a double function."

Here, after all, we are informed that *is* is *not* a copula but the *sign* of the copula! What then is the copula of which this word *is* is the sign? To this Dr. Latham affords no clue. Mr. Mill calls *is* "a sign of predication;" Dr. Latham calls it a "sign of the copula,"—a discrepancy calling for special notice side by side with their coincidence on the "double function."

Dr. Latham tries to improve on Mr. Mill's theory regarding the sense of the so-called "substantive verb."

Mr. Mill is content with attributing to that part of speech an ambiguous meaning. Dr. Latham goes further, telling us in his *Dictionary* that there are two words *am*, two words *was*, two words *be*, &c. ; the one set of these being different forms of the copula, and the other set genuine verbs. We learn also in the same work that—

“Whatever *am* in the ordinary sense of the word may be [in *I am speaking*], it is not a verb,” that “it is as little a verb as a substantive,” that “all that can be said of it is that it forms an element in the notion conveyed by the word.”

Now a verb, in the proper sense of the term, is a word which with a noun, or equivalent, forms a sentence, and to this definition *am*, in the given expression, corresponds perfectly. If “all that can be said” of it be that it “forms an element in a notion,” the less said of it the better.

Dr. Latham, however, does tell us something more of this verb, something which he did not take from Mr. Mill, but from Mr. Mill's opponent, Sir W. Hamilton. He says in his *Dictionary* that *am*, in *I am walking*, “is a sign of equality rather than of aught else.” This, though taught by many logicians, is altogether a misconception ; for the sign of equality (=) when properly used is a mere abbreviation, as its inventor, Dr. Robert Recorde, tells us, for *is equal to*. The word *am* or *is* signifies only being, while the sign (=) signifies equality of being. This is a very palpable difference, though many great men have missed it. It is curious that Mr. Mill, who was so deeply concerned with the meaning of *is*, when attacking Sir W. Hamilton's logical system, makes no objection to the latter's interpretation of the word as expressing equality. He allows the error to pass unchallenged. Our old friend, the Greek mathematician and reasoner, Euclid, however, consistently teaches that *being* and *being equal to* are different predicaments, e.g., in I. 13, where he gives separate treatment to two right angles and their equivalent.

CHAPTER VIII.

W. S.

IN the eighth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, in the article on Logic signed *W. S.*, we read :—

“It is necessary to dissect all propositions into three factors or constitutive elements. They are these:—The two terms, subject and predicate, which are the names of the ideas or objects correlated, and the copula in which the relation is asserted. . . . The copula asserts the relation, but it asserts nothing more ; and that we may make the closest possible approach to a pure affirmation or denial, it must always for strict logical use be either *is* or *is not*, *are* or *are not*. It might be said that the terms are the objective factors of a proposition and the copula is its subjective factor.”

1. If in a proposition the copula “asserts the relation,” it is superfluous to add “it asserts nothing more ;” because, according to the school *W. S.* belongs to, nothing but a relation is asserted in any proposition, and if the copula assert that, it asserts everything, that is, it discharges the function of the whole predicate. This anomaly is not provided for by the leader of the school referred to, Sir W. Hamilton, nor, I believe, by anyone.

2. *W. S.* talks of “making the closest possible approach to a pure affirmation.” Does this mean that we can very nearly make a pure affirmation but not quite ?

3. *W. S.* in the conclusion of the quoted passage gives us the clue to the real nature of the mysterious third element in propositions. He there styles it a “subjective factor,” in contradistinction to the subject and predicate, which he terms “objective factors.” The copula is a subjective

factor in so far as it is purely an imaginary factor, and no further.

Surely a Hamiltonian logician should remember that, according to the founder of his school, logic analyzes the form of thought only, and in the form of thought there is no distinction between a subjective and an objective element. The form of thought is wholly subjective in Hamilton's system, and includes the two concepts, which *W. S.* regards as objective elements! Apart, however, from the Hamiltonian logic, we cannot conceive of a subjective factor in a proposition except in so far as all the factors are subjective, being ideas in the mind. The subjective factor therefore of *W. S.* is an incongruous myth. If we were to admit a distinction between subjective and objective elements in propositions, the former would be the ideas, the latter the words expressive of those ideas; and the words are practically inseparable from the ideas which they express, so that the two cannot be treated as separate. A mere sound or mark without meaning is no word at all. This is why, in defining logic, I call it *the science of reasoning expressed in words*, since we have no means of analyzing mental operations except as they are represented in language; and how very imperfect among philosophic writers has been the analysis of thought as represented in speech, readers of this book will readily perceive.

CHAPTER IX.

MR. MASON.

MR. MASON (*Grammar*, p. 347) introduces us to the "grammatical copula," remarking—

"The grammatical copula in every sentence consists of the personal inflection of the verb."

He forgets, like Dr. Morell, that English verbs have usually no personal inflection, unless they be of the second or third person singular, and not always then; e.g. *He shall, Thou must, He died*. In these sentences, and all of the first singular, and first, second and third plural, there is nothing to correspond with Mr. Mason's "grammatical copula." He continues:—

"In the sentence *Time flies* the subject is *time*; that which is predicated or asserted of time is *flying*: the personal termination of the verb *flies* unites this idea to the subject."

It does nothing of the kind. The personal ending *s* in *flies* is there merely because the subject to the verb is third singular. Philology tells the value of such terminations, which grammarians by this time should know are (so far as it is possible to trace) fragments of personal pronouns first put after the verb, then joined to it, then corrupted and amalgamated with it. The first law of numerical concord, that the verb must agree with its subject in number and person, has its foundation in the nature of these personal endings, a fact worthy of note, though no grammarian I am acquainted with mentions it. Mr. Mason continues:—

"In the sentence *The rose is red* the subject is *rose*, that which is predicated is *being red*; the personal inflection by which *is* becomes a third person singular is the copula. If we say *The journey was pleasant*, what we assert of the

journey is its *having been pleasant*, it being clear that the notion of time belongs to the predicate."

Mr. Mason here makes one step in the right direction and another in the wrong. He approximates to the true theory by including the idea of time and the verb with the predicate, and deviates from it by reiterating the exploded notion that the personal ending is a copula. How he contrives not to perceive that the verbs in thousands of English sentences have no personal ending, and so no "grammatical copula," is inexplicable. Next we read:—

"Inasmuch as the personal terminations of a verb have no existence apart from the verb itself, it is usual and convenient in grammar to treat the copula as part of the predicate."

Not only is it convenient, but also necessary, to include the personal ending, when there is one, and whatever verb may be employed, in the logical predicate, if we wish to retain the ordinary definition of the predicate, and to escape the evident absurdity of saying there are three things in every proposition, but that one of these is sometimes part of another, and sometimes altogether indistinguishable.

Mr. Mason continues:—

"Thus in the sentence *Time flies*, *time* is called the subject and *flies* the predicate. In the sentence *The rose is red*, *rose* is called the subject and *is red* the predicate."

Precisely: this is as it should be; but we are then told that—

"This mode of speaking is slightly inaccurate, at least with reference to the use of the word *predicate* in logic."

The mode of speaking referred to is perfectly accurate. It is in strict accordance with the English idiom and with truth. As to the use, or rather the abuse, of the word *predicate* in logic, it does not follow, because this has been prevalent among hundreds of writers through hundreds of years, that it is to be any longer tolerated, or that we are

still to go on in the same illogical way, paying no regard to definitions laid down or to facts which stare us in the face.

Next comes a foot-note (this theory of the copula, by the way, necessitates a vast number of foot-notes) to the following purport :—

“All abstract sciences labour under the disadvantage of having to employ terms in a rather harsh and arbitrary manner; as in algebra addition may be, arithmetically speaking, a subtraction, and multiplication may be, for example, taking two-thirds of a quantity. So in logic the terms *predicate* and *copula* involve a little difficulty. In the proposition *The earth is a globe* it would be said that the predicate (*praedicatum* or thing asserted) is *a globe*. This mode of speaking requires a technical meaning to be put upon it before it has any sense. More strictly in accordance with the meaning of the language, it should be said that what we assert, or the thing asserted, about the earth is its *being a globe*. The grammatical use of the word *predicate*, as it is explained in the text, is in strict accordance with its real meaning.”

It is incorrect to say that any science “labours under the necessity of using words in a harsh and arbitrary sense.” On the contrary, it is an imperative duty, not fully recognized by grammarians and logicians, to avoid anything like arbitrary phraseology. No special difficulty is experienced by students of algebra from the way in which the words *addition* and *multiplication* are employed in that science. They are used in a by no means harsh or arbitrary manner. But in grammar and logic, not only students, but also many professors and writers, are in a complete fog concerning the important technical words *predicate* and *copula*. It is a charming pleasantry on the part of Mr. Mason to say that the common use of these terms “involves a *little* difficulty;” since the error which

gave birth to one of them has corrupted the whole body of mental and linguistic science, caused as much dissension among philosophers as any other single mistake, sent off metaphysicians to grope in regions of impenetrable gloom for something they know not what, laid mysterious puzzles before the youthful mind, rendered simple grammar as abstruse in some parts as any science which can be named, diverted logic from its true purpose to deal with sophistical frivolities, brought scholastic trivialities to rule the minds of clever men in the nineteenth century, retarded the progress of philological investigation, and reduced the twin sciences of language and logic to a state of confusion irremediable so long as the original error is retained.

Mr. Mason's note continues :—

“Again, with regard to the copula, although for logical purposes it is necessary to throw propositions into a form in which each term is substantive in its nature, and the two terms are connected by some finite form of the verb *be*, it is demonstrably wrong to say that the copula of every proposition is a part of the verb *be* (*is, are, was, &c.*) For *Time flies* is a perfect proposition in its present form, and involves no part of the verb *be* either expressed or understood. It is true that the proposition will assume a different shape when reduced to its technical logical form ; but if that form involves any element that does not exist in the original proposition, it is plain that it is not its exact equivalent.”

While asserting the necessity of reducing propositions from one form to another, it is incumbent on logicians to demonstrate such necessity ; and this none of them have yet successfully attempted. It would seem that it is not sufficient that a statement should be “demonstrably wrong” for logicians to reject it. Some reject such statements only when it suits their own theories to do so. The extract continues :—

"Again, the so-called copula in logic is really more than a copula or link by which two ideas are connected. If we have a finite form of the verb *be* (and without a finite form there can be no true predication) we may ignore, but we cannot eliminate either the root meaning of the verb or the idea of time. *Is* and *are* involve the notion of present time, as essentially as *was* and *were* that of past time. This little difficulty however is quietly swallowed by logicians, who tell us that the copula, as such, has no relation to time."

The capacity of logicians and grammarians to "swallow difficulties" does not appear to have yet been gauged. They can, like even Mr. Mason, reconcile themselves to placing under one category things which they themselves acknowledge to be essentially different (see Part I. chap. 2, sec. 7), and strenuously insist on consistency in others. Mr. Mason endeavours to escape the "little difficulty" caused by admitting the third element in propositions in this manner:—

"The fact is that technical logic ought to have some abstract sign, something like = in mathematics, and not, the verb *be* at all. Now, if we put together the two facts that there may be a perfect proposition without the verb *be*, and that when that verb is used there is no proposition unless the verb *be* in its finite form, the inference is plain that the real copula consists of those inflections by which a verb assumes a finite form. This justifies the mode in which the matter is treated in the text, and which, while it differs somewhat from what is generally set down in grammars, will be found to introduce a little more harmony between grammatical theory and grammatical practice."

This idea of the "abstract sign" is the last refuge of the tripartists. A sign for a thing which has no real existence will not mend matters. The truth is, not that there should be any sign for this nonentity, but that the doctrine of the

copula should be swept from the domain of logic and grammar both, as an indispensable step towards the restoration of harmony between grammatical and logical theory and practice. Mr. Mason speaks of an "abstract sign" as though some written and spoken signs were not abstract. If one admits degrees in abstraction, it would be quite a mistake to select the sign of equality as more "abstract" than the word *is*; for this would be substituting *is equal to* for *is* alone! It is far more scientific to keep the sign of equality for its proper purpose than to ignore its real significance, as some tripartists desire to do. In conclusion, if, to borrow Mr. Mason's words, we look at the fact that the majority of verbs in English sentences are destitute of personal inflection—a fact which has escaped the notice of so many writers—the inference is plain that what he styles the "grammatical copula," like the "logical copula," is a purely ideal conception with no corresponding objective reality. It is *vox et praeterea nihil*.

CHAPTER X.

DEAN MANSEL.

A. "In grammar the unit of thought is a judgment.
. . . Hence the unit of speech in grammar is a proposition.
. . . In logic the unit of speech is also a judgment. . . .
Hence the unit of speech in logic is a term.

B. "It is sometimes said that logic recognizes two only of the grammatical parts of speech, the noun and the verb, forming the two terms of the proposition with and without time. It would be more correct to say that logic, viewing language in a different light from grammar and analyzing on a different principle, does not recognize the grammatical parts of speech at all.

C. "The simplest elements of a complete assertion in grammar are the noun and the verb, the latter being a combination of attribute and assertion. Hence the grammatical type of a proposition is that distinguished in scholastic language as *secundæ adjacentis*; and to this form all varieties produced by the accidents of particular languages must in universal grammar be reduced.

D. (Note.—"Hence it follows that the copula grammatically speaking is no verb at all. It fulfils none of the functions of that part of speech, for it implies no attribute, and cannot when united to a subject form a complete assertion. In such a sentence as *The meadows are white with frost* the true verb is not the copula, but the copula with the adjective *are white*, as may be seen by substituting the Latin *prata canis albicant pruinis*. Whether this can be expressed in one word or not is an accident of this or that language, and is beyond the province of universal grammar.)

E. "In logic, on the other hand, for purposes of opposi-

tion and conversion, as well as from the necessity of assigning a quantity to both terms of a proposition, the type is required to be of the form *tertiæ adjacentis*; the subject and predicate being regarded as two given concepts, the objects of which are identified or distinguished by means of the copula. Hence in every case in which the proposition is exhibited in its logical form the grammatical verb will correspond, not to any single word in the proposition, but to a combination formed of the copula and the quantified predicate—to all in short that is asserted of the subject.

F. "The predicate concept may thus, in different points of view, answer to two distinct grammatical relations. Taken by itself it is a noun identified in certain respects with another noun as the subject. Taken in its predicate character, it forms a portion of the verb, the remainder being supplied by the copula. Those logicians who maintain the copula to be the logical verb, confound the accidents of particular languages with the essentials of language in general as a sign of thought. With them the verb is determined solely by the subordinate feature of its personal inflection, not by the primary characteristic of its signification."—(*Prolegomena Logica*, 290—4.)

REMARKS.

1. We may, if so disposed, style a judgment a unit of thought in grammar; but if we do this we must admit that there are in grammar other units besides that of thought, namely, units of volition, interrogation and impetration. Or in plainer language, we cannot deny and must not ignore, as Dean Mansel does in *A*, the existence of non-assertive sentences. Hence "the unit of speech in grammar" is not always a proposition. Frequently it is the expression of a command, wish or inquiry. This is

precisely one of the points so many philosophers fail to observe and reason upon. They carry out their mental analysis without a thought of it. As a rule they assume that there are but three operations of the mind, apprehension, judgment and reasoning. This false assumption is noticed by Dr. Reid in his *Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic*, Chapter II. section 5, thus :—

“ He [Aristotle] observes justly that besides that kind of speech called a proposition, which is always either true or false, there are other kinds which are neither true nor false, such as a prayer or wish ; to which we may add a question, a command, a promise, a contract and many others. These Aristotle pronounces to have nothing to do with his subject and remits them to oratory or poetry ; and so they have remained banished from the regions of philosophy to this day ; yet I apprehend that an analysis of such speeches, and of the operations of the mind which they express, would be of real use, and perhaps would discover how imperfect an enumeration the logicians have given of the powers of the human understanding when they reduce them to simple apprehension, judgment and reasoning.”

Sir W. Hamilton, who edits the issue of Dr. Reid's works from which this quotation is made, offers in a note for logicians generally an apology, saying :—

“ This enumeration was never intended by logicians for a general psychological analysis, but merely for a special enumeration of those faculties the laws of which were proposed to logic as its object matter.”

This apology can hardly avail, since there are logicians who take up the very position their apologist would not have them charged with. Not even Sir W. Hamilton could tell what certain logicians mean except he got at their meaning through their writings ; and from the words of Mansel, one of the most distinguished of Hamilton's

disciples, it is perfectly clear that he for one does omit to recognize, at the right time and in the right place, those mental operations which find their expression in non-assertive sentences. On this head Dr. Whately writes :—

“ Logical writers have in general begun by laying down that there are in all three operations of the mind, *in universum tres*, an assertion by no means incontrovertible, and which, if admitted, is nothing to the present purpose. Our business is with argumentation expressed in words and the operations of the mind implied in that: what others there may be, and whether any, are irrelevant questions. The opening of a treatise on logic with a statement respecting the operations of the mind universally tends to foster the prevailing error,” &c.—(*Logic*, p. 36.)

This is a passage worthy of note. How directly does not the first sentence confront Hamilton's apology for logicians generally? Whately might have gone further than merely to speak of the common doctrine as “by no means incontrovertible.” He might have utterly refuted it. Its admission or rejection does make a difference in the science of logic. The business of logicians is with argumentation of all kinds, and so with the verbal expression in every species of argument. So much is implied in the definition of logic as the science of reasoning expressed in words. No treatise accordingly on logic is complete in which the Sokratic or erotetic method of arguing is allowed to be thrown completely out of view by the syllogistic or Aristotelic plan. What operations of the mind there may be besides the three commonly given by logicians would be to them an irrelevant question, provided that argumentation involved no other. But then argumentation does involve other kinds of intellectual acts, those which accompany interrogation and impetration included. When we treat of the structure of *propositions* we may, with Aristotle, exclude the consideration of non-assertive sen-

tences, which are not susceptible of truth or falsehood. But when, instead of confining our attention to the nature of propositions, we go to treat of the mental operations or acts and their expression included in argumentation, we must not overlook or set aside any operation or expression concerned therein; and so "the opening of a treatise on logic with statements respecting various operations of the mind" need not foster any prevailing error. On the contrary such an opening would, if made properly, tend to clear away the stumbling blocks which have so long impeded the path of the student of both language and logic. Not the least are those arising from the habitual confusion by logicians and others of assertive with non-assertive sentences, as instanced in the case of Dean Mansel.

By employing the terms *subject* and *predicate* instead of *noun* and *verb*, nearly all need of reference to the parts of speech in a treatise on logic can be obviated. But there is no reason why logic should not "recognize the grammatical parts of speech;" and as for "logic viewing language in a different light from grammar," if it did so, the two sciences could not agree. A logician and a grammarian have different ends in view, but they must not look upon language in different lights. If they do this, how can they aid each other in those side issues which will arise, and for the satisfactory settlement of which are required true views of both sciences? There is certainly no use in grammarians forming a division of words into classes only to have their work upset by a logician like Dean Mansel, who, being altogether at a loss for a true principle for word-classing, and never having made a systematic examination of the functions of words, only renders confusion worse confounded by introducing new distinctions, having no foundation in fact, between "grammatical" and "logical" parts of speech. Dean Mansel talks of a "logical verb"

and "a grammatical verb;" and according to what he says in *E* the latter, in such a sentence as *He is a man whom we can trust*, would consist of all the words after *he*. This is a most arbitrary and mischievous employment of the word *verb*. A verb strictly is *a*, i.e. *one* word, not a phrase containing an example of nearly every part of speech. Dean Mansel here confuses the verb in assertive sentences with the predicate strictly so called and defined by me in Part II. section 3, *q.v.*

With regard to "the personal inflections of the verb," both logicians and grammarians have hitherto paid too little attention to them. Those who determine the verb thereby, implicitly adopt an unreliable criterion for the classification of words, viz., their *form*, as pointed out already. Those who, with Dean Mansel, determine it by "the primary characteristic of its signification" adopt another mistaken principle, subversive of all satisfactory word-classing as shown in the same place. (Part I. Chap. 1.) As to "the functions of the verb," Dean Mansel, like Mr. Mill, has apparently never examined them; yet he does not hesitate to speak as though the ground he treads on were familiar. He tells us for instance in *D* that the word *are*, in *The meadows are white with frost*, performs none of the functions of the verb. But one of the functions of this part of speech being to assert when applied to a subject, *are* is here a verb; and if it were objected on behalf of the Dean, that in the given sentence *are* "implies no attribute," and forms "no complete assertion," I reply (1) that the word *are* does not here in truth "imply any attribute," but it certainly does "express" the attribute of being, which is much more than merely implying it; (2) when we say *The meadows are*, we make a complete assertion, which we are at liberty to complete still further by the addition of some other words. When we state that *The meadows are*, we do not say *what* they are, but we do

assert *that* they are. *Are* is a "true verb," because with its subject it forms a sentence. See Part I. chapter 2.

On the authority of Dean Mansel we might say that the "grammatical verb" is not the "true verb" for in *E* we find that all the words *are white with frost* constitute the "grammatical verb," while in *D* we learn that *are white* is the "true verb!"

We are told moreover that "are white" is a true verb because *albicans* is so. Here is involved an assumption of the mistaken principle, so common still in this age of Comparative Grammar, of setting up one language as a model to others; by which we really blink the differences of languages, instead of making them. To regulate the grammar of a living tongue by that of a dead language and to force the classification of words in a comparatively simple language, English, into correspondence with an artificially transpositive and composite tongue, Latin, are practices calculated to introduce confusion into grammar, to retard the progress of philology, to set logicians upon wrong tracks and make linguistic and mental philosophy a bewildering maze. As long as logicians, with Dean Mansel, attempt to override the accidents of "this or that language," and set up an imaginary "universal" code, so long will there be ceaseless conflict between grammar and logic in those points where the two sciences meet. It will be time to talk of "universal grammar" when we are in possession of a universal language, for grammar always presupposes language. Meanwhile there is much necessary work to be done both in simple and comparative grammar.

2. Dean Mansel, like many other logicians, speaks of propositions *secundi* and *tertii adjacentis*, and tells us those of the former kind must in logic be reduced to the latter. He tells us this must be done "for purposes of opposition and conversion, as well as from the necessity of assigning a quantity to both terms of a proposition." But neither he

nor anyone else can show the necessity of such reduction. The whole purpose of logic can be satisfied without it. The purpose of logic (whether we consider it as the science and art of reasoning, or of the laws which govern reasonable thought) is to explain thoroughly the nature of correct reasoning or inference, so as to enable students to observe and apply its laws themselves and to detect others abusing them. This is the sole purpose of logic, and it can be effected without the periphrasis insisted on by Dean Mansel. It is necessary to reduce propositions in the manner he postulates only to conform them to Aristotle's analytical method of treatment.

As to the alleged "necessity of assigning a quantity to both terms of a proposition," I would point out that in *E* is an admission of which no writer on logic appears to have seen the full significance. It is the more noteworthy that it is absolutely fatal to the Hamiltonian theory of analytical logic adopted by the Dean. He tells us propositions must be reduced from *secundi* to *tertii adjacentis* on account of the necessity of assigning a quantity to both terms. This clearly implies that propositions *secundi adjacentis* have no assignable quantity in the predicate. They cannot, however, have a quantity without its being assignable. If the quantity be understood, it can be expressed. When, for example, I think and say *Fish swim*, if I really mean *All fish swim* the quantity of the subject is assignable or expressible. Not so with the predicate. In that nothing is understood. This shows that there are countless judgments into the predicates of which the element of quantity does not enter. Dean Mansel follows the Hamiltonian logic, which professes to treat of "thought as thought," that is, of thought as it passes in the mind. Now it is beyond dispute that propositions *secundi adjacentis* as fairly represent mental acts as those *tertii adjacentis* do. Yet Hamilton's analysis of the form of thought is confined to

the latter species only. If the Dean of St. Paul's made the above admission in Sir W. Hamilton's lifetime it is part proof that neither the latter nor any of his followers had a clear idea of their own theory of quantification.

As to our "identifying or distinguishing" any things by means of the copula, this has no real existence, and therefore we can do nothing by means of it except mislead ourselves and others by imagining there is such an element in propositions.

CHAPTER XI.

PROFESSOR DE MORGAN.

IN the *Formal Logic* or *Calculus of Inference* of this well-known mathematician, we are introduced to new variations of the supposed third element and of the meaning of the word *is*. Of the latter at p. 43 Professor De Morgan writes :—

“The reality of logic is the examination of the use of *is* and *is not* : the tracing of the consequences of the application of these words.”

At pp. 49 and 50 we read :—

“The complete attempt to deal with the term *is* would go to the form and matter of everything in existence at least, if not to the possible form and matter of all that does not exist but might. As far as it could be done, it would give the grand cyclopaedia, and its yearly supplement would be the history of the human race for the time.”

If the “reality of logic” be the examination of the use of *is* and *is not*, it would follow that those philosophers who have not examined these words so as to apprehend correctly their full use and significance have no real logic. Among these is Professor De Morgan.

To “trace the consequences of the application of the word” in question would indeed be a comprehensive project. It would lead to the “matter and form” of some things which are not dreamed of in philosophy. “There is no such element in propositions as logicians style the copula” is an application of the word *is*, the full consequences of which it is beyond the reach of unprophetic man to determine. One consequence will be the collapse of those logical systems which are based upon the assumed

existence of a third element in propositions. The Professor continues :—

“That logic exists as a treated science arises from the characteristics of the word requisite to be abstracted in studying inference being few and easily apprehended. It may be used in many different senses, all having a common property. Names, ideas and objects require it in three different senses. Speak of names and say *Man is animal* ; the *is* is here an *is* of applicability ; to whatsoever (idea, object, &c.) *man* is a name to be applied, to that same (idea, object, &c.) *animal* is a name to be applied. As to ideas, the *is* is an *is* of possession of all essential characteristics ; *man* is an idea which possesses, contains, presents all that is constitutive of the idea *animal*. As to absolute external objects the *is* is an *is* of identity, the most common and positive use of the word. Every man *is* one of the animals ; touch him you touch an animal, destroy him you destroy an animal. These senses are not interchangeable. Take the *is* of identity and the name *man* is not, as a name, the name *animal* ; the idea *man* is not, as an idea, the idea *animal*. Now we must ask what common property is possessed by each of these three notions of *is*, on which the common laws of inference depend.”

Does Professor De Morgan wish to establish a distinction between the “characteristics” of the word *is* and its “senses ?” Its senses are many, he says, while its characteristics requisite to be abstracted in studying inference are few. The characteristics of the verb *is*, exclusive of its signification, are those which it has in common with other verbs in the same mood or moods. To these the Professor does not refer. If he did, he would have to alter what he has said about the “reality of logic.” Mr. De Morgan then really holds that the senses of the word *is* are many, but that its senses requisite to be abstracted [considered] in studying inference are “few and easily apprehended,” and

that each has a common "property, sense, meaning, notion or characteristic." What then is this sense common to some of the different senses? Let the Professor himself show, if he can. At p. 50 he continues:—

A. "The following are the characteristics of the word *is*, which, existing in any proposed meaning of it, make that meaning satisfy the requirements of logicians when they lay down the proposition *A is B*. To make the statement distinct, let the proposition be doubly singular, or refer to one instance of each, *one A is one B*: let it be *this one A is this one B*.

B. "First, the double singular proposition above mentioned, and every such double singular, must be indifferent to conversion: the *A is B* and the *B is A* must have the same meaning and be both true and both false.

C. "Secondly, the connection *is*, existing between one term and each of two others, must therefore exist between those two others; so *A is B* and *A is C* must give *B is C*.

D. "Thirdly, the essential distinction of the term *is not* is merely that *is* and *is not* are contradictory alternatives; one must, both cannot be true. Every connection which can be invented and signified by the term *is* and *is not* so as to satisfy these three conditions makes all the rules of logic true."

Promise here fails performance. What does the whole of this extract teach of "the common property, characteristic, notion or sense of the word *is* requisite to be abstracted in studying inference?" It treats indeed of the convertibility of the terms between which the word *is* stands; also of the connection between premises and conclusion; also of the repugnance of *is* to its contradictory *is not*. But of the sense or meaning of *is* itself, it tells us absolutely nothing. Yet the Professor in good earnest gives the above as explanatory of the signification of that word. We shall presently, however, see the drift of the extract.

Mr. Mill, it will be remembered, claims for his father the discovery of the ambiguity of the word *is*; but this supposed discovery is totally eclipsed by Professor De Morgan's. If Mr. Mill senior found a new star, Mr. De Morgan has pointed out a constellation. The last-named logician has invested the unfortunate little word with an indefinite number of meanings. That Mr. Mill did not conceive of these is all the more remarkable since Professor De Morgan says that some of them are "easily apprehended." He mentions above—

1. An *is* of applicability.
2. An *is* of possession of all essential characteristics.
3. An *is* of identity.

Again, at p. 51 he gives—

4. An *is* in the sense of *is tied to*.

And at p. 52—

5. An *is* in the sense of *is equal to*.

At p. 53—

6. An *is* of absolute identity.
7. An *is* of agreement in particulars.
8. An *is* of possession of a quality.
9. An *is* of reference of a species to its genus.
10. An *is* of existence.

In addition to these ten significations he states that there are other "common senses which are not admitted in logic." What is Mr. Mill's "ambiguity" compared with all these meanings with which Professor De Morgan has invested the word "*is*"? Of all these distinct (or if the reader chooses *indistinct*) significations, that which Professor De Morgan singles out as "satisfying all the conditions" postulated by him for the establishment of his logical system, is the "*is* in the sense of *is equal to*." Now I would ask—Does the word *is* ever signify *is equal to*? This question I answer with a decided negative, supporting my view in this way.

If in such a proposition as *X is Y* the meaning of *is* were *is equal to*, then in *X is equal to Y* the words *equal to* would be redundant and might be struck out accordingly. But they are not redundant, and cannot be struck out without altering the meaning of the proposition, unless indeed you understand them. And if the words under consideration be understood, when supplied they must appear in the place where they were understood. This place is between *is* and *Y*, and so, it appears, they are understood not in the word *is* itself, but in the proposition of which *is* forms a part. Strictly and philosophically speaking therefore, the word *is*, neither by expression nor by implication, of itself, signifies equality; and so Professor De Morgan has no ground for his assumption at p. 52 that *is* in the sense of *is equal to* "does satisfy all the conditions" required to establish his theory concerning the reduction of propositions to the form of an equation. Accordingly his *Formal Logic* or *Calculus of Inference* is based upon a palpable misconception.

As to the sign of equality which Professor De Morgan at p. 52 styles "the copula of the mathematician's judgment," seeing that it is properly read *equals* or *is equal to*, it is difficult to conceive how a hard-headed mathematician should suppose he could substitute this sign as a strict equivalent for the word *is*, which only signifies *being* and not *equality*. Being is not equal to being plus equality. Being and equality are different predicaments consistently recognized as such by Euclid with the approval of most great mathematicians, except Professor De Morgan, and only confused by the latter when he steps out of his proper sphere into the quicksands of traditional and speculative logic. The Cambridge professor (p. 47) says:—

"Writers on logic, from Aristotle downwards, have made a large and important step in substituting for specific

names, with all their suggestions about them, the mere letters of the alphabet, *A, B, C, &c.*"

A useful step indeed it is for brevity and clearness on occasions; but it has taken the philosophic world two thousand years to make another step in "mathematical logic," and unfortunately Professor De Morgan, who was a great mathematician, has taken it in company with Sir W. Hamilton, who, according to Mr. J. S. Mill, was no mathematician at all, by trying to make out either that every proposition is an equation, or ought to be reduced to one, to qualify it for coming within the province of their improved systems. Every equation is an assertive sentence, but not every assertive sentence is an equation. Those sentences only in which equality is asserted can be equations; and if it be said that at least every proposition or assertive sentence can be reduced to an equation by changing its form and supplying ellipses, as Sir W. Hamilton postulates, I should in reply point out a fact, which is commonly overlooked both by that writer and Professor De Morgan, and all others who uphold their theory. This fact is that every equation, being an assertive sentence, must be analyzed as other sentences of the same kind are; *e.g.*,

<i>Subject.</i>		<i>Predicate.</i>
$x + y$		$= z.$

Here $x + y$ is the subject, and what we assert of this subject is *its equality to z*. There is then no "copula of the mathematician's judgment," any more than there is a "grammatical" or a "logical" copula. To define the predicate as that asserted of the subject, and then to hold that in the above example z alone is the predicate, is manifestly wrong. What we there assert is the *equality* or *being equal* of one quantity to another. The predicate therefore is not z but $= z$.

The word *is* then does not mean *is equal to*; and, if it really had all the meanings attributed to it by the Cambridge logician, what a reflection it would be upon the British, Irish, American and Colonial bar that not even its brightest ornaments have detected, nor its sharpest members ever availed themselves of its ambiguities! What with an *is* "of possession of all essential characteristics," and an *is* "of agreement in particulars," and an *is* "of identity," and an *is* "of equality," and an *is* "of existence," and a thousand other *ises* "easily apprehended," no advocate need, in default of a case, abuse the other side. He would merely have to rake up the ambiguities of the word *is*. If the ingenious counsel who conducted the notorious Tichborne personation trial had hit on Professor De Morgan's idea regarding the multiplex meaning of *is*, what might have happened? A fair complement of logicians must have been subpoenaed; their agreements and disagreements in essentials and particulars as to the signification of this little but vitally important word would have sufficed to protract the decision till doomsday. Meanwhile the nation at large, so deeply interested in the trial, would see the very foundations of society and of the constitution undermined. The admitted ambiguity of the word *is* would render doubtful indentures, agreements, legal documents of every description, including acts of parliament; and, from Magna Charta downwards, the value of all instruments would be subject of doubt and dispute. Law would vanish; confusion reign; rapine and violence stalk triumphant through the land; the British Empire, in its magnificent proportions, would suffer speedy dismemberment; the same state of affairs would of course spread to America; and seventy millions of English-speaking men would be at their wits' end. The history of the world would be changed. In truth the Fifteen Decisive Battles would, in their consequences, have nothing to compare with the results of

establishing the ambiguities of the word *is*. There is only one preventative to all this, viz., that the sense of the nation is against the admission of any ambiguity in the word. In the trial referred to, judge, jury, claimant and counsel were agreed that, if there is one word in the English language unambiguous, it is the word *is*. Every nation has an inalienable right to form the highest court of appeal in regard to the meaning of the words in its own language, and of this right a whole army of logicians would strive in vain to deprive it. Professor De Morgan unscientifically attributes to *is* the meanings of a variety of words which it pleases him to understand in certain propositions; and what he styles "the common property, sense, characteristic or notion" of the word in all the cases advanced by him is nothing more nor less than the proper and sole signification of the word itself, which it has in every proposition in which it occurs. This, as before noted, is its signification of being or existence, which, in spite of all the refinements of logicians, it never loses.

CHAPTER XII.

SIR W. HAMILTON AND KRUG.

THE memorable dispute between Sir W. Hamilton and Professor De Morgan, which for a season enlivened (!) the pages of the *Athenaeum* and arrested the attention of a large part of the philosophic world, hinges partly on the copula, and on the mistaken idea that all propositions are, or ought to be reduced to, equations. It is remarkable that while the Hamiltonian *New Analytic of Logical Forms* and the quantification of the predicate depend upon the supposed third element in propositions, Sir W. Hamilton, without ever examining whether there really is such an element, has accepted it as a reality and built extensively upon it. In his *Lectures on Logic* (pp. 228-230) he writes :—

“That which in the act of judging we think as the determined or qualified notion is technically called the subject ; that which we think as the determining or qualifying notion, the predicate ; and the relation of determination recognized as subsisting between the subject and the predicate is called the copula. By Aristotle the predicate includes the copula ; and from a hint, by him, the latter has by subsequent Greek logicians been styled the appredicate (*προσκατηγορούμενον*). . . . Thus in the proposition *Iron is magnetic* we have *iron* for the subject, *magnetic* for the predicate, and the substantive verb *is* for the copula. In regard to this last it is necessary to say a few words :—‘It is not the case that in propositions the copula is always expressed by the substantive verb *is* or *est*, and that the copula and predicate stand as distinct words. In adjective verbs the copula and predicate coalesce, as in the proposition *The sun shines*, which is equivalent to *The sun is shining*, *Sol est lucens*. In existential proposi-

tions, that is, those in which mere existence is predicated, the same holds good. For when I say *I am*, *Ego sum*, the *am* or *sum* has here a far higher and more emphatic import than that of the mere copula or link of connection, for it expresses *I am existing*, *Ego sum existens*."—(Krug.)

"What the word *copula* very inadequately denotes is the form of the relation between the subject and predicate of a judgment."—(P. 252.)

"It is only necessary further to observe that in the one process, to wit, in extension, the copula *is* means *is contained under*, whereas in the other it means *comprehends in*. Thus the proposition *God is merciful*, viewed in one quantity, signifies *God is contained under merciful*, that is, the notion *God* is contained under the notion *merciful*; viewed as in the other, means *God comprehends merciful*, that is, the notion *God* comprehends in it the notion *merciful*."—(P. 274.)

REMARKS.

1. The fact pointed out by Sir W. Hamilton, that Aristotle includes the so-called copula in the predicate, has not received from him or his followers the attention it merits; while most writers completely overlook it. What Aristotle says on the matter will be noticed later. But here I ask—How can Hamilton, knowing the prestige of Aristotle and his influence in so important a matter, go on calmly treating as a third element in propositions what he says Aristotle treats as part of the second, without showing how the latter is wrong or attempting to justify his own action?

2. Sir W. Hamilton first declares the copula to be "the relation of determination recognized as subsisting between the subject and the predicate." Afterwards he tells us the copula is "the *form* of the relation between the subject and predicate of a judgment." These statements stand in need

of explanation which Hamilton's lectures do not afford. In truth, unless one approaches Sir William's explanation of propositions with a clearer idea than that explanation gives of their true nature, it would be impossible to make out what he means, so vague are his expressions.

3. In the extract from Krug we read that sometimes the copula and predicate coalesce as in *Sol lucet*. How can things essentially different coalesce and yet remain what they were? There is another difficulty, not foreseen by either Krug or Hamilton. The coalescence in *lucet* is not of any copula and predicate, if we accept the verdict of philologists who teach that the termination added to the root *luc* is pronominal. The coalescence in *am* and *sum* is of the same kind, and other coalescence in the given verbs there is none. Even the German philologists fail to notice the bearing some of their discoveries have upon the current tripartite theory of propositions. That here alluded to is of itself enough to unsettle many of the logical and psychological speculations their countrymen so freely indulge in.

As to "substantive verbs" and "adjective verbs" and the "predication of mere existence," Sir W. Hamilton, like the German logician he quotes, with all due deference be it spoken, has apparently made little inquiry into the value of such expressions, which form part of the learned lumber bequeathed by remote ages to the present. The verb *is*, according to Professor Earle, received the title of "substantive verb" because it expresses the attribute of existence, which, as it were, stands under (*substat*) every other attribute. Let it then lose this meaning, as Krug and Hamilton allow it to do in such propositions as *Iron is magnetic*, and it forfeits the appellation which those writers give it in all cases! The truth is that, until grammar and logic are purged of all such incongruous terms as "substantive verb" and "adjective verb," they will never be in a healthy condition.

4. One would have thought Professor De Morgan has attributed enough spurious significations to the word *is* in its supposed character of copula in propositions. Yet here Sir W. Hamilton adds two which we look for in vain in the *Calculus of Inference*. The Scottish philosopher tells us that *is* means sometimes *is contained under*, at other times *comprehends in*. This by no means accords with Professor De Morgan's explanation, and is another instance of confusing what *is* of itself signifies with what, in conjunction with other words understood, it is commonly, but inaccurately, said to imply. If Hamilton be right in his interpretation of the little word, De Morgan has failed to get at "the few and easily understood senses requisite to be abstracted in studying inference;" for he gives neither of the above meanings.

Moreover, Sir W. Hamilton teaches that each proposition or judgment consists of only *two* concepts. But, if in *Iron is magnetic* the word *is* signifies *is contained under*, there would in the proposition be at least *three* concepts; for in the case supposed the notion of *being contained* enters into the copula itself! See Part I. p. 11 of this work.

5. It would not do to leave Sir W. Hamilton's explanation of the copula without showing pointedly how the bipartite nature of propositions conflicts with his celebrated theory of predicative quantification and the much-prized *New Analytic of Logical Forms*. In doing this I address myself specially to those who are familiar with the Hamiltonian logic.

Sir William in his *Lectures* professes to treat of "*thought as thought*." If the two words italicized be not altogether superfluous, the natural interpretation of the three would be *thought as it passes in the mind*. The best means of ascertaining how thoughts pass in the mind is through language in which they become, so to speak, photographed. Thousands of our thoughts pass through the mind in such forms as these—*Fish swim, Men think, Roses bloom*. Now

Sir W. Hamilton analyzes not thoughts of this kind, and so through the whole of his logic neglects to treat of thought as thought, that is, of thought as it passes in the mind in countless instances. He treats only of thoughts as they appear in that particular form of expression called "of the third adjacent," in which the word *is* occurs. The third adjacent Hamilton represents as *the* true form of thinking, whereas it is but *a* form of thinking. What right has the logician to set aside a real form of thought men commonly employ, substitute another for it, analyze that and build the theory of logical analysis thereon? Undertaking to analyze judgments, he treats of them in one form of expression only, and that not the most commonly employed. Even the form of judgments which he does treat he has not fully examined. Without a third element or copula in propositions Sir W. Hamilton's logic is erroneous and his analytic false. That such an element does not really exist has been proved already.

There are two other insuperable objections in the way of the Hamiltonian theory of predicative quantification. First, as shown in noticing Dean Mansel's explanation of propositions, the element of quantity does not enter into the predicates of many propositions, and quantification in such is impossible. Second, with regard to equations, as shown in dealing with Professor De Morgan, if every logical judgment were so contorted by periphrasis as to be brought into an equational form (which Hamilton regards as essential to his improved analytic), there would still be no surmounting this difficulty, that in every equation the thing asserted is the *equality* of one term to another, and therefore the idea of equality belongs to the predicate, and by no means could the sign of equality fairly represent any copula or third element standing between the subject and predicate, as Sir William would have it do.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE REV. J. BALMES.

THE writers heretofore noticed are all English-speaking ; but the tripartite theory has supporters in every land where logic has been cultivated as a science. One might make the tour of modern Europe and find everywhere similarly crude explanations of what is inexplicable. In Italy, Germany, France and Spain the tripartists at present reign supreme in the logical world ; and I here give the first specimen which presents itself to me of a European philosopher whose work appears in an English dress. The *Fundamental Philosophy* of the Rev. J. Balmes is introduced to the English and American public by Dr. O. A. Brownson, who in a preface, while giving the work by no means unqualified praise, recommends it as "well adapted to create a taste for solid studies." The merits of the work it is not my concern to dwell on ; but the indication of certain errors, which materially impair its *solidity*, and which have entirely escaped Dr. Brownson's notice, will throw more light on the question in hand. The *Fundamental Philosophy* consists of several books, of which the fifth is devoted to an explanation of the idea of being, on the development and analysis of which idea the whole work professedly depends. In Vol. II., p. 129, referring to the supposed copula in propositions, Mr. Balmes writes :—

"For the more thorough understanding of this matter it will be well to distinguish between the absolute and relative ideas of being, that is, between what is expressed by the word *being* when it designates reality, simple existence, and when it marks the union of a predicate and a subject. In the two following propositions we see very clearly the different meaning of the word *is*.—*Peter is*, and *Peter is*

good. In the former the word *is* designates the reality of Peter or his existence; in the latter it expresses the union of the predicate *good* with the subject *Peter*. In the former the verb *to be* is substantive, in the latter it is copulative. The substantive simply expresses the existence; the copulative a determination, a mode of existing. *The desk is* signifies the simple existence of the desk. *The desk is high* expresses a mode of being, *height*."

Here we have "absolute and relative ideas of being" or "substantive and copulative ideas of being." What does Mr. Balmes mean by these expressions? The absolute or substantive idea is explained as that of reality. But *is* does not express reality. When I say *Peter is* I assert only the existence of Peter, but whether the existence so predicated be real or imaginary there is nothing to show until a complement be supplied. In the instance given, I take Mr. Balmes to be speaking of an imaginary Peter, though he may have some real Peter in his mind's eye. Like Mr. Mill, the Spanish logician admits an ambiguity in the word *is*. Like Mill, he tells us the first meaning is that of existence; and, like the same author, Mr. Balmes is by no means lucid as regards the second meaning of the word. Above he says that *is*, when not expressing existence, "expresses the union of the predicate with the subject." At p. 131 he adds—"The verb *to be* when copulative expresses the relation of two ideas;" and this relation he explains as one "of identity." A relation of identity! This strikes me as a rather dubious expression. I am identical with myself. Am I related to myself? Identity excludes relationship, yet a *relation of identity* is a favourite phrase among logicians. How many other dubious "relations" the word *is* expresses Professor De Morgan has shown.

But though Mr. Balmes holds that *is* has a double meaning, he by no means allows that being and existence

are distinguishable. "So far," he says (p. 136) "is the idea of being itself susceptible of abstraction from the idea of existence, that it is rather the idea of existence itself. When we conceive of being in all its abstraction we conceive of nothing else than of existence: these two words denote one and the same idea." In the next page he adds—"I should be very much obliged to any one who would tell me to what the idea of being in general corresponds abstracted from existence." But this acknowledgment of the truth is again outweighed at p. 138, where for the second time he confuses the idea of *existence* with that of *reality*. "The idea of being," he there says, "is the very idea of existence, of realization." This is the same slip that Mr. Mill makes in taking the terms *existence* and *real existence* as always convertible. Logicians will remain in difficulties while they take such terms as interchangeable at pleasure. When people in common conversation say that such a thing does or does not exist, they understand the word *really*, or an equivalent. This they do for brevity and convenience, and this common ellipsis is an instance of those "secret ways of language," through not having become familiar with which many writers have paid a heavy penalty.

"How shall we make it understood," inquires Mr. Balmes at p. 128, "what we would express by the word being?" The best plan would be to give its synonyme and then leave it alone. Mr. Balmes himself tell us that the word is expressive of "the simplest idea possible," and that "the learned and ignorant alike continually employ it without shadow of confusion," which they certainly could not do unless they understood what is meant by it. Logicians are the only people who make difficulties about the word.

At p. 125 we read that the word *be* expressive of the idea of being is found in every language. With this

statement compare Mr. Wallace, as cited by Professor Earle in the *Philology of the English Tongue*, p. 272 :—

“As to such words as *to be*, it is impossible to get them in any savage language till you know how to converse in it, or have some intelligent interpreter who can do so. In most of the languages such extremely general words do not exist, and the attempt to get them through an ordinary interpreter would inevitably lead to error. . . . Even in such a comparatively high language as Malay, it is difficult to express *to be* in any of our senses, as the words used would express a number of other things as well, and only serve for *to be* by a roundabout process.”

Though it is hard to see how, even “when we are able to converse in a savage language,” we can find in it a word which does not therein exist—still this passage is enough to prevent rash statements about the existence of the verb *be* in all languages.

The last mistake of Mr. Balmes which I shall notice is at p. 160, where he says :—

“We cannot affirm or deny without saying *is* or *is not*.”

To this statement, which refutes itself, experience a hundred times daily gives a flat contradiction ; yet it is quite as true as the whole theory of the tripartite character of propositions.

CHAPTER XIV.

DR. BROWNSON.

AN instance of how the current theory of the structure of logical propositions has been the occasion of corrupting philosophy in several of the profoundest problems presented to the human intellect for solution or for contemplation may be found in *Brownson's Review* for January, 1854, in an article entitled *Schools of Philosophy*. In this article Dr. Brownson reviews the controversy between what he calls the ontological and the psychological schools of thought; and he attempts in the course of some thirty pages to give the pith and marrow of philosophy, so as after a manner to explain the harmonies of creation. His great aim is really to crush pantheism; but he can hardly be said to succeed.

Dr. Brownson, professedly following Gioberti, an Italian metaphysician, takes for his *primum philosophicum*, or first philosophical maxim, the formula *Being creates existences*, *Ens creat existentias*, by which he really means what might be much better expressed in the plain English—"God creates all things." Analyzing his philosophic formula, the American writer styles *Being* the subject, *existences* the predicate (!) and *creates* the copula; explaining this last as the *relation* of the first with the second term. Here there are at least two difficulties, besides the strange application of the technical terms of the ordinary logic. In the first place, as Dr. Brownson himself well puts it, "relation apart from the [things] related is inconceivable." Relationship, strictly speaking, does not exist *between* things but *in* them. We commonly speak of a relationship existing between father and son; but annihilate either of these and the relationship vanishes. Why then should the reviewer seek for a "copula, nexus or relation," as he calls it, *between* the

Creator and His creatures? This is not the way to crush pantheism.

Secondly, Dr. Brownson further explains the "copula, nexus or relation" as—"The creative act of God producing existences from nothing." But elsewhere he defines God in the phraseology of the Schoolmen, as *actus purissimus*. Here the distinction between the so-called subject and copula is lost, since both are represented as *acts*. Neither is this the way to crush pantheism; and into this position Dr. Brownson is led chiefly, it would seem, through adopting, as so many others have done, the current theory of the supposed copula in logical propositions. His mistaken analogy is this. As between the subject and predicate of a proposition there must be a copula or nexus expressing the relation between them, so in the *primum philosophicum* there must be three things, a subject representing the Creator, a predicate to stand for creation, and a nexus or copula expressing the relation between them!

It is curious that Dr. Brownson, who introduces Mr. Balmes to our notice in so favourable terms, should in regard to the idea of being (about which in philosophical works there are mountains of confusion) take up a position directly antagonistic to that of the Spanish philosopher. The latter, as we saw, speaks strongly regarding the identity of *being* and *existence*. Dr. Brownson teaches that these two words are by no means identical in their signification. He tells us it would be untrue for a man to say of himself *I am*, asserting that such a statement would be tantamount to an assumption of divinity on the part of man! *Being*, Dr. Brownson holds, in the strict sense of the word, is applicable to the Deity only; and he tells us that man cannot, philosophically speaking, say *I am*. He should say *I exist*. According to this acceptance of the words *am* and *exist*, works which maintain the *existence* of God would be so many supports of that pantheism which it is Dr. Brownson's aim to extinguish!

CHAPTER XV.

ARISTOTLE.

LET us see now what Aristotle says on the structure of propositions ; for it is possible some of the writers I differ from suppose that upon Aristotle, as their main support, they may fall back when their own outworks have been abandoned. Should this hope fail them, then *saute qui peut*. Those readers, who have waded through my examination of the ever-varying theory regarding the supposed third element or copula in propositions, will perceive that it would have been impossible to state a single and consistent exposition of this Protean phenomenon common to all the tripartists. All I could do was to take each one's explanation of the theory separately and prove its author's position untenable. No two of them agree completely—nay, no one of those I have dealt with (Morell, Crombie, Earle, Sullivan, Whately, Newman, Mill, Latham, Mason, Grote, Mansel, De Morgan, Hamilton, Balmes, or Brownson) agrees with himself, or has a consistent explanation of the supposed third element in propositions. All they agree to is accepting, tacitly or expressly, the current definition of the predicate as that which is asserted of the subject, and maintaining that there is a third element connecting the predicate with the subject. The writers referred to have all won names in literature. They are all either logicians, grammarians, philologists or philosophers of note ; and their opinion carries great weight. The structure of propositions, however, is not a matter of mere opinion ; and who knows not that when any man, or any number of men, take up a false position, neither genius nor scholarship is a sufficient support, and they are liable to many absurdities ? Nay, the greater the ingenuity of the

writer, the greater at times will be his mistakes. In treating of the different theories of these gentlemen, I claim to have shown them no disrespect. Had the passages cited for criticism been written by men of less celebrity, merit or influence, they would not have received so much notice. The theory of the copula deserves consideration, not for its own merits, since it has none, but on account of the reputation and influence of its supporters.

I have called the supposed third element a Protean phenomenon, and such in fact it is. Its expounders are perpetually shifting their ground, while obscurity of expression is its very life. They speak of a copula, and tell us that it is or consists of—

1. The word *is*,
2. The word *is* or the phrase *is not*,
3. Either *is* or *is not*, *are* or *are not*,
4. Any part of the verb *be* with or without *not*,
5. Any other auxiliary with or without some part of *be* and the adverb *not*,
6. Such verbs as *become*, *grow*, *seem*, *give*, *make*, *create*,
7. Almost any verb,
8. Any verb,
9. Sometimes no verb, but an inflection.
10. An abstract sign,
11. The sign of equality,
12. Something inexplicable wrapped up in the verb,
13. A subjective factor.

At an early stage of inquiry we hear only of one copula. Gradually, however, it begins to dawn on us that there is a variety of copulæ. Thus we read of—

1. A pure copula,
2. A mixed copula,
3. A logical copula,
4. A grammatical copula,
5. A mathematical copula.

Again, of the word *is* they say, first, that it is the copula, the pure copula ; secondly, that it is not the copula, but the sign of the copula ; then that it is a sign of predication ; then that there are two words *is*, one a pure copula, the other a genuine verb, a mixed copula. Some also hold that *is* is the only logical verb ; while others contend that it is no verb at all, and that the logical verb is something else.

Next, with regard to the *meaning* of *is*, they say first, that it signifies existence, and is thence called the substantive verb ; secondly, that it does not, when a copula, signify existence, but some other idea not specified ; yet still it remains a substantive verb. Then, we learn, that it means "simple" existence, "mere" existence, "pure" existence, "absolute" existence, "real" existence, "substantive" existence, "copulative" existence ; then that it does not signify existence at all, but that it expresses "affirmation," "mere affirmation," "pure affirmation," or "the closest possible approach to pure affirmation ;" finally, that frequently it has no signification "of its own," but that, to make up for this, it has an unlimited capacity for arrogating to itself the meaning of other words so as to be able to express any number of relations such as of identity, agreement, equality, conformity, possession, comprehension, extension, and a thousand others "easily apprehended."

After wrangling about the copula and the word *is*, the tripartists next fall out concerning the "incidence of the negative," that is, whether the adverb *not* belongs to the copula or predicate. Upon this question, amongst others, Mr. J. S. Mill and Dr. Latham are at issue ; and since it has been shown that what they call the copula is part and parcel of the predicate, strictly so called, it follows that the arguments on both sides are waste. Then too there is "the celebrated question of modality," of which this "incidence of the negative" is a portion, another stumbling block of

logicians springing out of the inexplicable relations of copula and predicate.

As to the predicate, they make this, first, by the current definition synonymous with the verb and all its complements; then, disregarding the definition, with some complement of the verb *is*; then with complements of other verbs, such as *becomes*, *tastes*, *strikes*, *comprehends*, &c. Indeed the term *predicate* becomes under their manipulation almost as elastic in its application as the term copula, so elastic in truth that to apply Mr. Mason's words when speaking of Becker's *Analysis*, "It would puzzle any one to deduce from their explanation a clear and satisfactory definition of the predicate in a proposition."

And for how much of all this confusion is Aristotle answerable? Here is a question of interest. Horne Tooke attributes the doctrine of the copula to Aristotle. Referring to Locke, he says in the *Diversions* (I. 41):—

"He evidently leaned towards the opinion of Aristotle, Scaliger and Messieurs de Port Royal, and therefore, without having sufficiently examined their position, he too hastily adopted their notion concerning the pretended copula *is* or *is not*."

It is strange that this passage, in which Horne Tooke speaks of the "pretended copula," has not attracted notice. Its very isolation renders it the more deserving of comment. It is the only allusion made to the copula throughout the *Diversions of Purley*, and it is but a passing allusion. Consider, however, the import of the quotation. What Locke, Scaliger and the logicians of Port Royal say on the matter, I do not here concern myself with. But with Aristotle it is different. There can be no mistaking what Mr. Tooke implies. He evidently means that Aristotle is a tripartist. Is such the case? It may be proved conclusively that he is not, and that Horne Tooke's allegation, so far as he is concerned, is not well founded.

In the first place, throughout the extant works of this great master of intellect the word "*copula*," or any Greek equivalent, is "conspicuous by its absence." Who invented the term is a secondary question to be decided by antiquarian research. Strange that Aristotle, with whom it has been said logic began and ended, makes no mention by name of the third element indispensable for the structure of propositions. He mentions the noun and verb, representing the subject and predicate, but not the copula. His commentators, it is true, and his translators, divide his works into chapters and paragraphs, labelling and annotating these at pleasure. And so we find Mr. Owen, for example, in his translation of the *Organon*, in many respects so admirably done, heading chapter x. of the Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας in English thus:—"Of opposition with the addition of the copula." But there is no warrant for this, and the tripartists will search in vain for any mention of a third element in the writings of the first logician.

There is that, however, in the *Organon* which positively excludes the copula; and there are several things in Mr. Owen's version which, duly weighed, might have shaken his trust in the tripartite theory. Take for instance these words:—

"But when *is* is additionally predicated as the third thing, then the oppositions are enunciated doubly."

If in the proposition *Man is just*, *is* is predicated at all, then this word forms part of the predicate. But the tripartists make it stand *between* the subject and predicate, and by no means admit that it is itself predicated in such propositions. It will be observed therefore that, far from having Aristotle with them, he vindicates the position taken up in the foregoing system of Syntactical Analysis. I do not, be it understood, appeal to Aristotle as an authority. I refer to him merely to show how untenable is the position

of many of his interpreters, and how baseless the allegation of Horne Tooke that Aristotle is a tripartist.

The passage cited above is not the only one that may be given in favour of the theory which, before consulting the *Organon*, I supposed new; but which a reference to that work compels me to call old—older indeed than the tripartite teaching. In chapter v. of Mr. Owen's version we read:—

“It is necessary, however, that every enunciative sentence should be from a verb or from the case of a verb, for the definition of *man* unless *is* or *was* or *will be*, or something of the same kind be added, is not yet an enunciative sentence.”

Here it is clearly implied that the noun *man* with *is* or *was* or *will be* does form an enunciative or assertive sentence, that is, a logical proposition in which there is a predication, and in which the predicate can be neither more nor less than what Mr. Owen and the tripartists style the copula. The same translator, summarizing this passage, writes:—

“Cases of the noun differ from it that being joined to the copula they signify neither truth nor falsehood.”

So then the noun with the copula does signify truth or falsehood, that is, the so-called copula is a predicate!

Aristotle's explanation of the word *term* also would appear to have escaped the notice it deserves, and from misconstruction of it may have originated the tripartite theory. In the *Prior Analytics* we read:—

“I call that a *term* into which a proposition is resolved, as for instance the predicate and that of which it is predicated whether *to be* or *not to be* be added or separated.

“Ὅρον δὲ καλῶ εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις, οἷον τό τε κατηγορουμένον καὶ τὸ καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται, ἢ προστιθέμενον ἢ διαιρουμένου τοῦ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.

According to this a proposition consists of two parts. The Aristotelic use of the word *term* is perfectly intelligible as explained by Aristotle. The common application of the word *predicate* to a mere complement of the verb is elliptical, and becomes mischievous when regarded as full and exact. When we say *Socrates is just*, logicians tell us we predicate *just* of Socrates ; but it would be wrong to speak so unless we meant *just* to signify *being just*, and so what they style the copula is evidently part and parcel of the predicate. The word *just* not being a verb cannot be used as a predicate, strictly so called. On this account we are compelled to adopt a periphrasis by predicating Socrates being first, and then we modify the assertion thus formed by the adjective complement *just*. With verbs we can predicate immediately, *e.g.* *Fish swim* ; but with adjectives in good English we cannot. In children's prattle and in such broken English as Negroes and Chinamen often speak, many words are improperly employed as verbs which are not recognized as such in that polite usage which grammarians and logicians are supposed to cultivate. The child, as we are told by Dr. Latham, says *Sun bright*, and *Fire burn*, and is understood. In the former of these expressions the child makes a verb of what grown people use as an adjective, and, in the second, leaves out the inflection of the third person singular, with the same disregard of grammatical conventionalities as he displays for other forms of educated custom. In all this there is no mystery. Aristotle is not here to explain his teaching ; but, though it needs explanation and much improvement in many parts, we should not lay the misapprehensions of others at his door. Whatever may be his shortcomings in regard to nouns and verbs, which result from an oversight on his part of the need there is to class words according to a fixed principle, still he does not commit himself to such a position as that of Dr. Sullivan, who tells us that propositions consist of *three* parts because

we can resolve them into *two* ; nor to that of Dr. Latham, who maintains that *two* parts are sometimes *three*. Nor, in fine, does he build any mistaken theories on the presumed existence of a third element in propositions. Here then we see the last hope of the tripartists fail. On Aristotle they may not lean for support, even on the supposition that the *Organon*, as we have it, is really Aristotle's work, a circumstance regarding which critics are not agreed.

CHAPTER XVI.

AQUINAS.

At this point the thought occurs—May I not have misinterpreted the *Organon*? To solve this doubt I turn over a volume of neglected lore written by a commentator of a bygone age on the works of the Hellenic master-mind, who still exerts so potent an influence over the intellect of the civilized world. Aquinas is commonly referred to as the representative of the Schoolmen, to the minimum of whose faults he adds the maximum of their merits. In his *Commentaria* on Aristotle I find what I have in vain looked for in many other works—an enunciation of the bipartite theory of propositions, and a distinct rejection of the tripartite, though the accompanying explanation is not all that could be desired.

In the *Commentaria* of Aquinas (I. 40) I find his remarks on the following lines of Aristotle :—

“Ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἔστι τρίτον προσκατηγορῇται, ἤδη διχῶς λέγονται αἱ ἀντιθέσεις. Λέγω δὲ ὅλον ἔστι δίκαιος ἄνθρωπος· τὸ ἔστι τρίτον φημὶ συγχέσθαι ὄνομα ἢ ῥῆμα ἐν τῇ καταφάσει.

Mr. Owen's Translation.

“But when *is* is additionally predicated as the third thing, then the oppositions are enunciated doubly; I say for instance *A man is just*, here the word *is*, I say, is placed as a third thing, whether noun or verb, in the affirmation.”

The Old Latin Version

(On which Aquinas comments).

“Quando autem est tertium adjacens proedicatur, dupliciter tunc dicuntur oppositiones. Dico autem ut, est

justus homo, *est*, tertium adjacere nomen vel verbum in affirmatione."

The Comment of Aquinas.

"Circa primum duo oportet intelligere. Primo quidem quid est hoc quod dicit, *est* tertium adjacens praedicatur. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod quandoque in enunciatione praedicatur *est* secundum, sicut cum dicitur, Socrates est; per quod nihil aliud intendimus significare, quam quod Socrates est in rerum natura. Quandoque vero non praedicatur per se quasi principale praedicatum, sed quasi conjunctum principali praedicato ad connectendum ipsum subjecto; sicut cum dicitur, Socrates est albus, non est intentio loquentis ut asserat Socratem esse in rerum natura: sed ut attribuat ei albedinem mediante hoc verbo *est*; et ideo in talibus *est* praedicatur ut adjacens principali praedicato. Et non dicitur esse tertium, quia sit tertium praedicatum; sed quia est tertia dictio posita in enunciatione, quae simul cum nomine praedicato facit unum praedicatum. *Ut sic enuntiatio dividatur in duas partes et non in tres.*"

Translation.

"About the first it is necessary to understand two things: first indeed what this is that he says '*Is* is predicated as a third adjacent?' For the elucidation of which we must consider, that sometimes in a statement *is* is predicated as a second, as when it is said *Socrates is*; by which we intend to signify nothing else than that Socrates is in the nature of things. But sometimes it is not predicated by itself as the chief thing predicated, but as though conjoined with the chief thing predicated to connect it with the subject; as when it is said *Socrates is white*, it is not the intention of the speaker to assert that Socrates is in the nature of things; but that he may attribute to him white-

ness through the medium of this word *is* : and so in such [propositions] *is* is predicated adjacent to the chief thing predicated. And it is not said to be a third, as if it were a third thing *predicated*, but because it is a third *expression* placed in the statement, which together with the name predicated makes one predicate. *So that the enunciation is divided into two parts and not into three.*"

Of all the exponents of the philosophy of the Middle Ages there is none who at the present day has so many ardent admirers as Aquinas ; yet it would appear that these admirers study his writings very little. The above remarkable passage has escaped the notice of most, if not all, modern logicians. Aquinas seems to be a most luminous and faithful interpreter ; but the idea that the text on which he comments is not, or may not have been, written by Aristotle does not appear to have crossed his mind. Moreover, so devoted is he to the great master, that he exhibits a marked leaning to defend his errors, or make out a case for Aristotle where none exists. And though, in the concluding words quoted, the true theory of the structure of propositions is distinctly indicated, immediately below Aquinas speaks, without explanation, of the word *est* ambiguously as "a sign of predication." As the point is one of great importance, I repeat that the word *is* can be called a sign of predication only in so far as all verbs are signs and in the assertive mood predicate. *Is* is a sign of predication in that it predicates being or existence, and in no other way. Passing by the want of such an explanation in the *Commentaria*, and allowing for the ambiguity of *προσκατηγορήται*, which Mr. Owen renders—"is predicated additionally," and which Aquinas accepts as *adjacens prae-dicatur*, little could here be desired except a distinct appreciation of the difference between what the word *is* expresses and what, according to the speaker's intent, in conjunction

with other words understood, it is commonly said to imply. *Is* does not of itself signify *is in the nature of things as before explained.*

With Aquinas then I regard the whole theory of the copula as not attributable to the writer of the *Organon*, but as a later invention. The single fact that the writer of the treatises going by the name of *Organon* speaks of *εστι* as a "noun or verb," *ὄνομα ἢ ῥημα*, shows that the question of the structure of propositions was left by him in a most unsatisfactory state. Having no definite principle for word-classing, Aristotle, or whoever else wrote the work alluded to, plays fast and loose with the parts of speech; and from this practice modern writers do not refrain, though the utmost confusion, even in the higher regions of philosophy, results from it, as we have seen in the preceding chapters.

Of Aquinas two things in conclusion may be noted additionally to what has been said. First, he points out, what Mr. J. S. Mill supposed his father was the first to notice, the supposed ambiguity of the word *is*. Second, Aquinas, though without the advantages which Comparative Grammar has placed at the disposal of modern writers, comes nearer to the true teaching of Philology in regard to the nature of verbal terminations than any other of the writers I have quoted on the structure of propositions. Thus, in the *Commentaria* (I. p. 11) he refers "the variation made through the number and person of verbs" to the subject; and philologists teach us most final letters of verbs in Latin, as in many languages, are fragments of pronouns once acting as subjects to those verbs to which they became affixed, losing by this process their individuality. Not holding the theory of the copula, Aquinas had an instinctively clearer notion on this head than many recent philosophers, who still invent year after year new explanations of an untenable theory, which bears a *prima facie*

evidence of unsoundness, and which was a disgrace to the Middle Ages. The tripartite doctrine flourished for generations before the birth of Comparative Grammar, but, with the continued cultivation of that science, it cannot long survive.

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GRAMMAR AND LOGIC IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

BY J. W. F. ROGERS,

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"Mr. Rogers's book is not a grammar in the ordinary sense of the word, nor is it a treatise on logic, though it deals largely with both. The work is an attempt to show that the study of grammar is hampered by the accumulated errors of centuries, and that logic is equally in an unsatisfactory state. But why, it may be asked, are the two subjects dealt with in one work? Because the subjects are very closely connected with each other, being so kindred, in fact, that a system of the one to be sound must be based on a sound system of the other. Logical propositions, for instance, form a species of sentence. It is impossible, therefore, to have a thoroughly clear view of the nature of propositions without a just apprehension of the nature of sentences. With regard to word-classing, too, which logicians and grammarians claim as common ground, a settlement of the principles on which words are to be classified is essential to a satisfactory treatment of sentences. Word-classing, the nature of sentences and the nature of propositions—these are just the three topics to the elucidation of which Mr. Rogers limits his efforts.

"Word-classing being admitted to be the very foundation of grammar, it might be thought that grammarians would have instituted a strict inquiry for the principle upon which this foundation should be laid. Strange to say, grammarians, even those of the

highest repute, have failed egregiously in regard to this point. Not that they have overlooked it altogether; but different writers have put forward different principles; hence confusion, and hence, too, difficulties apparently insurmountable. Dr. Morell, for instance, settles the parts of speech first, and then looks about for principles on which to class them. Pupils who have to use his grammar as a text-book know to their cost that his classification is 'a tangled skein of incongruities.' Dr. Crombie would have words classified agreeably to their import or the offices they perform, thus introducing two principles of classification, one of which is clearly incompatible with the object in view. Words cannot be classed by their import, for if so there would be, as our author remarks, thousands of classes, and the principle so interpreted would not lead to the parts of speech. Its product would not be a grammar, but a dictionary or a thesaurus, in which words with the same or similar meanings would be grouped together under various categories. Dr. Sullivan, in his *Attempt to Simplify English Grammar*, comes very near to the distinct announcement of the true principle, for he says, 'the same word may, just as it is used, be a noun, an adjective, or in fact any part of speech.' But then, having enunciated this guiding principle, he immediately loses sight of it, and declares for the classification of words according to their meaning. Dr. Sullivan is thus in the same boat with Dr. Crombie, who, as we have seen, confuses the use or function of a word with its signification. Our author simplifies the matter at once by seeking in usage, and in usage alone, a satisfactory principle for classification. 'Usage,' he observes, 'being the basis of all grammar, whatever grammatical rules are to be established must be grounded thereon.' This, then, gives the rule by which words in all tongues should be classed. We have an exemplification in the fact that many words are nouns, verbs, or adjectives according to their employment, as in a *calm day*, where the word *calm* is an adjective; *there came a great calm*, where it is a noun; *calm your temper*, where it is a verb.

"Our limits forbid us to follow Mr. Rogers throughout his application of the principle laid down to all the parts of speech; but some reference may be made as to the result arrived at in its application to the verb. Mr. Rogers finds it necessary to impugn the various definitions of the verb given by the authorities. Crombie, for instance, Morell, Latham, and others hold the essence of the verb to consist in affirmation or assertion. Mr. Rogers points out how incomplete the definition is; verbs being used for

other purposes besides assertion, such as to inquire, advise, command and express a wish. Quoting Cobbett's definition to the effect that 'Verbs are a sort of words, the use of which is to express the actions, the movements, and the state of being of all creatures, whether animate or inanimate;' our author remarks that though it sounds comprehensive it does not satisfy. Verbs, as he says truly, are employed not only to express actions, movements, or states, but also, as already stated, to command and interrogate; and, moreover, many words not verbs express actions, movements, and states of being, such as the nouns *cut*, *run*, *sleep*; and not only may nouns, but adjectives, as we find, and even adverbs and prepositions, express or imply action—*e.g.*, *swift*, *swiftly*, *from*, *towards*. The expression of action, then, is not a peculiar characteristic of the verb. Our author's definition is so simple, so plain, that while some will ask, 'Why did we not see this before?' others will say, 'Everybody knew it.' It is this:—'A verb is a word which with a noun, or equivalent, forms a sentence.' A second definition is given having regard to the different moods of the verb. It is as follows:—'A verb is a word which, with a noun, or equivalent, expresses either a direct or indirect assertion, a command, request, or entreaty, an inquiry, a wish, or a condition.' This description neither limits the verb to the mere assertion of being, doing, or suffering, nor does it exclude the verb *be*, while it includes the verbs in every sentence man is capable of forming, at least in the English language. At the same time, as will be perceived, the description makes no provision for what grammarians are in the habit of calling the infinitive mood. With regard to this point our author remarks that infinitives are not verbs, and he concurs with Dr. Crombie and Dr. Morell in regarding the infinitive as a noun; but at the same time he is compelled to charge them with inconsistency for calling it a verb in spite of their contention to the contrary. All the other parts of speech are classified and defined on the same principle—*i.e.*, according to their uses. Untenable and useless definitions are thus swept away, and with them many of the differences and errors of grammatical writers; and the result of this attempt to simplify and systematize this part of grammar is upon the whole such as to show that there is no necessity whatever for that perplexity which has hitherto attached to the subject.

"Having disposed thus satisfactorily of word-classing, Mr. Rogers proceeds to the second topic which he undertook to consider—*viz.*, the nature of sentences. Here he has to examine the different kinds

of sentences—assertive, interrogative, imperative, and optative ; also, the elements of sentences, first the essential elements, viz., subject and predicate, and next, the subsidiary elements, called here enlargements and complements. Having thus disposed of the elements of sentences, he has in the next place to deal with syntax, or order in which they stand in sentences. We have no hesitation in saying that Mr. Rogers's simplified analytical system—for an exposition of which we must refer the reader to his pages—will be found a most valuable aid not only in grappling with the difficulties met in the study of the English language and in detecting errors ; but also in giving an insight into the nature of language in general, and in conducing to the quicker acquisition of foreign languages.

"The third and last topic is the nature of propositions, to the consideration of which, though pertaining to logic, Mr. Rogers is naturally led by his system of Syntactical Analysis. For in his system the verb and the grammatical predicate are considered as synonymous, and the expressions treated throughout as convertible terms. That is to say, he rejects the current theory that propositions consist of three parts—subject, predicate, and copula. He holds that there are but two parts, subject and predicate ; and accordingly he sweeps away the copula as a mere myth—a fabrication of grammarians and logicians. To establish his position, Mr. Rogers examines the teachings of Morell, Crombie, Earle, Sullivan, Latham, Whateley, J. H. Newman, J. S. Mill, Hobbes, Mansel, De Morgan, Sir W. Hamilton, and others. Some of these authorities named are of the highest mark in philosophic inquiry, but be their mark high or low he succeeds in showing them to be wrong on this point. Some of them are ludicrously wrong. They seem to have been blindly following each other, having somehow got the impression that they were all following Aristotle. But Mr. Rogers is able to quote Aristotle in proof that for all the confusion they have introduced into the question the great Stagirite is not responsible at all. The exposure is very cleverly done, and both logicians and grammarians will in future have to take it into account. The whole work, indeed, is cleverly written, every idea being clearly thought out and clearly expressed. Many are the errors exposed, many are the difficulties got rid of, and many the points placed in a conspicuous light which before were in Cimmerian gloom. With all the simplification thus effected it is not too much to hope that grammar will in future be learned in half the time usually spent on it.—*Age*.

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PUBLISHERS :

London : Trübner and Co.

Australia : George Robertson and Co. Limited.

Crown 8vo, price 7s. 6d.

